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A perfection of means and confusion of aims seems to be our main problem. 
 
Albert Einstein 
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Abstract 
This study explores factors that can influence attempts by DOD organizations to 
change their internal processes or policies. When one considers how widespread 
attempts to change organizations are and the reported massive 70% failure rate (Kotter, 
1995), the subject definitely deserves attention and research. Already a large number of 
studies with scholars from different specialties have been undertaken trying to 
understand the process. Yet, most of the empirical work is descriptive limiting our 
knowledge of the causal relationships that can make change efforts succeed or fail. 
Due to its miserable implementation, the change process could have been 
abandoned as ineffective; but it is not up to individual employees to decide if it will take 
place. The transformation is being forced upon every organization in the market or in 
public sector environments, regardless of its origin, mission or any other factor. A 
combination of various (more or less) external changes literally brings organizations to 
their knees facing only two options: adaptation or extinction. 
This is where uncovering ways to improve the effectiveness of change process 
will prove to be invaluable. Without this knowledge, there will be many companies that 
may fail. Among those at risk, there are many for which termination would be 
catastrophic. Organizations that play such a critical role where failure is not an option 
are primarily in the public sector, although recently federal government activities taking 
over major domestic automobile manufacturers such as General Motors suggest that 
private organizations may be too large to fail as well. Ensuring the existence of some 
organizations like the Department of Defense’s is especially vital. 
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Unfortunately, most of the research targeting the subject of change has been 
carried out on private companies. This may be because they were the first to experience 
and endure it. It can also be because they are much easier to access for researchers than 
are public institutions. Military organizations, which comprise 3.5% to 7% of GDP 
(Chantrill, 2010) nearly 20% (Congressional Budget Office, 2008) of the funding for 
the federal government and account for 34.15% of all federal employees (United States 
Department of Labor, 2010) are among the least studied organizations. This research 
focuses on change efforts undertaken in organizations in the U.S. Department of 
Defense to address this gap in our knowledge. 
Considering how critical the efficacy of Department of Defense is, there is no 
doubt that every effort should be taken to ensure that personnel in this sector are 
provided with solid knowledge of transformation in order to carry out the change 
process successfully. Organizational change and development and leadership literatures 
were the main sources of information about how to manage change efforts used for this 
research. Combined they supply us with a description of its nature and the ways to 
manage it. 
The study design is a meta-analysis using existing research studies contained in 
the Center for Army Lessons Learned, an institutional repository for data from a variety 
of sources. This collection of information is gathered, analyzed, and disseminated in 
order to serve as a lesson learned for military commanders, staff, and students. The 
examination of change efforts undertaken within the past 30 years in the DOD 
conducted for this dissertation research is one of many examples demonstrating how the 
collected data is used. Information that formed the data set for this study was collected 
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from a sample of 75 of the 183 case studies available through this electronic repository. 
A grounded theory review of the cases was conducted in order to identify factors that 
influence change processes. The presence or absence of these was established using 
qualitative coding methodology. Through a combination of inductive and deductive 
testing, a better understanding of key variables (leadership, people) has been gained and 
a causal model suggested describing the relationships between key variables and the 
effectiveness of organizational change efforts.  
The analysis presents four main research finding. First, I have identified 
common factors affecting change processes in DOD. These factors are quite similar to 
those reported in the empirical research on private and public organizations. This leads 
me to reject the hypothesis that the DOD is unique in their change efforts and that a 
generic theory of organizational change can be reasonably applied. Second, the role of 
the leader is quite important to DOD change efforts with evidence that a 
transformational leader is often the one in the position of leadership to manage a 
successful transformation of barriers into change enhancers. A third finding is that the 
even mix of barriers and enhancers or cases where there are more enhancers than 
barriers is more likely to allow change to continue and yield positive results. The 
opposite is true, if there are too many barriers, the change effort becomes stalled. 
Finally, while we cannot say with any certainty how barriers are transformed into 
enhancers, we can draw initial conclusions that this process will only occur when the 
barriers are explicitly identified and a problem set based on the situation is developed. 
The transformation can take many forms, similar to what could be expected from 
contingency and situational leadership theories. 
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With the foundation of these four findings, I build a model that includes the 
variables observed to be the most common in the DOD. The model explicitly identifies 
the interactive process between the environment and the factors and where successful, 
the enhancers to the change process that are fed back out into the environment. This 
model suggests a learning process that can be iterative but that also acknowledges the 
dynamic role of the environment as a potential barrier or a potential enhancer at 
different times or points in the change process. While the limitations of meta-analysis 
prevent me from definitively describing a regularly used DOD approach to handle 
barriers and how they are identified and transformed into enhancers, it is clear from the 
case coding that some type of turning point is in evidence when change is moved 
forward and tends towards the desired success. The majority of the factors do not differ 
from those identified in the academic literature; however, an argument is made that their 
application in the military setting is not unique. This conclusion is not sufficiently 
documented in existing empirical studies, and not currently described in the literature. 
The concept of managing them is not entirely new either, but seems to have been 
abandoned by practitioners and theorists in the search of innovative techniques.  
The key contribution to the literature comes from discovering the factors’ nature 
and from documenting the way they were managed by the DOD personnel. In spite of 
unique military environment, the method they commonly used can be successfully 
employed in every sector and company, and able to embrace a variety of possible 
factors that may emerge. Taking into consideration this flexibility of the identified 
technique, it should prove very valuable to people across various industries struggling 
with ubiquitous change and its challenges. 
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Chapter One: Research Study Introduction and Overview 
On Monday morning, September 10, 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld delivered a speech opening the Department of Defense (DOD) Acquisition 
and Logistics Excellence Week. In this oratory he officially named many of the 
system’s features (overwhelming bureaucracy, lack of freedom to perform, inflexibility, 
existing in past era etc) as drawbacks that needed to be urgently reformed in order to 
ensure safety to the American people (Rumsfeld, 2001). He felt it necessary to explain 
why he was “violating” (as it was perceived) the established system: “Some might ask, 
how in the world could the Secretary of Defense attack the Pentagon in front of its 
people? To them I reply I have no desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate it.” 
(n. p.). 
There is no way of knowing how successful he would be with his reform, 
although it can be easily assumed that he would have faced a lot of resistance. What is 
notable about this speech is the astonishing coincidence that he gave this “if it ain’t 
broken, fix it” speech less than 24 hours before the unthinkable events of September 
11th happened. As the days went by, it became painfully obvious how all the systems’ 
weaknesses led to catastrophic misinterpretation, and inability to deal with a threat. The 
points Rumsfeld brought up in his speech were all of the sudden completely understood 
and logical. Moreover, people were absolutely stunned at how unaware uninformed? 
ignorant?) the staff and management of these systems have been, to let these flaws go 
unnoticed and erode into such a disastrous payback. The perceived grossly exaggerated 
Rumsfeld plan of the day before September 11th emerged as a “too little-too late” well 
intentioned wish list. Realizing the tremendous importance of the military’s ability to 
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acknowledge weaknesses and immediately acting upon them came at a horrendous cost.  
It took a long time for the top DOD leadership to recognize systemic flaws and 
decide that the entire organization needed to be transformed. Continuous improvement 
of seemingly minor things (that were probably perceived as natural) would probably 
result in smooth and mild ongoing transformation instead of now forced, major and 
drastic changes to every layer of this complex system. Staff and middle management, 
obligated by bureaucratic rules, did not have the luxury of adjusting the problems or 
even raising concerns, thus they preceded coping with them. The Pentagon machinery, 
together with many old-fashioned leaders, kept ignoring the growing gap between the 
environment and the operations of the DOD. It took a top politician, not worried about 
risking his position to challenge the stiff commanders and openly state the obvious, to 
bring the need for change to the surface and invite a critical re-examination of how the 
organization could offer what was needed and what could be gained through extensive 
change efforts. 
A variety of factors may play a role in an organizational change depending on 
the situation, but it is usually up to the leader to initiate the change process and the ways 
it will be carried out. In fact, there is a large body of normative literature and empirical 
research that explores the factors that can influence change efforts. Many of these works 
identify factors that affect organizational change processes. While many factors have 
been well-established for private and public organizations (i.e. leadership style, 
structure, culture, etc), this study aims to examine specifically DOD organizations 
searching for patterns where the factors may be slightly different or entirely unknown to 
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academic literature due to the particular nature of work.  
The factors most often mentioned by the literature as affecting change processes 
are communication, organizational culture and structure, team work (Organizational 
Behavior), people and leader (Leadership), work organization, economic reasons for 
change (Management, Business, and Economics). All these and many others surface 
very often during transitions, but one has a special feature: leader – put in charge to 
control and shape the rest of them. Hence, the role of leadership should be taken into 
special consideration while studying organizational change efforts. 
Anecdotally, there are many reasons to suspect that change efforts in DOD 
organizations may be different from those in other types of organizations. One reason to 
expect a difference is that organizations in the DOD area have far less flexibility in 
performance and usually have more restricted access to funds than private companies 
have. That suggests that personnel in charge of change implementation will try to find 
effective solutions within strict regulations and budget. If one cannot rely on free 
thought and / or money then to what does one turn…? This is exactly the goal of this 
study – to detect what factors the military commanders lean on while transforming their 
units or brigades under so many restrictions. 
 A second source of differences in DOD organizations is that many times they 
operate within old and law-regulated structures, chains of command, specific ways of 
working, and tones of other procedures and policies. While many civilian leaders are 
free to adjust things like their communicating strategies, or reorganize what is not 
working, military commanders are heavily restricted on picking up an idea and applying 
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it to their units. If it is not along established procedures, then it will not be accepted. 
After all defense of the country is intended to be heavily controlled and not a subject to 
a trial and error form of management. Thus, academic theories are less helpful to junior 
and mid-management in DOD constrained within a command and control hierarchy 
where uniformity and compliance with order is valued. Even the top commanders are 
restricted unless given specific authority to change; and even these changes still have to 
be approved by politicians such as the chief executive and congress. 
The leaders of DOD do not have a wide choice of incentives for rewarding and 
motivating (or punishing) the employees the way private sector leaders do. Monetary or 
fringe benefits are specified and not a subject of choice for DOD supervisors. Well then, 
without these resources how does one handle resistance to change or provide motivators 
to implement it? While civilian freedom of organizing is beyond limit, the military often 
does not have that same luxury. There have been gains in this area, however, officers 
are increasingly taught people-oriented approaches, which makes a tremendous 
difference in obtaining subordinates’ cooperation and is suspected to be vital for 
successful change efforts. 
The switch is recent, hence there are still many old-school top officers believing 
in “order” system and considering solely their own opinion – thus keeping new 
approaches from being considered and approved to use and remaining a major obstacle 
to transformation. DOD does not authorize leaders to fire insubordinate staff (which is a 
significant tool for effectiveness in civilian world). The potential for this to backfire can 
be high when considering “toxic leaders” (Hull, 1998) who akcnowledge only what is 
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orderdered upon them from above. 
Quite often, DOD organizations, leaders, and workers are subject to political 
pressures instead of having the ability to rely on common sense reasoning. In many 
cases, changing political leaders, who either do not have enough insight and experience 
to understand DOD situation or have conflicting political agenda, significantly delay 
and harm ongoing transformation processes. As well, change may be different because 
of term and leadership changes. The chain of command from the very top to the 
operating levels of the organization can become severely twisted by law and politicians 
who make decisions, and then make military commanders responsible for implementing 
it (Scott, 2006). Having external decision makers who do not face the consequences and 
internal leaders bearing the burden of someone else’s choices is difficult in any 
organization. Many valuable, experienced commanders retire at the point where they 
are unwilling to bear the responsibilities of ineffective national defense policies set by 
people outside of the organization. Those who stay usually pass the stress of 
implementing questionable decisions on to the lower echelons of the organization, 
spinning the vicious cycle of “order-done-no matter how odd” atmosphere and wasting 
time and resources on ill-suited proceedings. 
If such decisions were regarding a color of furniture or lunchtime rules, it would 
not hurt anybody. But, if decisions are created in such manner regarding national 
security and its current transformation, it poses danger to all of us. Thus, the common 
forums for a federal employee are to be a whistle blower against the politician or to 
retire. Had the need for transformation been better understood a few decades ago, 
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national security agencies may have prevented a lot of tragedy. 
 An additional distinct feature of DOD organization is that the overwhelming 
majority of employees is exposed to danger and risk their health and life on an everyday 
basis. These employees already put a lot on the line. If transformation is not perceived 
as beneficial in at least some aspects, they have strong motivation to oppose it, 
especially when they technically cannot be fired for it. Again, the leader is often the one 
to do something about it. In DOD, it is not only about his/her skills, but also about how 
much power they have to put the transformation efforts on the correct track. 
Based on these differences, it seems reasonable to expect that organizational 
change efforts in DOD organizations may be much more difficult to implement. That 
means the DOD leaders may have to come up with their own DOD-customized way of 
executing transformation. If this assumption is correct, then it is important to study 
change efforts in DOD organizations to make our knowledge more comprehensive and 
our theories more robust. To this end, this study seeks to answer four main research 
questions aiming at the DOD change. 
Research Questions 
Research Question #1: Are the factors commonly identified in the 
organizational change and leadership literature similar to those affecting organizational 
change in DOD? 
Based on the similarity or dissimilarity of identified factors we will be able to 
assume the applicability of academic theories regarding transformation to the military 
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settings. 
 Research Question #2: What is the position of the leader factor in DOD 
transition? 
In light of decisions and directives imposed upon DOD organizations by the 
external environment and political actors, combined with constraints on personnel 
management, the position of the leader factor in DOD needs to be more closely 
examined. 
Research Question #3: Are there factors specific to DOD organizations that 
influence organization change efforts that are not identified in studies of “regular” 
public/private companies?  
If there are unrecognized factors that make a difference while implementing 
transition in difficult DOD settings, their identification should bring considerable 
benefits to civilian reforms that occur in a less severe background.  
Research Question # 4: What are the causal relationships between factors that 
influence DOD organization change efforts? 
Elucidating how these factors separately, and in combination, influence 
organization change in this unique environment can help other “regular” companies as 
well. And, that was the whole purpose of this project. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
In Chapter Two, I review the literature on organizational change and 
development and leadership to establish the key factors that can influence 
organizational change efforts. Chapter Three provides a review of scholarly and 
professional literature describing change efforts in DOD organizations to set the stage 
for a comparison between generic theories of organization and knowledge related 
specifically to change efforts in military organizations. This is the gap in the literature 
that this study seeks to address. The research methodology is described in Chapter Four, 
followed by the analysis of the variables in the study in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six, 
the results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis through three different stages 
are presented and the findings from this analysis are discussed. The research questions 
are answered in Chapter Seven and these results are compared to existing literature. The 
dissertation ends with some reflective thoughts on the study’s purpose and how the 
results can inform the scholarly literature as well as practitioners in the military as well 
as other sectors. Avenues for future research are also described. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The subject of change has been studied widely by scholars from variety of 
fields. Scholars in the disciplines of psychiatry, psychology, and anthropology were 
among the first to study the topic of change. Later, researchers in sociology and 
economics began to explore the topics. The most disciplines to join this research 
endeavor are from the disciplines of organizational behavior, business, and leadership. 
From this record, one can conclude that change is examined at many different levels, 
i.e., individual, organizational, and systemic institutions. In fact, there is a criticism 
(Poole and Van de Ven, 2004) that the research regarding change is daunting, and runs 
in all kinds of directions without a unifying framework.   
Experts on organizational behavior, management and leadership heavily 
emphasize the role of the leader in the change process. The leader should be the one to 
recognize the need for transition, envision the outcome of it, settle on the ways it will be 
implemented and most of all communicate it to the employees to get their buy-in and 
cooperation. Change, even though is very often forced on the organization, will very 
seldom implement itself as a consequence of that external force. Thus, the leader is the 
one to recognize it and set its tone, direction, and means. The outcome very often 
depends on the chosen ways of implementation, making the leader’s perception, 
abilities and choices critical to the overall process. Therefore, this chapter will review 
literature regarding organizational change and leadership. The organizational change 
part of the review will try to capture change types, triggers, barriers, factors leading to 
change and those promoting its effectiveness. The section focusing on the topic of 
leadership will briefly picture some of the leadership theories and ways in which they 
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can be complimentary or detrimental to transition process. 
Review of organizational change literature 
Burke in his book on organizational change provides a few definitions regarding 
transformational processes (2002 p.64-67). Gersick (1991) defines change as  “A 
network of fundamental  interdependent “choices” of the basic configuration into which 
a system’s units are organized, and the activities that maintain both this configuration 
and the system’s resource exchange within the environment. Deep structure in human 
systems in largely implicit.”  In simpler terms, he goes on to say: “incremental changes 
in system’s parts will not alter the whole.” Tushman and Romanelli (1985 as cited in 
Burke, 2002 p. 65) state that organizational change occurs when “…organizations do 
not evolve but are more likely to change via strategic reorientations that demand 
significantly different patterns of operations.”  
It also occurs when “… an organization evolves through various life cycles” 
(McNamara, 2010, n.p.);  or, the simplest  definition is perhaps: “Organizational change 
occurs when a company makes a transition from its current state to some desired future 
state” (USLegal, 2010).  
Generic organizational change definitions state that it is a transition from one state or 
strategy to another. In however many different words used by the authors, it appears 
they are basically the same. Definitions do start differing when applied to different 
sectors or disciplines. For example, an economic definition of change: “The response of 
firms and the industry to changed market conditions, economic growth and competition 
through innovation” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.3). 
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A group dynamics definition of change: “Change is an alteration in the nature of 
group interaction or performance, in the state of the group as a whole, or a second order 
change in the patterning of group processes. Shifting levels of dynamic variables over 
time serve as indicators of change processes” (Poole, and Hollingshead, 2005, p.324). 
And, a military specific definition of change: “Revolution in the military affairs 
is a radical change in the conduct and character of war” (Gray, 2006). 
Differences based on the disciplinary background of the scholar, (i.e., response 
of companies to the market, patterns in teams and group processes or the new conduct 
of war) suggest there would be different sets of factors that these change processes will 
have to address. There are different economic, human and different objectives to 
achieve. Following this argument, there will be differences in type of change (cost 
cutting, cultural) and the choice of methods of change implementation (work re-
organization, new communication channels and forms of interaction).  
Burke (2002, p.82) emphasized one more principal difference, the one between 
revolutionary and evolutionary change that applies to every one of the above-mentioned 
types of transformation: “Revolutionary change occurs in leaps, spurts and disruptions, 
not in an incremental linear fashion.” 
Evolutionary change is typically attempting to improve aspects of the 
organization that will lead to higher performance. The fundamental nature or deep 
structure of the organization remains undisturbed. The primary rationale for its strategy 
to implement the organizational mission remains intact. Yet major organizational 
change can occur such as modification of the structure, installing a new system of 
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information technology or launching a new line of business. As such, change can be 
perceived as being common, especially in the private market. 
Whatever the reason and means of execution, the goal is the same – changing 
the existing state a company is in. The variations of organizational change definitions 
cover a very wide range of different processes leading to the same goal: a new state. 
Understanding this should help leaders make an informed decision while managing 
transformation (which failure to do so is so common today).For the purpose of this 
study, we adopt a definition of organizational change as: “A difference in form, quality 
or state over time in an organization” (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004, p.xi ). 
Seo, Putnam and Bartunek (2004) document the history of how scholars in many 
disciplines developed an understanding of organizational change organizing our 
knowledge into three main patterns: 1) human capital development, 2) internal process 
change caused by external environment imperatives, and 3) learning and 
transformational organizations. Each pattern is described more fully below.  
The first clearly emerging pattern related to organizational change was the need 
to consider the role of the human system and how it would respond to change efforts. In 
addition, there was a developing sense that there was a need to preserve the human 
capital of the organization. The theoretical roots of this pattern emerged in the 1950’s. 
The base for considering organizational change processes consisted of Lewin’s, Likert’s 
and Hackman and Oldman’s theories. Lewin (1951) introduced a three-step model of 
change (unfreeze-change-refreeze) and force field analysis (organization as the 
equilibrium of driving and opposing forces). Combined these two theories were 
13 
considered to be the foundation of the transformational perception.   
In 1967, Likert’s book, The Human Organization, was considered to have 
introduced a path-breaking theory of management systems and styles reflected the core 
belief of how the human capital should be managed. The theory strongly stressed trust 
in participative system as the optimal condition, where mutual respect, teamwork and 
cooperation are the standards for managing employees. The natural extension of this 
idea was present in Hackman and Oldman’s theory (1975) of individual focus and job 
enrichment as necessary in order to ensure internal work motivation, growth satisfaction 
and general job satisfaction. Thus, human systems and the value of human capital to the 
organization was focused on heavily. 
Turning to the second pattern of organizational change theory, early scholars 
perceived organizational change as a mainly internal process. The primary purpose of 
change was to achieve a selected goal, usually fixing a problem or developing the 
organization to avoid problems in the future. In the view of these scholars, 
organizational members were the change agents, and they were supposed to go through 
the process utilizing participation and collaboration. Many times, the scope of change 
concentrated on individuals and groups and how they responded to the changes being 
made to internal processes. Generally, scholars were concerned that the transition 
processes were episodic and implemented slowly, albeit thoroughly. 
When the change started, it occurred at a surprising rate and forced 
transformation upon the organizations, it was reflected in the literature as early as the 
late 1960. Scholars’ perception on the subject of change and the degree to which this 
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was viewed as an internal process changed as well over time. The main reaction was to 
drop traditional thinking and “unlearn the old habits!” (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004, 
ch.4). Thus, a new philosophy, represented by theorists such as Katz and Kahn (1966), 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1969), Nadler and Tushman (1977), and Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985), emerged in the organizational change literature.  
Katz and Kahn’s introduction in 1966 of open systems theory with the exchange 
and alignment with the environment theory is believed to be the base of organizational 
existence. It was complemented by Lawrence and Lorsh’s (1969) contingency approach 
stating that work and organizational structures depend on the characteristics of the 
environment. Following the idea, Nadler and Tushman (1977) declared that there 
should be a fit between the strategy, organization and the environment. Surprisingly 
though, the common belief of punctuated equilibrium (periods featuring a “normal” way 
of working and periods of revolutionary change) was still considered true, as it 
sometimes is today (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). It was also pointed out that change 
depends on leadership and that it often requires new vision. During this time, the value 
of human systems faded shifting the advantage to economic, technical and strategic 
systems. 
Overall, change was viewed as caused by the need of obtaining a purpose –
adaptation to the environment. Usually initiated and even forced by external factors, it 
required much wider range; now it was system wide and at a large scale. The traditional 
change agents, organizational members, now sought help of the other agents: outside 
consultants. Participation with the lower level employees was replaced with more 
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directive leading. The change speed was rapid, but still transitions were only episodic. 
The next observable shift in organizational change understanding was visible 
after 1990. At this time, Senge’s (1990) theory of learning organizations gave a 
foundation for new thought. Thus, now the change is viewed as occurring constantly 
and joined by continuous learning and enhancing the capacity to create. Scholars of this 
period try to combine the best of both past approaches. They definitely do not discard 
the past, but are aware that traditional ways may not always be effective. They put 
much more emphasis on human than economic or technical systems. People and their 
ability to learn and create are being considered directly affecting the organizational 
capacity to learn and create. The purpose of the transition is still development and 
alignment with the environment. The primary change agents are organizational 
members. The focus of change focus may be both external and/or internal: it depends on 
the situation. Change may be slow or rapid, group or system wide oriented, and so on; 
but contrary to the past, scholars in this phase agreed that it is continuous. 
Over the period of these fifty years of organizational change research, we have 
had three main patterns of how organizational change is viewed: human systems 
development, internal process change reflecting external influences, and the 
transformation of learning organizations.  
One thing that the historical patterns have in common is that they each identify 
factors thought to have significant influence on the relative success of any change 
efforts. Throughout the years, many ideas and theories about factors influencing change 
have been accumulated and make a rich picture of possible types of change, its barriers, 
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enhancers and methods of handling. Each of these is explored in more depth below. 
Types of change 
Many types of change are mentioned in the literature. Poole and Van de Ven 
(2004) see it as critical to distinguish between processes and people’s role in the change 
since it influences the types of changes, which are very different in the nature: planned 
and unplanned ones. Planned change is consciously designed and brought upon an 
organization. The focus of the theories relating to planned change is how to implement 
it successfully and ensure its effectiveness. Unplanned change is usually forced upon an 
organization by some factors and quite difficult to control and bend to the company’s 
advantage. Theories regarding unplanned change focus typically on the factors that 
force the changes. (Seo, Putnam, and Bartunek, 2004). 
Luecke (2003) offers a different perspective on the primary types of change, 
identifying four main types: structural, cost-cutting, process, and culture.  
Structural change –includes reconfiguration and reorganization of the units, 
parts and departments of the organization. It may emerge in form of acquisitions (within 
and outside of the company), mergers, diversification, specialization etc. This type of 
change is the closest one to Hammer and Champy’s idea of reengineering (1993) as a 
way to alter organizational structure and achieve more efficiency. 
Cost cutting change – one of the most popular types of change and usually the 
first one to be tried. It focuses mainly on eliminating non-essential activities, expensive 
extras, switching to the ways to produce at a lower cost. 
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Process change – the center of attention here is restructuring the existing 
methods of work in order to deliver results faster, of better quality and/or of lesser cost. 
Cultural change – oriented at the change of the cultural values and the overall 
work climate of the organization. Naturally, it may involve a change of a small subset 
of values, or entirely new culture may be introduced. 
There are also differences in the focus of change leading to different types of 
change seen on the market. The focus of change depends on what is described by Beer, 
Einstat and Spector (1990, as mentioned in Yukl, 2005), on what needs to be changed. 
The authors concluded that in order to implement change one needs to know what to 
change. They also state that it can be either the change of attitudes or roles, but not both. 
The fact that the opinion/perception of what needs to be changed is a key factor, is very 
valuable and worth noting. From the time the change process starts, and depending on 
the final decision, the focus of the change is formed. 
Another way to examine change is to focus on whether it has an internal or 
external focus. The internal focus is the most common, virtually ubiquitous. One can 
guesstimate that 99.9 percent of ever existing organizations have been concentrating 
their efforts on improving and adjusting their internal structures to the external 
environment. Within an internal change perspective, we can name countless change 
efforts related to product, people and organizational structure. Product-related changes 
include merchandise improvement, production processes, work organization. People-
oriented changes consist of human resources policies and practices, reward and 
motivational systems, work practices etc. Organizational structure-related changes 
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contain organizational systems of authority, departmentalization, organizational culture, 
communication networks. 
The external change focus seems to be quite rare. Usually it is possible for very 
strong and financially sound companies with plenty of resources and knowledgeable 
workforce in research and development department. Sometimes a marketing unit takes 
on such a challenge and indeed can be successful. There were times when small 
companies grew into powerful monopolies and oligopolies (two major monopolies in 
the market such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola) and decided to shape - and in the case of 
the oligopolies cooperated to do so – the external environment according to their 
desires. And, there are times when small, mid-size or even big corporations accidentally 
discover this something that overnight shakes and changes market reality. 
Harvard professors Beer and Nohria (2003 as described in Luecke, 2003) offer 
another set of change focuses: “E” and “O”. Theory “E” refers to economic approach to 
change and reflects the goal of dramatic increase of shareholder value, followed by 
equally dramatic actions taken by the top management, i.e. abandoning contracts 
between the employees and the organization, workforce reduction, sales of assets, 
bonuses for performance etc. This type of change usually improves short-term cash 
flow and share price, but causes a lot of stress for the employees, chaos, fear and quite 
often loss of those who are not willing to deal with such working conditions. Those who 
stay very often will lose trust in the company, lose the commitment and motivation, and 
are not as loyal as they were before. 
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Theory “O” stands for organizational capabilities approach, where the overall 
goal is to develop an organizational culture supporting constant learning and a high 
performance. It requires good relationships between the company and the people, 
employees’ commitment and participation. The people are valued and seen as the most 
important assets and can feel it in the way the organization treats them. Thus, the 
actions taken are quite different from those in theory “E”: people are given greater 
autonomy, are urged to active participation.  
Which type of change is the most effective? It depends on many factors. All 
possible changes have long-lasting consequences that should be carefully considered. 
Quite often, it is not even a subject of choice for a company. Many corporations prefer 
using a mix of the two approaches. One may conclude that also customizing an 
approach to the existing situation would be beneficial for organizations. 
In this section, we presented a few examples of how scholars view change and 
its types. There may be a planned change or usually unwanted and difficult unplanned 
one, economic change bringing short-term, radical results or organizational one 
focusing on people as the most valuable assets. There is a popular internal change in the 
form of adapting organization to its surroundings or external one, where a corporation 
tries to shape its environment. And, there is even more detailed explanation of changes 
which can be cost, structure, process or culture oriented. Each of the proposed sets 
reveals its own distinctions and possible consequences, which add to our understanding 
of change. Next, we turn to events that cause the changes.  
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Factors Leading to Change  
Relatively few scholars write about why the organizations change in the first 
place, but there are at least two comprehensive summaries that I describe here. Poole 
and Marshal (2004) state that scholars have recognized four motors of change: 
evolution, development/purpose, confrontation/conflict, and competition for resources. 
Evolution causes changes due to the course of time, natural changes in the company in 
its life cycle. Development or any other wanted purpose by the owner /management of 
the corporation brings planned changes. Confrontation and conflict between 
departments, which were supposed to cooperate with each other, leads to ineffective 
work organization, conflicting goals of the sub-units force the firms to reorganize its 
processes. And finally competition for the resources, whether between the business 
competitors or within the company brings small or big revolution upon organizations. 
 A second summary of forces for change is presented by Robbins (2005) who 
describes six major reasons for organizational transition. The first one is the nature of 
the workforce. Almost every organization in America has to adjust to multicultural 
employees. Being able to embrace and take advantage of the different values of the 
employees is a challenge. Human resources policies and practices require constant 
alteration in order to attract, recruit and keep the diverse workforce. The same issues 
regard the “star-performers employees” that, unlike the old generations, are not 
necessarily loyal to the corporation, and can easily find another job with a different 
company. Many organizations strive to keep up with diverse, sometimes inadequate 
work skills of the employees. It is especially difficult today, when the turbulent business 
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environment requires broad and highly specialized knowledge at the same time, and 
constantly updated on top of that. The most important though, is that the organization 
should be “built” the way that it will be able to take advantage of the diverse 
background, knowledge and skills this multicultural workforce brings. 
Technology is a second reason for change. The speed of technological changes 
is overwhelming and many companies struggle just to keep up with it. Technology has 
the power to change the jobs and the entire organizations. It affects communication 
systems and can bring a considerable advantage with it. Technology influences the 
speed and flow of information – usually significantly increases the flow of the 
information which requires the corporation to change and work faster. Following the 
above factors, technology may affect the entire communication network, usually for the 
better, but a company must be able to use this positive change efficiently. At times, 
technology brings a heavy burden on entire industries, as the music, film and 
book/publishing companies have experienced, they have suffered tremendous losses due 
to the easiness of copying. 
Economic shocks are another reason for change. Historically, the past has been a 
reliable predictor of the future. This was due, in large part, to the fact that the 
environment was steady and chaos was not threatening organizational existence. 
Nowadays organizations have to be able to absorb whatever life throws at them and 
effectively cope with it, or better yet – take advantage of it. Virtually out of nowhere 
increasing or plummeting prices can and do force changes on the companies. The 
collapse of huge businesses like Enron has sent many people and organizations home 
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with nothing (lost jobs, retirements, investments; lost businesses for clients, suppliers 
and stakeholders). It also slammed us with a hard-learned lesson about ethics, 
transparency, responsibility and easiness of manipulation of someone else’s money. 
There are also good sides of economic unforeseen changes as well. Instead of recession 
following the 9/11 attacks, the house prices kept rising, keeping many organizations 
alive and some even thriving. 
Competition is the fourth reason on the Robbins’s list. The nature of competition 
has changed and keeps changing for today businesses. An organization’s leaders cannot 
necessarily know all their competitors who may come and go unexpectedly. They exist 
all over the world and may come up with the ideas you simply would not even think 
about, or never paid attention to. If an organization remains passive and relies on 
submissive responding to the competitors it is very likely to fade away for the clients 
and eventually vanish from the market. Successful organizations have to be proactive, 
they have to be able to rely on short product cycles, have to be highly innovative and 
flexible. The most successful ones are those who can dictate the standards and 
conditions for the competitors and have other companies following them. 
Social trends are a fifth possible source behind change. The way of meeting, 
talking and working has changed impressively within the last two decades. Now, a 
considerable number of people work from home, other countries and continents, from 
planes and trains. Diverse values of different cultural backgrounds have been pooled 
together; they mix, match or cause explosions. They make us discover new ways for 
life, work and success. Today organizations cannot rely, like they did in the past, on the 
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loyalty of the greatly missed generation of Veterans (Robbins, 2005, p.20). Nowadays 
workers will often change employers or career paths altogether, whereas Veterans 
would remain loyal to the company throughout their careers.  
The sixth source of change is world politics, as cited by Robbins. Even though 
this is cited as the last factor, it is obviously not the least powerful. The fall of 
communism, and disintegration of Soviet Union, suddenly opened arms of China, 
happenings in Middle East and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism affects 
organizational positions today. World politics, alongside social trends, influence 
businesses heavily. Technology also has had its influence, but not as constant as it does 
today. Together with economic shocks, they made their occurrences periodically in the 
past. Competition – sometimes was virtually non-existent, sometimes was highly 
cooperative, and today is very fierce. 
In addition to the factors described in Robbins’s book, improving the overall 
efficiency of the organization is a motive to change. That may have various reasons 
mentioned above, but quite often is an effect of difficulties in getting people to 
cooperate and perform and /or result of ineffective organizational structure 
(communication channels, work design, chain of command etc). This happens to also be 
mentioned by Yukl (2005, p.288). Usually, efficiency declines due to the environment 
changes, but less often, organizations have been unproductive from the beginning. 
Thus, organizations can change because of their desire to enhance their performance, 
innovation, creativity, or their aspiration to shape organizational future. 
 
24 
The leader can also be a significant reason for change. It maybe this kind of 
force, which – in form of the leader – pushes and motivates the company for change. Or 
it may be that a company, tired of ineffective or tyrant leader’s practices, removes 
him/her and changes in the preferred direction. 
Another, almost universal reason for a change for companies is the adaptation to 
the external environment. This one quite often takes a form of passive adjustment. 
However, I always respected companies who were implementing changes due to the 
feedback from customers, suppliers, stakeholders, and employees (Wal-Mart, Bank of 
America, Starbucks, some of the “green companies” responding to ecology and energy-
saving problems in the ways that help their profits and benefit the clientele). One can 
cite the example of green companies who are responding to social pressures while still 
finding ways to be profitable. Even though it may look like a more reactive than 
proactive change, people greatly appreciated it, especially on the outside of the 
company, and reflect organizational flexibility and willingness to change. 
A much better, but more uncommon reason for change is a desire to shape the 
external environment, and to dictate the standards and market conditions for the rest of 
the companies. This is the focus of the new Prometheus process that proposes ways to 
analyze, “attack” and change your surroundings to your company’s advantage (Warden 
and Russell, 2006). It is a daring idea, but the goal can be obtained, as some 
corporations have proven (e.g. Microsoft). 
Combining all of the above-mentioned aspects, one can state that the factors 
leading to change come either from the inside of the company or from its surroundings. 
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The internal factors include organizational evolution, a desired purpose, the nature of 
work, internal conflicts, top management and a need to adapt to the environment or 
aspiration to change it. The external reasons consist of almighty politics, economy, 
technology, social trends and the everlasting competition. These reasons become a 
choice or a force for companies to start change process. The change process is cited as 
one of the most challenging tasks the top management faces today (Yukl, 2005; Higgs, 
2006). Below are described the most often mentioned problems encountered during 
transition processes. 
Barriers for change 
Identifying barriers to organizational change is particularly important. There are 
no barrier free-transitions and being aware of what may cause the problems will let us 
prepare ahead – giving a chance to minimize the source of potential barriers. If 
practitioners had a good knowledge of possible barriers they could encounter, they 
would try to eliminate these beforehand and then proceed with smoother and therefore 
much shorter, less costly, and less traumatic transformation. Even upon encountering 
unexpected barriers, they would have much better idea of how to handle them. This 
would save a lot of trouble in today’s market place and turbulent environment. 
The literature identifies common barriers to change processes, including the 
leader, vision, structure, culture, communication and a planned process for change. 
Factors such as these are described across a variety of literatures including 
organizational behavior, leadership and organizational change. Below is a brief 
summary of each of them. 
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Let us start with the leader and his/her style. Whether it reflects his/her traits, 
behavior or skills, a leader style may be either a great help or a serious problem in 
implementing change (Burns, 2003). The now famous Ohio State and Michigan studies 
(Yukl, 2005; Robbins, 2005) indicate that leaders who organize structure and are people 
oriented / or just people oriented, do obtain better work performance and higher 
employees’ job satisfaction, thus, better chances for change implementation. Jansen 
(2000, p.53) calls for paying attention to “considering the role change agents play in 
fostering the very resistance they are trying to overcome”. 
Vision is one of the factors very often emphasized by leadership scholars as an 
essential part of leading (Conger and Kanungo, 1998, Burns, 1978). Thus, lack of vision 
is a significant problem. How can one lead, control, manage change if there is no point 
to refer to, if people have no idea of where the corporation is headed? This issue is also 
brought up in terms of ways of communicating vision (Kotter, 2007) or the more often – 
“under communicating” it. Relationship with employees is frequently addressed in 
regards to the leader (Burns, 2003; Smith, 2006; Hoag, Ritschard, and Cooper, 2002; 
Kouzes and Posner, 1995) but organizational culture has also power to shape 
relationship between employees. Leaders need to make sure that culture will 
consistently be reinforcing mutual trust, respect, support and collaboration instead of 
fierce individual competitiveness. Kouzes and Posner (1995), Burns (1978), Bass 
(1985) and Goleman (1995) provide valuable description of how to build better 
relationship with your followers, which will more than likely translate into better 
performance. Yukl (2005) reminds us of participative leadership that may take a variety 
of forms (Heller and Yukl, 1969; Strauss, 1977; Likert, 1967; Tannenbaum & Schmidt 
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1958; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) and empowering people. It is also worth emphasizing the 
conclusion that Jones, Jimmieson, and Griffiths (2005) came to: failure of planned 
organizational change may be due to many factors, but “few are as critical as 
employees’ attitudes to change event” (p.362). 
Resistance is one of the major obstacles on the path to change (Yukl, 2005; 
Robbins, 2005; French and Coch, 1948; Kotter 2007; Huczynski and Buchanan, 2003). 
It has its source in people’s life and work habits, in the fear of change, of the unknown. 
If a leader does not effectively communicate with followers and explain why the change 
is needed, what is likely to happen when we change and if we will not change, and if the 
employees’ fears will not be addressed, one can be sure that a change effort will fail. 
Resistance can also have its roots in the structure of the organization (Robbins, 
2005; Kotter 2007; Fayol, 1916). Many times a leader forgets that employees’ sincere 
efforts can be diminished if there are old, rigid systems that will thwart whatever 
attempt is tried to be carried out. Changing the structure from the old to the new 
effective one, which will be supporting or even buffering modification efforts, usually is 
a major challenge in the change process. 
Similarly, the organizational culture may be resisting change (Senge, 1990; 
Prahalad & Hamel 1994; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Smith, 2006; Kotter, 2007). The 
existing culture may not be change oriented, it may have deeply rooted traditional ways 
of working, may promote criticism of the new, may be opposed to risky operations. If 
such an atmosphere has existed for years in the company, it becomes just another 
problem to deal with. Organizational culture is very difficult to change, as it is shaped 
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over the long years, and is intensely embedded in organizational history, habits, ways of 
working, employees and their attitudes. Many authors (Wright and Thompsen, 1997; 
Kotter, 2007; Robbins, 2005; Natemeyer and McMahon, 2001) stress the need for open, 
flexible, learning, pro-innovative, and people oriented organizational culture. With such 
a climate, it is much easier to support the change. 
Communication and communication networks may also cause obstacles on the 
path of change process (O’Hair, 2006; Robbins, 2005; Kotter 2007; Smith, 2006). How 
people communicate, how quickly the information flows, who does it reach, who blocks 
it, who forms clicks, and who is an outlier away from the information has a major 
impact of efficiency of everyday work, let alone the change efforts. Communication 
scholars work on the subject of how to evaluate, change and shape the network in order 
to make it effective and compatible with organization needs. There is also an old, good 
media richness theory addressing the choice of the proper medium used to ensure the 
message will get to the followers and will be understood.  
Finally, the presence or absence of a planned process for the change may be a 
source of difficulty. While existence of a strategy is definitely a plus, a quality of it may 
either help or destroy the change implementation. If the plan is not realistic, not built on 
consistently updated information and agreed on with the followers, there are good 
chances that it will destroy undertaken efforts. 
It seems important to emphasize again the cost of the misconception on the 
subject of change. As Beer et al. (1990) suggest - the focus of change depends on what 
needs to be changed. The authors conclude that in order to implement change one needs 
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to know what to change. Thus, the perception of what needs to be changed is crucial for 
transitional success. The inaccuracy of the subject of change more often than not is a 
major obstacle to the whole process of transition. For example, if a company needs to 
reorganize its work processes, but instead thinks that changing cost structure will help, 
then the existing problem will not get solved. 
The above description of barriers is certainly not an exhaustive one, but captures 
what is the most often identified as the obstacles for change. Just from this report one 
can see that the difficulties can be encountered everywhere: starting from the idea of 
change and its plan, through existing organizational structure and culture, the leaders, 
their relationship with employees and employees themselves. Many of these problems 
are overlapping and trigger other trouble; consequently, the change implementation is a 
very challenging task. To balance the subject, we may need to look at the more positive 
side of the transition project. 
Factors promoting change effectiveness 
When it comes to factors that lead to change effectiveness, one should consider 
how change effectiveness is measured. Little empirical research exists on this subject. 
But reviewing how organizations perceive change success, one may conclude that 
change effectiveness is usually judged by two facts: obtaining assigned change goals 
and financial performance (costs, profits, cash flow).  
Many scholars (for example Robbins, 2005; Yukl, 2005; Beer et al.,1990;  
Kotter, 2010; Lewin, 1951; Schein, 1992; Duck 1993) suggest aspects that usually 
positively influence change. These are described next. One factor serving the change 
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efforts from the very beginning is the willingness to change. This willingness can be 
observed by examining many of the factors that were described above as barriers. Some 
of the reasons for change are positive, particularly when they are internally driven 
change efforts and not externally forced.  
Other factors can be either positive or negative, depending on the situation. For 
example, just as the leader can be a barrier, they might also be a change enhancer. 
When there is an open-minded leader (instead of a blind one surrounded with “yes-
people”), who is aware of the need to change that is a great starting point.  
The people in the organization are another factor that can represent a barrier or 
an enhancer to change efforts. Now, the willingness to change has to exist also in the 
top, mid- and lower management and the rest of the employees. A leader who is aware 
of the need to change would communicate it to the followers and make them aware of 
this necessity. More, the leader would implement a system reinforcing change-oriented 
behavior (Yukl, 2005; Kotter, 2007; Ramayah et al 2007; Robbins 2005; Natemeyer and 
McMahon, 2001). This condition is not always needed, as sometimes the willingness to 
change already exists. 
Another commonly agreed upon factor that can influence, positively or 
negatively, change efforts is the vision and its proper communication (Weber, 1922; 
House, 2006; Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; Kotter, 2007). The knowledge of where do you 
want the organization to be, how to get there, is a vital factor. Without a vision, one 
cannot lead a change. The proper communication of the vision is also emphasized not 
only by leadership, but also by organizational behavior and communications scholars 
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(Robbins, 2005; Baker, 2002; Robertson, 1998; Young and Post, 1993). 
Related to the presence of the vision is the role of strategic thinking and a good 
plan for fostering successful change efforts (Yukl, 2005, Robbins, 2005; Kotter, 2007). 
As noted above, not having a planned process for change can be a barrier. However, 
being prepared and know what needs to be changed (Beer, Einstat and Spector 1990), 
what we will start with and how we will carry it all out can be important enhancers 
leading to a successful change effort. 
From this discussion, we can conclude that we need people involvement in order 
to implement our change (Yukl, 2005; Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Kouzes & Posner, 
1995; House, 1977). A leader alone can hardly ever carry out a successful change. 
Subsequently most scholars suggest for a leader to be at least moderately people 
oriented, respect the followers and cooperate in them, so they will not work against the 
leader’s efforts. Furthermore, we can consider the power bases of a leader (French and 
Raven, 1959). The leaders who have referent and expert power bases will usually have a 
better relationship with the followers, and therefore more likely obtain better 
performance, than those who rely solely on coercive or legitimate power. 
A proper employee motivation system should be in place for successful change 
implementation (Robbins, 2005; Kerr, 1975; Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; Locke et al., 
1981; Herzberg, 1967). Every organization has some sort of a motivation system in 
place, but it is especially useful in times of change. Change is a stressful and difficult 
time for the entire organization, it is easy for people to get tired, become indifferent or 
just quit. A motivation system can and does play important role in keeping people 
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going. To keep them going in the right direction, one needs to make sure that the system 
reinforces change-oriented behaviors that are consistent with what the organization 
needs (Kerr, 1975).  
Teams and team building are also considered very helpful at work (Yukl, 2005; 
Robbins, 2005) and in change efforts as well. Organizations benefit from their 
collective effort, better quality decisions and solutions, often from their diverse 
backgrounds (Gabert, 2006; Franklin, 2006). Obviously, there are disadvantages, but in 
majority of the cases, they are outweighed by the advantages of team work.  
Cross-functional efforts could also help the change efforts. A cross-functional 
effort is naturally more effective than a single department’s attempts to carry out a 
major plan influencing entire organization (Yukl, 2005). Today, very few changes 
involve only a single sub-unit of a company. Instead, the entire organization needs to 
act as one, all the departments need to support and fully cooperate with each other, 
especially when implementing a change process. 
 The list of factors helping transition efforts is not any shorter than that of the 
obstacles. We can consolidate all the aspects into a short list: leadership (visibility, 
support and alignment of leader’s message and behavior); people (majority of the 
factors are linked to people: willingness to change, team building, cross-functional 
effort, proper motivation pointing out how much successful change depends on human 
beings); significance of vision and its communication; alignment of organizational 
culture and structure with change processes and the new vision. The ideal condition 
would be to coordinate all the factors into a successful transition process. However, in 
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practice, doing this can be an ordeal. This is where the challenge for the leaders is 
encountered. 
Theories on the Role of the Leader in Change Processes 
The role of the leader in the change process is quite significant. Even if the 
leaders do not support the change, the people can push it through, but they usually do it 
with a help of an informal leader that emerges from among them (i.e. Lech Walesa 
1980-1990 and Pope John Paul II 1978-1990 during the fall of communism). Hence, 
formal or not – leaders seem always have a place in the transitional efforts). However, 
as many scholars indicate, change efforts are mostly unsuccessful (Martin, Jones, and 
Callan, 2006; Higgs, 2006; Applebaum and Wohl, 2000) and the most of all, it is 
because of management failure (Burns, 2003). Leadership literature review can be of 
big help here, as it portrays successful and unsuccessful leadership models. 
Leadership theories describe many of various types of leader’s behaviors and 
styles, which may be detrimental or beneficial to executing transition process. Overall, 
we may divide leadership theories on task-oriented, people –oriented and mixed. As the 
research shows (Ohio State and Michigan studies described in Yukl, 2005 and Robbins, 
2005) leaders who are people- oriented do obtain better performance and help creating 
better work conditions (climate, trust), which in turns helps motivating people. 
One of the latest theories that describe a leader just about perfectly for 
organizational changes is transformational leadership. Created by Downton (1973) and 
popularized by Burns (1978), this theory describes a leader who is truly involved in the 
hard work, highly respects the followers and cooperates with them while working 
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towards common goal. The transformational leader’s role is to transform organizations 
and/or people – formed “by nature” to support change processes. Next to these people-
oriented tactics, we see a heavy emphasis put on ethics, creating and maintaining the 
“right” work conditions, recognizing need for change and consistently working toward 
achieving a vision. 
In more recently works, popularized by Daniel Goleman (1995), we have the 
introduction of an emotional intelligence theory (Thorndike, 1936; Wechsler, 1939; 
Gardner, 1983; Salovey and Meyer, 1990), which mainly promotes self-awareness and 
is based on better self-management, as well as understanding of others and thus building 
successful relationships with people. Even though the theory is not aimed at change 
process specifically, one can assume that a leader, who can build a good relationship 
with and between the followers, will face fewer challenges during the transition process. 
It is difficult to pinpoint who formed a theory of visionary leadership; 
nevertheless, visionary leadership is in fact very helpful during the change execution. 
Scholars describe it as the core components of effective (Brockbank, 2006) and 
excellent leadership (Campbell and Samiec, 2006). However, common sense suggests 
that it is much easier to lead through difficult times when we know where we are going. 
After all, the leader should know where one wants to get the organization to go, what to 
achieve etc. without a vision, it would be just drifting, most probably far from any 
success. This theory alone may not be enough to manage the transformation process, as 
a leader has to be able to have employees believe in the vision and motivate people to 
work towards it. However, I still see it as an essential part of any and every style chosen 
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by a leader. It is quite impossible to be a transformational, effective or any other kind of 
leader, if you do not know what it is that your organization should be working on. 
Charismatic leadership (Weber, 1922; House, 1977; Conger and Kanungo, 
1998) may be helpful in leading change, but one has to have this charisma first. Thus, 
this theory may not be applicable to all leaders. Charismatic leaders are less likely to 
have problems convincing their followers about what should be done and how. 
However, since it is based on personality traits, one cannot just easily pick and use this 
approach. I also believe that a charismatic leader may fail leading through change, if 
one does not have a clear vision/goal and idea how to achieve it, or of the change goal 
does not appeal to everyone. The mission may not be accomplished as well, if a 
charismatic leader looses the respect and loyalty of the followers.  
House’s (as presented in Robbins, 2005) path-goal theory describes a leader that 
seems suitable for managing change. Such a leader assists followers by helping them 
obtain their goals, by removing barriers, providing support and direction, and by 
clarifying the path when confronted with obstacles. This theory seems to be similar to 
transformational leadership, considering that leader motivates people, helps them with 
obtaining the goals, provides support etc. On top of that, a leader is supposed to be 
flexible and adjust his actions depending on the employees and environment. However 
nice and reasonable this theory seems to be, amazingly it received only partial support 
from other studies and is also perceived as a complex one (Northouse, 2003). 
According to today’s thinking, is it assumed that autocratic leadership would not 
be in support of transition efforts, due to not being open for other people’s ideas, 
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participative leadership and definite lack of having good relationship with employees 
and other stakeholders. All the usual characteristics of autocratic leadership are not 
thought to be helpful to implementation of change process. 
Transactional leaders seem to be not suitable either, as they usually do not pay 
attention to people, work atmosphere, and they rely solely on a simple reward-
punishment system, that does not appeal to all employees, and is not supportive of long-
term commitment. This theory was long practiced and successful in the past, when 
people had different values and the workplace rules were unlike today. In the second 
half of the 20th century, it lost its significance, but it is still being tried by some leaders, 
usually with very short-lived effects. 
The impact of Greenleaf’s servant leadership on change is hard to assess. In his 
1970 article “The Servant as Leader” one can find that: 
“The servant-leader is servant first… It begins with the natural feeling 
that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one 
to aspire to lead. That person is sharply different from one who is leader 
first, perhaps because of the need to assuage an unusual power drive or 
to acquire material possessions…The leader-first and the servant-first 
are two extreme types”. (Greenleaf, no page available) 
One may wonder if a servant leader is strong enough to lead a change. There 
seem to be very little, if any research done on the effectiveness of servant leadership, 
thus we may only discuss the issue. The idea is very close to transformational 
leadership, but there are some differences; i.e. servant leader is focusing on people and 
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their needs, whereas transformational leader focuses on change and its execution, while 
maintaining good, ethical atmosphere at work. Servant leadership worked for the author 
of this theory and is heavily popularized by servant leadership centers, but it is difficult 
to find any empirical research results supporting this type of leading. 
Situational leadership (Hersey and Blanchard, 1977) presumes that a single best 
leading style does not really exist, since it really depends on the situation what would be 
considered the best in particular settings. The scholars propose that leaders adjust their 
style based on what is relevant in a given situation (task type, urgency etc), and 
followers’ maturity (their skills, ability and willingness to follow, experience and need 
for supervision). Situational leadership seems to be very unique; first of all it is based 
on the premise that there is no single best style to lead, secondly it has capacity to 
embrace many other leading styles and explain why they do or do not work in certain 
situation (autocratic style in spite of its negativity has its place and time).   
Many leadership styles may support successfully leading organizations through 
change. Based on the research we may imply that any people-oriented leader will be 
valuable, as good relationships with subordinates’ usually equal better performance. 
Thus if a leader has a vision, a good plan how to reach it and emotional intelligence, it 
should prevent many serious obstacles to transition even before they occur, hence 
making the change process that much easier.  
Summary 
The most condensed description of organizational change could be that it is a 
very complex process, appearing in various forms, and forced upon almost every 
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organization in the 20th and 21st centuries. Some of those transitions were a matter of 
choice, but most were a result of heavy environmental pressures. We have seen changes 
that are revolutionary or sequential, economical or organizational, structural or cultural, 
with an internal or external focus, and many others. These changes often reflect a reason 
and objective of the process. 
While a type of change may be of managerial choice, the factors leading to it are 
often beyond the manager’s influence. The economic shocks, competition and politics 
tend to be huge energizers to change. Technology brings often welcomed, although 
quite costly, changes. The multinational workforce has transformed organizational 
cultures and HR practices. Social trends dictate the path for the companies to follow, 
although some companies try to dictate what the social trends will be. Most of those 
factors are of external nature. It appears that the number one internal factor is the leader, 
with the power of making or breaking the company one leads. Depending on a leader’s 
style, intentions, skills, and ambitions s/he is intentional or unintentional source of 
change. The other internal change factors of people, organization, culture and structure 
become such often because of the decisions that leaders made (someone shaped the 
organizational structure and culture; someone exceeded the budget or implemented an 
innovative idea, someone under-communicated the objectives etc). 
Quite interestingly, the very factors leading to change can play a role as barriers 
or enhancers during transitional efforts. Politics play a negative or positive role in many 
organizational changes. The same is true for the overall health of economy, credit, 
technology or lack of access to it. Scholars have already written numerous books 
describing the dual role that the leader and people have in change processes. Debates on 
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this subject can go forever. 
Bottom line, putting together a list of barriers and enhancers experienced in the 
DOD organizations’ change efforts is the goal of this research. Such a list should be of 
great use to the military officers, and to civilian practitioners as well, who by nature of 
the “regular” market usually enduring a bit less of the problems their DOD peers do, but 
still can benefit from the enhancers the military staff put to use. 
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Chapter Three: The Unique Case of DOD Organizations 
The literature regarding public organizations and above-mentioned factors is 
very rich, however there is not too much written solely about the Department of 
Defense. In the introduction to this study, I presented an argument suggesting that a 
special treatment of these kinds of organizations would be worthwhile to broaden our 
understanding of the degree to which generic theories of organization can be 
successfully applied to military organizations.  
“Revolution in the military affairs is a radical change in the conduct and 
character of war” (Gray, 2006, p.vi) and as such seems to be very dissimilar from what 
organizational change scholars usually focus on. “Regular” public and private 
organizations have a lot more to choose from when searching for the best possible 
solutions, the situations and factors described in the literature are very similar to those 
they deal with.  DOD, as a “national security establishment, is not simply an 
organization: It is a system of interrelated organizations that presumably share a 
common purpose. It is also a vital institution that both reflects and shapes the dominant 
values of American Society” (Foster, as cited in Runzi, 2007, p.12). Another point is 
that the “…national security establishment must be capable of reconfiguring itself, not 
simply to adapt to its internal and external surroundings, but to influence the direction 
and shape of those surroundings” (Foster, as cited in Runzi, 2007, p.12). This way it 
stays as a major power, not relying on others, and not fearing foreign forces. That aspect 
is also very unique to DOD: it can not outsource its services, or drop them once they 
become too costly. 
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DOD’s rare specialization of war is fused with the seemingly contrary mission 
of ensuring peace. Either one of these assignments still poses significant danger to the 
members. DOD employees are at considerable risk and stress, facing life-threatening 
tasks daily. There is even a notion that employees belong to the military. Employee’s 
private decisions have to go along military plans; some even require supervisor’s 
approval. They are constantly moved all over the world. When they deploy, they are 
gone for months and even years. How does one lead and motivate under such 
conditions? 
Alberts and Hayes (as cited in Scott, 2006, p.11) stated:  “…warfare is 
qualitatively different from the management of other human enterprises …” and that is 
easy to agree with. Many CEO’s smoothly float from one company to another, but it is 
very likely they would not have been in an easy position if put in charge of the 
country’s defense. The military is certainly somewhat unique in its monopoly of 
violence (Scott, 2006, p.11) and peacekeeping. 
Given that DOD keeps its people in constant change, it should be natural for 
them to go through transformation. It turns out it is not. The attacks and aftermath of 
9/11 caused quite a bit of turmoil in the DOD, with which they are still struggling. 
There are few non-military journals or journal articles describing organizational change 
in the DOD. The primary military-oriented source is the Quadrennial Review Journal, 
which contains articles regarding many subjects and organizational change in the DOD 
is just one of these subjects. Military students researching organizational change turn 
frequently to the academic literatures for theories, models and methods. 
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Out of the problems that surface in both the military and civilian world, there is 
a changing pace and even mission (National Guard); limited budget issues, limited 
power of the leader and political pressures. 
The increased reliance on the National Guard as a combat force, regional 
peacekeeping force and a homeland defense/security force has stressed the National 
Guard beyond programmed requirements. Competing missions (federal and state) and 
structure requirements (war fighting vs. domestic support/homeland security) are at 
odds in the time of war. It is possible that there is an overload to the system, but units 
must meet both, the state obligations and the joint war fighting and stability operations 
(Sellars, 2006, abstract). And for some branches it has been going on for quite some 
time: “Beginning with Operation DESERT STORM and continuing with many other 
operations throughout the 1990s, the Air Force found itself deploying forces more 
frequently. At the same time, the reliance on the reserve component began to steadily 
increase, as the total size of the active force was reduced by 40 percent. As a result, the 
percentage of active duty airmen that were designated as deployable grew from 12 
percent of the force in 1990 to 76 percent in 2000” (Warren, 2005, p.4). 
Despite the war demands, the government may not be assigning enough 
resources (money, staff, and equipment) to the DOD to carry out the two missions: war 
and transformation. The old schedule still applies to the Reserves – active brigades get 
everything first with the best equipment, all the leftovers in terms of money and 
equipment are for the reserve (Fuhr, 2006, p.3). The same is true for the educational 
system that has not significantly changed since the Cold War. There is money either for 
education or for training, but not for both. “This system was one of the contributing 
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factors to the unavailability of several Army National Guard brigades in the Gulf One; 
many officers and non-commissioned officers were not qualified…” to be put in charge 
(Fuhr, 2006, p.4) 
Due to the end of Cold War “funding dipped to its lowest in 1995…accounts 
were often funded at 50 percent or less in 1990’s” (Johnson, 2006, p.8) which had an 
influence on number of essential personnel when the Global War on Terrorism started 
“…funding and programs were having a direct impact on increased retention of field 
grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. It also indicated that readiness was 
suffering” (Johnson, 2006, p.9). A few years into the war, senior mission commanders 
still face the difficult decision on whether to fund housing maintenance or unit training 
(Johnson, 2006, p.11).  
Astonishing, although not uncommon, is that “some of the attention – in terms 
of money and equipment - is political rather than objective assessments” (Fuhr, 2006, 
p.4). The DOD personnel, however, were not passive, though, they were trying to drive 
the United States Government (USG) into a new way of thinking (Torres, 2007 p.1) 
Most common in the public organization is the problem of a limited power that 
leaders have in a form of lack of controlling authority leading to inability to execute 
operations (Todd, 2006). 
Overall, DOD organizations, just as all public ones, have less flexibility, 
restricted access to funds, and are heavily regulated. These conditions suggest that they 
can benefit from the literature focusing on public sector. However, its unique mission 
and work (war fighting) makes it sometimes impossible to adapt literature prescriptions 
44 
and advice. In this respect, the Defense Department is isolated and left to rely solely on 
their staff’s experience and expertise.  
Summary 
Overall, due to intense change in the DOD (stress of physical, fiscal and human 
resources) and their significant struggle with the process, any research, literature 
tailored specifically to the military needs would be of a great help for this unique and 
very important department. Moreover, if there are factors in the DOD transition 
processes, that are different from those identified by the academic literature, it would be 
useful for all to recognize, name and research their role. 
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Chapter Four: Research Design 
Scholars have dedicated great energy to determining what factors influence the 
relative success of organization change efforts. In the literature on organization change, 
theorists point to several benefits that are expected from change efforts and 
recommendations on how to make change efforts the most successful. However, almost 
an equal amount of space is devoted to a discussion of the resistance to change and the 
factors that lead to this resistance. The leader’s role in organizational change efforts is 
another topic that has been widely studied with prescriptions about the optimal type of 
leadership abounding. Much of the literature takes a generic approach to the study of 
change efforts, arguing that there are more similarities than differences and that the 
sector of the organization, while interesting, is not a factor significantly influencing 
change effort success. Few studies, however, directly address the applicability of 
generic theories of organization change to military organizations. 
Chapter Three builds an argument that these types of organizations are worthy 
of targeted analysis to verify the claim that prescriptions for successful change efforts 
can be generically applied to all organizations. This area of inquiry provides a unique 
opportunity to deductively test existing theories. In this research design, it is expected 
that there will be areas where existing theories fall short when applied to the DOD 
organizations. Thus, the research design also contains a significant inductive research 
component, where generalizations gathered from empirical observations will be used to 
propose new theoretical developments.  
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This study is a qualitative meta-analysis of existing data, reanalyzing case 
studies prepared by other authors to document the presence or absence and relative 
strength of the eight variables identified in the literature review as being critical to the 
overall success or failure of organization change efforts. As part of this meta-analysis, 
the research also seeks to uncover other variables referenced in the cases that have 
significant influence on an organization’s change efforts. 
 According to Guzzo, Jackson, and Katzell “meta-analysis is a literature-review 
technique with great face validity. Prior to its appearance, literature reviews were 
restricted to narrative accounts or accounts that made use of minimal levels of 
quantification. Through its quantification, meta-analysis is a significant alternative to 
these traditional methods.” (2009, n. p.). Having very few rules, this technique leaves 
the researchers with many choices and decisions i.e., what studies to examine, how to 
determine findings, whether or not to correct errors in the sample studies, etc. The most 
significant advantages of this technique come from providing us with a possibility of 
examining a number (small or very large number) of research studies and drawing 
conclusions from all of them, giving an excellent base for generalization of the findings. 
It allows detecting patterns across many studies. The prime challenge is not so much to 
clearly define the goal of the study but developing the suitable and correct coding 
scheme that will allow for answering the hypotheses. 
Qualitative methods of studying a subject allow for examining data in a way that 
quantitative methods could not reflect such as determining social settings, background, 
and many other variables in which context is more important than its numerical form. 
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As such, meta-analysis, grounded theory review, and content analysis provide a good 
method of examining a large number of case studies, yielding an overall picture of 
factors significant for organizational change in the Department of Defense. 
Using this overall research strategy (a meta-analysis drawing primarily from 
qualitative analysis of existing case studies), the first research question is directed 
toward deductive verification of factors thought to influence change efforts commonly 
cited in the organizational change and leadership literatures. Research question two 
explores in depth the influence of the leader on change efforts, since the type of leader 
and their communication of the need for change and vision of the organization after the 
change efforts is extensively documented in leadership theories. Research question 
three is devoted to the inductive exploration of existing data to uncover factors that 
should also be considered in the organization change literature. Finally, the fourth 
research question reflects a desire to describe a causal model for DOD organizations 
based on the findings of this exploratory research. The model that results from this data 
analysis will be compared to other models that exist in the literature to identify 
differences and gaps and offer explanations for why this might exist. 
Research Question #1: Are the factors commonly identified in the organization 
change and leadership literature as important in influencing organizational change 
similar as those affecting DOD transformation? 
Research Question #2: What is the position of the leader factor in DOD 
transition? 
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Research Question #3: Are there factors specific to DOD organizations that 
influence organization change efforts that are not identified in studies of “regular” 
public/private companies?  
Research Question #4: What are the causal relationships between factors that 
influence DOD organization change efforts? 
The first step in the research was deductive verification of the importance of 
factors already identified as influencing organizational change efforts. Rather than 
starting with a blank sheet of paper and inductively identifying variables in a case-by- 
case analysis, a handful of pre-identified factors were singled out from the body of 
academic literature. These variables are frequently named as significant elements of 
change processes in studies in organizational behavior, leadership, business and 
economics. Described below are the eight factors that are deductively examined in this 
research based on the literature. The first seven factors serve as the independent 
variables for the research and the last factor is the dependent variable; that is all of the 
first seven factors are expected to have a significant influence on the conclusion that a 
change effort was a success or a failure. 
Pre-indentified variables: 
The definitions below served as a base for identifying and coding the variables. 
To code the cases, I looked at sentences and paragraphs, searching of the use of the 
specific term or for language that would fit within the pre-established definition. 
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Reasons for Change: reason/s why the transformation process is being 
undertaken. Any time a reason for change is pointed out/emerges as a factor, it will be 
coded and counted as such. 
Leadership: very broadly taken, since I was not exactly sure what I would find. 
Thus, the leadership variable will be looked at in terms of: 
-type of leading (authoritative, people or results oriented, transformational, 
transactional etc); 
-leader’s personality influencing the processes in the organization; 
-leader’s decisions, actions – whether or not it was leader’s or other factors’  
influence that shaped the change process; 
Any time a leader’s influence on the change is brought up /emerges, it will be 
coded as such.  
People: literature names the people as the most valuable asset of the 
organizations. They have enough power to either help the company succeed or bring it 
to failure. Consequently, this is the way we will be taking people in consideration: 
whenever employees (non-leaders) are the ones to influence organizational change in 
any way, it will be counted as a significant factor. 
Communication: communication networks and its habits influence the overall 
outcome of work. Communication factor will be looked at from its patterns perspective 
here. If it will contribute to the organizational change in any way, it will be counted as a 
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factor. 
Organizational structure: organizational structure is named as an important 
factor in organizational behavior and economics literature. It can contribute to 
efficiently carried out projects or impose significant costs to a company. Whenever 
organizational structure would influence change efforts it will be considered as a factor.  
Organizational culture: understood as the “personality of the organization” 
(http://managementhelp.org/org_thry/culture/culture.htm); reflecting its values, 
standards, habits. It usually embraces a certain way of working, imposes particular 
behavior patterns. Whenever its pressure weighs on the ongoing transformation efforts 
it will be counted as a factor. 
A planned process for change: the planning process and its results in terms of 
appropriate or inadequate transition process. If a part of planning course is named as 
having impact on the overall change and its consequences, it will be counted as a factor. 
Outcome measures of change efforts: the ways the case study authors evaluated 
the change outcomes will be looked at in order to become familiar with the DOD 
transformation, its definition of success/failure, and its methods of estimating the 
effects. 
There are commonly named factors in organizational change such as teamwork, 
diversity and conflict management. It seems the uses of these terms are often derived 
from the above “parent” categories and are simply more specific operationalizations. 
Since the purpose of this research is to start with a general set of variables and let the 
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data speak of what other more or less specific ones are important in DOD, I do not 
include the similar terms identified in the literature as separate variables, but code them 
in the equivalent “parent” category. 
Data Source  
To test these variables and examine the causal relationships, I used data drawn 
from an existing repository of case studies and reports related to the Department of 
Defense organizations and housed in the Army Center for Lessons Learned. The Center 
for Lessons Learned collects reports, thesis, descriptions and studies in various forms 
regarding a range of subjects. Cases reflecting organizational change in the DOD are 
one of many themes. Included in this repository are nearly 300 cases reported from all 
branches of DOD as well as cases from other federal organizations. 
There is wide variation in the types of cases housed at this location with 
descriptions of many different settings and proceedings of organizational change. These 
cases take the form of professional reports, descriptions, and masters’ degree theses 
collected by the DOD in their Center for Army Lessons Learned. This center is 
available for anyone to access, however its main users are military leaders, enlisted 
personnel and politicians who try to take advantage of the very lesson learned. 
Specific to this study, the population frame from which I sampled was all the 
cases in the DOD Center for Lesson Learned that described organizational change in the 
DOD within the time period of 1980 to 2010. In this population of cases, there are few 
that reported change efforts earlier than the 1980s. I decided not to include these earlier 
cases because they would not reflect the efforts to transform the military based on a new 
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war-fighting context and strategy. Initially I searched for cases that had organization 
change in the title, the abstract or the table of contents. Over 200 cases were discovered 
through this first round of filtering the cases. From this list, I browsed through the 
introduction of the document, selecting cases that had the organizational change effort 
as the focus of the research and publication. Using this criterion, there were a total of 
183 cases that were acceptable for inclusion in my study and this was determined to be 
the population of cases for the meta-analysis. 
Once I had established the boundaries of the population identified for this study, 
the next step in the research process was to determine the sampling strategy and sample 
size. Overall, a total of 76 cases were chosen for this study representing 42% of all 
cases in the population being studied. The sampling strategy was to randomly draw 76 
cases. To do this, I randomly picked up one case at a time from the list of all studies. 
The case was deleted from the sample (and moved to the list of already examined 
cases). The process of blindly choosing from the cases available on the sample list was 
consistently carried out through the process.  
What were the authors of my sample cases writing about in their case studies? I 
report on this question to assure the reader that the case studies could provide materials 
appropriate for secondary analysis to draw meta-analytic conclusions about change 
efforts in DOD organizations. Nearly 70% of the cases in the sample were descriptive 
of the change efforts undertaken in their organization. The remaining thirty percent of 
the cases reported on a specific research project undertaken as a requirement for 
completion of a program of graduate study. 
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Within this sample, there is nice variation in the authors’ affiliations with 
branches in the military, in terms of the education achievement of the authors and the 
purpose of the research project. Descriptive information is provided in Table 1 and a 
narrative of the representativeness of this sample follows. 
Table 1: Affiliation of Case Authors 
 Overall PHD 
authors 
War College 
Graduates 
Master’s 
Degrees thesis Other 
ARMY 38% 0% 18% 18% 1% 
CIVILIAN 24% 8%   22% 
NAVY 16% 1% 8% 7%  
AIR FORCE 14% 1% 8%   
MARINES 5%  3% 3%  
COAST GUARD 1% 1%    
 99% 12% 37% 28% 24% 
 
When looking at the stratification of the sample, we find that 38% of the cases 
come from the Army. The random choice of the cases from the population resulted in a 
sample of cases that accurately reflect the DOD structure (Army providing the most 
cases, Marines, Coast Guard the least), which is one of the best basis to consider the 
findings of this study valid and general for the Department of Defense. 
Within the sample of cases, the majority of the authors were seeking advanced 
degrees from elite institutions. This distribution of authors is important because the case 
studies were guided by theoretical as well as substantive literature and the research was 
designed according to the best practices in social science research. In fact, it was not 
unusual to find hypotheses formally stated and variables and causal relationships tested 
using sophisticated statistical analysis. In this sample of 76 cases, 12% of the authors 
had achieved a PhD, and 37% were graduating from the War College. This is important 
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since the War College is attended by selected senior officers who have already received 
Master’s degrees. Officers selected for the War College are the top officers, with a high 
potential of reaching the rank of General or a rank appropriate to their branch of the 
military. Fifteen percent of the cases studied were authored by individuals completing a 
masters’ degree. Of the remaining eleven percent of cases, the authors held prestigious 
positions in government service including a General working with civilians on a 
Scientific Board, reports written for Congress, and research project/reports from non-
military universities or organizations. 
In conclusion, the sample is judged to be an appropriate as it is representative of 
the population of DOD organizations and since the data comes from all the DOD 
branches. Nearly one-half of all cases come from authors with a very high level of 
education (masters level or higher), allowing assuming that the reports were of very 
high quality. The theses and the reports were assumed to have been held to high 
standards. 
Weaknesses of the study 
Weaknesses of the study can be addressed by considering different types of 
validity commonly described by methodology scholars. The first type of validity to 
consider is internal validity, commonly referred to as a test of the credibility of the 
results of reviews. There are several different types of internal validity to assess. Each is 
defined below and then a determination is made concerning the degree to which it can 
influence the research results based on the design of my study. 
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Face or measurement validity asks: “did I measure what I claimed to measure?” 
The measurement criteria were based on the academic literature, thus following already 
established variables. Looking for new factors, I started from looking at the already 
known and established new ones, so the face validity is high in terms of adopting the 
“natives” language and perspectives. 
A second type of internal validity examines the reliability and consistency of the 
coding system. The original variables in the coding system were based on existing 
literature and I used the definitions and examples provided in the literature to guide the 
coding of the cases. As new factors emerged, the author wrote down what the variable 
seemed to be about in her coding scheme and then went back and examined the 
previously coded cases for the presence of the new factors.  
When considering statistical conclusion validity one would want to ask: “are the 
conclusions strong enough and dependable”? The many different coding/measurement 
systems used in the sample of case studies drawn for the meta-analysis prohibits me 
from stating whether the findings are statistically significant. It allows only for 
statements of the findings and the assumptions embedded within them, and serves as the 
base for more detailed research. 
Another way to look at the question of the internal validity of the study is from 
the perspective of Type I (implying non-existent relationships) and Type II errors (not 
detecting existing relationships). Meta-analysis does not really have a way to detect 
non-existent relationships, since such will be reported in vast minority of the sample 
studies. It is more likely to fail to detect existing relationships, if the sample is rather 
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small or the cases differ widely on how and what they were measuring/ reporting on. In 
this project, the sample of 76 cases and selection on a narrow subject for the study 
allows one to assume it to be good enough to provide conclusions that relationships are 
strong, moderate or weak. 
Furthermore, external validity is also important. In looking at this, one would 
seek to understand the degree of generalizability, that is, can the findings of a meta-
analysis performed on one type of organization be generalized to other types of 
organizations? Meta-analysis is one of the best techniques that allow the researcher to 
assume the greatest generalizability possible. First of all, it takes into consideration 
many other studies about chosen subjects, and brings them together. That allows us to 
detect which facts form the pattern across studies and which were accidental or outliers 
due to some specific settings. 
Methodology Summary 
The choice of research methods was suited to the goal of this project and based 
on the nature of the collected data. Both deductive and inductive research elements are 
incorporated into this meta-analysis in order to test pre-established variables and to find 
the unknown variable/variables: a factor, method or system that was suspected to exist 
somewhere in the DOD. Meta-analysis is an excellent method allowing for investigating 
and drawing conclusions from a number of previous studies. Content analysis of the 
cases was the next choice based on the nature of the subject and its presentation: 
descriptions, reports, explanations, narrative stories, and testimonies. The threats to the 
internal and external validity of the study were carefully considered in the research 
57 
design, coding, analysis and write up activities and every effort was made to minimize 
these to the greatest extent possible. 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of Deductive and Inductive Process 
The qualitative method of researching the subject in form of content analysis 
was chosen for this study. Meta-analysis was used to detect patterns across the cases in 
the DOD area. Deductive reasoning was used to detect if the pre-set of “parent” 
variables occurs in DOD. This set was then extended by new emerging variables. 
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Inductive reasoning was used to identify these factors and arrive at research conclusions 
based on the combined group of deductively and inductively derived factors. 
Chapter Five: Data Coding and Univariate Description 
When analyzing each case, I used both deductive and inductive coding processes 
simultaneously. I started with the list of eight variables and read each case to mark 
where the variable appeared as a starting point for further analysis. While reading the 
cases, other factors that seemed to be important to the organization’s change efforts also 
emerged inductively. I would make note of the new factor within the case and would 
then go back and look at other previously reviewed cases to see if that factor was also 
evident. When I found a recurring pattern suggesting that this factor was not 
idiosyncratic to one case, I would add it to the list of variables that I was searching for 
during the coding process. 
Thus, case coding proceeded deductively with a search for variables already 
present on the ever-expanding list and inductively in a search for factors that seemed to 
emerge from what I was reading. The “incoming” or new variables were not expected to 
match one of the original factors (variables) unless they clearly belonged there; it was 
anticipated to find something entirely new. No specific relationship between the known 
and / or unknown variables was assumed, until it became transparent in repeated 
instances. 
Throughout this coding process, I was constantly observing the placement of 
one variable near others searching for underlying patterns suggesting causal 
relationships that may exist. As I progressed from a few to about the mid-way point in 
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case coding, I began specifically looking and marking the bivariate relationships as a 
means to confirm the causal connections that were inductively emerging. I expected to 
find certain causal connections based on the literature, primarily unidirectional 
relationships between the independent and the dependent variables as noted in the 
research design chapter. 
Stages in Data Analysis 
From this description of the case coding process, I submit that there were three 
main analytical stages in the research process: 
1st stage: exploratory, moving from the specifics of each case to the general 
overall conclusion. Following the suggestions for conducting a grounded theory review 
of the cases, I started with a primarily deductive review of the cases with content 
analysis as the primary method. During this process, I inductively identified additional 
variables and then added them to the list of variables to code. This process continued 
recursively to previously coded cases and iteratively throughout all the case coding. 
2nd stage: Identification of relationships that may exist between variables based 
on the proximity of other variables within the coding for a specific case. These 
relationships were tested in the same manner that I coded the cases for the variables. 
3nd stage: quantitative analysis of the coded variables and the relationships 
between and within the independent and dependent variables, to estimate the strength of 
the relationships between variables based on their presence. The quantitative analysis 
was limited to percentages, since qualitative approach allows researchers to form rather 
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suggestive than significant conclusions. 
Using this coding and analysis strategy, I next report the descriptive statistics for 
the original eight variables as well as for the 16 variables that emerged during the 
coding and analysis. Table 2 shows the original and added variables. Due to the large 
extent of variables across cases, below is a brief explanation of all organizational 
change factors found in the sample cases. In the discussion that follows, the magnitude 
of the variables’ presence in the cases analysis is described to draw initial conclusions 
about their importance to organization change efforts. 
Table 2: Variables that influence organizational change efforts 
Original Variables Newly Identified Variables 
Reasons for change Doctrine Learning 
Leadership Work organization Time 
People Environment Joint work / unity of effort 
Communication Politics Authority / command and control 
Structure Money/Resources Partial transformation 
Culture Change Process Stakeholders 
Planning Safety Innovation as change 
Outcome of Change efforts Computers/software Change being changed 
 
Descriptions of Deductively Identified Variables 
Leadership – this variable was coded in a total of 68 cases, with an average of 
3.7 occurrences per case. In general, this variable has one of the strongest influences 
across all cases. Very broadly taken, when it was coded it was looked at in terms of any 
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action/influence of the leader on the change process. Interestingly, not all the cases 
named a leader as a factor in the change process, the absence of the leader as an aspect 
can be a subject of a very interesting study. Nevertheless, in the 87% of the cases that 
did name leader as a factor, it was a powerful factor. It ranged anywhere from being 
very supportive to the transition, through passive examples to a disrupting, the most 
despised aspect of the transition. For example, Air Force General Merrill McPeak came 
to play a role of a detested outlier in one study. One cannot reflect his leadership in a 
few examples, but it is worth to provide at least a few (c. 106): 
-“General McPeak’s term has been characterized as the most turbulent and 
challenging period in the history of the U.S. Air…” 
- he is seen as “…favoring pilots and making others feel as 2nd class citizens 
caused frustration…” 
-“…the rapid time table and pace General McPeak set for the Air Force did not 
help make many of his changes popular. Some people thought change was being shoved 
down their throats and resisted appropriately…” 
The leadership factor emerged in many perspectives: taking such forms as 
describing relationships with subordinates, in the form of leader’s personality, style of 
leading etc. It is a very rich factor in terms of the variety of ways it surfaces and the 
power it can acquire. The power and significance of this factor could not be exactly 
measured here due to the chosen method of meta-analysis (which does not allow for 
significant statements), plus the subject itself deserves individual study and is different 
from the main goal of this research. Nevertheless, one can see it through some 
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examples: 
-“… poor leaders cause domino effect of deteriorating the organizations and 
processes” (c. 14) 
-“… leader’s ability to achieve synergism in time, space, purpose and effect” (c. 
183) 
-“… creating a new image; open, tough, can take on anything. Innovator, 
rewarding desired patterns, demonstrated desired values, flexible, moving toward 
vision, cooperating with others…” (c. 7) 
-“…organizational adaptation is largely a result of a leader’s decision, choice.” 
(c. 103) 
pinpointing the teams functioning  so well, that all of the members become 
leaders of the processes they are charged with.  
Bottom line, the complexity of leadership was very well mirrored in the sample 
cases of this study.  
People – this factor was coded in a total of 65 cases, had a frequency of 3.8 
mentions per case. Like leadership, it is a variable with one of the strongest influences. 
Whenever employees (non-leaders) were the ones to influence organizational change in 
any way, it was considered as a significant factor. 
It is the most easily explicable factor and just as rich as the leadership variable. 
People in DOD lived to the general standards and more or less actively opposed the 
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change just as their colleagues in the civilian world do. I do not recall a case where they 
succeeded to stop the transformation; however, they managed to remain a non-curable 
obstacle in over 9% cases. The people factor was seen in both individual and group 
actions, and often described their own values, attitudes, hopes dictating their behavior, 
their relations with management, and even their age. Following are a few examples: 
-junior officers attuned to change implementation (c. 24) 
-enthusiasm from those expecting to benefit from change (c. 24) 
-it is within the human dimension that transformation of the culture in the Army 
began (c. 103) 
-the senior leadership understood the compelling need for change, however the 
workforce did not see the same urgency (c. 35) 
-increasing mistrust is related to greater cohesion in the workgroup (c. 101) 
-bitterness and resistance to the entire transformation effort (c. 102) 
Overall, as these statements suggest, DOD people seem to act the same in 
regards to transition as their colleagues in civilian organizations. 
Structure – appeared as a variable in a total of 51 cases. On average, there were 
2.4 codings of the variables per case; suggesting it had a moderate influence on 
organizational change efforts. When I read about things like the degree of formalization, 
span of control, or departmentalization, I coded this passage as structure. In general, one 
can conclude (not surprisingly) that structure is very complex in DOD; it is among the 
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heaviest, one of the most stiff and difficult factors in many organizations, especially the 
public and military ones. 
“The size and complexity of organizations within DOD vary greatly …” (c. 65), 
which very easily leads to “the tragedy of commons” – complex systems containing 
many subsystems that may have that conflict with each other by design or management 
(c. 46). Not surprisingly, it appears in nearly 70% of the cases and is often mentioned as 
a barrier. The good news is that structure was changed to the advantage of the 
organization in nearly 40% of the cases. Hence, the structure in the DOD appears to be 
less stiff than thought of, giving hope the other organizations.  
Culture – appearing in a total of 51 cases with an average of 2.0 mentions per 
case. Across the cases, this variable had a moderate influence on change efforts. 
Normally it was described with statements of a set of specific values, standards shared 
by members of an organization. Like structure, culture is a very difficult factor to 
change. Emerging for long years, it cannot be turned around with one decision and a 
signed paper. Even though it does have some flexibility, it appears to be behind the 
structure. Naturally, it surfaces more often as a barrier than an enhancer. Here are some 
examples of passages coded as culture. 
- DOD is too reliant on technology and combat skills in solving what is 
complex, long-term problems requiring non-kinetic solutions (c.45) 
-outdated military policies regarding human resources (from 19th century); YES 
people rewarded, totally dependent on boss’s opinion (c.14); 
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-lack of planning culture and capacity (c.20); 
-assumption that organizational culture equals collective behavior of leaders that 
others will follow (c.24); 
-organizational support, fairness, rewards system is of an issue (c.111); 
-the lack of understanding found within the interagency community (due to 
differing organizational sub-cultures, mandates, and resources) further complicates 
coordination efforts and [creates] demands [for] reform to enable full cooperation and 
unity of effort/ cultural bias, tendencies, and norms are difficult to overcome, 
particularly in the complex and diverse USG arena (c.53); 
-working and fighting together forms a bond of trust that has enormous 
implications on the beliefs and norms that tie directly back to cultures (c.57); 
-cultural change, create progressive environment open for constant change, 
(c.13); 
-individuals and organizations that share the service and deployment culture 
(c48). 
Even though cultural problems were often evident across the cases and generally 
were found to be difficult to overcome, culture was still an important variable to 
consider since it relates to the core values of DOD organizations in terms of patriotism 
and brotherhood. 
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Communication – found as a factor in 48 cases; and having a frequency of 2.5 
codes per case. This variable demonstrated a moderate influence on change. When I 
read narratives emphasizing communicational habits, channels, networks in an 
organization, I noted the communication factor. The military seems to be making a very 
good use of this factor since it more often appeared as an enhancer, than as a barrier. 
Communication appeared to be an independent factor in change processes since it was 
seldom coded in combination with the variables for culture and structure. 
-messages coordinated between commanders and forces (c.99) 
-constant dialogue helped develop requirements (c.82) 
-success stories continue to drive expectations (c. 43) 
-doctrine written in a standard language promotes simplicity and eliminates 
language barriers; reduces confusion (c. 110) 
-additional communication and support vehicles created (c.45) 
Academic literature identified communication as a factor that was often not 
sufficiently used, such as using very few channels to communicate, not clarifying the 
message, using the language/jargon familiar to the sender, but not to the receiver etc. In 
reviewing these cases, it seems that the military manages well factors of 
communication. 
A planned process for change- coded in 25 cases and appearing 2.8 times per 
case on average. The planned process variable has a moderate influence on change. A 
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lack of attention to the planning process often resulted in inappropriate or inadequate 
transition processes evidenced by policy disagreements and senior leaders’ lack of full 
cooperation, mid-level officers left with their own intuition and continuing to use ad-
hoc approach when solving problems. This made it difficult because at the same time 
they are still responsible for following the guidance, policies and orders.  
The military developed an odd habit of ad-hoc planning. On one hand, it is 
somewhat understandable as usually war is chaotic and one is forced to make big 
decisions on the spot. However, DOD does not have to be as improvised as the war may 
be. The DOD got caught off guard by the environmental changes followed by the “new” 
enemy’s unconventional attack and tactics. The new enemy was not new to the internal 
security forces, which now are forced to fully cooperate with the military. 
And, that is a challenge to the DOD as well. Now DOD struggles to adjust to 
new geo political demands, new enemy, limited budget and volunteers, its own structure 
and procedures, and domestic and foreign cooperation at a new level. That is quite a lot 
of problems to struggle with at the same time, and a habit of ad-hoc planning does not 
help here. Mid-level officers are left to make better decisions regarding majority of the 
above-mentioned new challenges. Those officers most often do not need to be 
micromanaged, but senior officer support would help (although senior officers cannot 
come to one conclusion at their level), but very often is absent. A good regulation could 
be of help as well, but it is being constantly changed (an average of every 3 days!! 
c.31). A lack of cooperation between the senior officers does not add value in building 
an effective joint structure and culture for others to work within the organization. Case 
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37 describes extensively Pentagon’s planning and decision support processes designed 
to be rational are anything but that;  Pentagon planning problems are so complex that 
they defy intuitive judgment alone. 
Reasons for change – the reason for the transformation may be assumed from 
the cases in the form of external factors, such as the environmental, geopolitical 
changes and unconventional enemy, and  increased reliance on National Guard as a 
force (c. 56), -overwhelming chaos (c.7), -diffusion of threats across the globe (c.44). 
Change outcomes - also referred to as a goal developed from current state of 
the DOD not being able to fight unconventional enemy. Hence we can assume this is 
what they should be after transformation:  flexible, highly adaptive military able to fight 
conventional and unconventional threats (c. 13, 40, 42, 47, 49, 52, 53, 57, 58, 82, 94, 
104, 110, 103, 171). The unconventional enemy that DOD is unable to challenge 
effectively often represents a poor change outcome because they do not have control 
over these elements of the external environment. This was suggested in comments such 
as:  
- fighting an enemy that requires technological, intellectual, and cultural 
adaptations (c.13); 
- ambiguous threat environment-from rogue actors employing unconventional 
methods (c.53); 
Additionally cases referred to outcomes as results from attempts to change sub-
procedures in a transformation process (c. 21, 74, 76, 183), or limited opportunities for 
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applying effects for producing desired outcomes while minimizing collateral effects and 
unintended consequences.(c. 74). Sometimes outcomes were not what was expected, as 
seen in this comment, even when the result of a specific policy or action can be 
readily observed, delayed and unexpected outcomes are rarely anticipated in 
full (c.76), or they were attempting to turn the organization to effects- based 
operations (c. 21 and 76). 
Descriptions of Inductively Identified Variables  
After the content analysis of all the cases was completed, the list of variables 
was extended to include the following factors: 
Change Process – this variable occurred in a total of 65 cases, with an average 
of 5.0 mentions per case. I conclude that this variable is one of the highest influencers 
of change efforts. In coding this variable, it seemed to be very similar to the work 
organization factor. However, process of change is different since it pertains to 
implementing transformation, and changing the existing work organization. This 
variable represents an understanding by the case author of the process of changing the 
old system into new one. For example, the change process may have flattened the 
number of levels in the organization. It was assumed that it would emerge here as a 
method commonly used, but surfaced as a cluster of attempts, actions, carried out in 
order to implement transformation. That made it difficult to analyze. Those maneuvers 
were of various types and it is nearly impossible to reflect them here. However, most of 
them reflected the struggle of finding the right way of correct implementation process, 
learning from mistakes and trying to correct them. 
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Within the cases, the process was usually portrayed as difficult, challenging, and 
requiring a lot of critical thinking and analysis of what was going on and why. Once the 
“why” was answered; the next phase of “how” to change the disadvantage around/ how 
to remove the problem was started. Initially, this variable appeared to be quite 
promising in explaining change effort outcomes, since once the barrier was known – the 
solution was quite easy to state, i.e. misalignment between organizational structure and 
process of change (c.8) suggested that we need to align the structure to the current 
process. That is easy to see and state – the problem is how to realign those two? From 
this point on a vicious cycle of errors sometimes was repeated, depending on the 
accuracy of the chosen way of fixing the problem. There were many very interesting 
comments regarding the process of change, each worth a separate study. I can include 
only a few here: 
-"…recognize limitations of “industrial age” organizations and given current 
conditions, consider new ways of organizing…” (c.40); 
- “…revolutionary change disrupting ongoing operations and change itself...” 
(c.57); 
-“… achieving a balanced approach as the most difficult part…” (c. 57); 
- “…change triggers search for antidote …..Eventually the antidotes triumph 
…The solution, in principle if not always in practice, is to carry through …” (c. 61); 
- “any time you attempt to reorganize, the affected area immediately develops 
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antibodies.…… Have the people respond to change as a friend, not enemy” (c.106); 
-“… paradigm of technology ….. was overdone. Technological innovation 
slipped inadvertently into what began to approach a technophobic perspective… the 
best weapon system will never revolutionize anything" (c. 61); 
-“…change must be overturning an existing order!” (c. 167). 
In summary, I found this variable to be very similar to the work organization 
factor. However, the process of change pertains to implementing transformation, very 
often in form of daily actions. We can have pre-and post - transitional work 
organization and the process of changing it is the process of change; i.e. taking 
advantage of existing chaos (pre-transition state) and create more chaos (process of 
change) in order to implement desired change like breaking down cliques, starting new 
system of continuous training etc (c. 7).  
Work organization – found in a total of 57 cases, and averaging 3.3 codes per 
case, the work organization was a factor with high influence on change efforts. Passages 
that described a set up arrangement of carrying out daily duties were coded with the 
work organization variable. It is understood as work set up prior to change occurrence. 
This variable seemed to be a major victim to changing environment. The organization 
of work has been built over long years and worked fine, but once the Cold War was 
ended, quite suddenly lost its effectiveness. It is also a dangerous factor, since little 
flaws in work organization can erode invisibly into major drawbacks, with painfully 
negative consequences. A similar situation was experienced by the DOD and other 
Homeland Security agencies when the tragedy of September 11 happened. In this case, 
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it was closely tied to structural weaknesses as well; the two of them devastatingly 
backfiring on the entire country. Some cases presented examples that question the 
whole purpose of having the military at all: 
-headquarters not effective at sea and ashore… not able to conduct amphibious 
operations/ unable to deploy multiple MEB’s independently (c.81); 
Most cases reflected less extreme situations: 
-work that produces measurable outcomes tends to drive out work that produces 
immeasurable outcomes / measuring the wrong things (c.21); 
-poor contract supervision allowing to over-bill the DOD (c.183); 
- never-ending turnover of personnel, prompting commanding officers  do things 
differently than their predecessors – change for the change’s sake (c. 32). 
However, while trying to fix the work organization, many of the military leaders 
had a great idea of drawing from the academic literature, are taking advantage of the 
civil world solutions: 
- Six sigma, continuous improvement process, organizational analysis and 
design (c. 28); 
-environmental manipulation and open systems (c. 76); 
-the OSF strategic analysis tool used to align organizational decisions with the 
missions (c.65). 
73 
It was a bit surprising, but also pleasant to see military officers seeking solutions 
on their own, without passively relying on DOD official guidance. It was also nice to 
find out that academic literature and professional guidance was helpful in enhancing the 
change efforts. 
Joint work/unity of effort – found in a total of 52 cases, with an average 
frequency of 3.8. This is another variable with high influence on change efforts. The 
concept of joint work emerged from the “people” factor. Many times, it was clearly 
distinguished as joint work and did not “fit” into the people factor. When mentioned as 
a people factor, it would often reflect more about people’s resistance to joint work 
because of their sense of the need for unique skills or abilities, more individual actions, 
or not working well in relation to leaders. When coded as joint cooperation / unity of 
effort it is an attempt to reflect the situation, actions of people coming together from 
different teams, units, branches, organizations and even countries, to try to form new 
bodies, establish new system, carry out a mission.    
Joint work / unity of effort was a powerful factor in DOD change proceedings. It 
was derived from “people” factor. In the beginning, it emerged as one of the many ways 
that people were influencing transition, but quickly proved to be mentioned too many 
times, to be considered a sub-form of a variable. It was also clearly named as the “joint 
effort / cooperation”, not as a consequence of people’s behavior. Therefore, it was re-
counted and treated as a separate factor. Joint work/unity of effort issues surfaced 
mainly as a result of enforced new structure (fusion / cooperation of many Homeland 
Security organizations). Having developed a deep rivalry between the DOD branches it 
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was difficult enough to bring those together to work, let alone embedding them in a new 
network with external institutions. These comments illustrate the coding of this 
variable: 
-independence degrades effectiveness and ability to externally focus when 
attempting to fuse into joint force (c.110); 
-erosion of individual service capabilities that were previously honed by the 
pride of competition (c.42); 
-little or no processes in place to coordinate the interactions of each entity that 
contributes to fielding (c. 35). 
In spite of many obstacles that aroused from merging people of different 
institutes, joint effort and interagency cooperation appeared many times in the cases 
coding and often contributed positively to the change efforts. 
Environment – mentioned in a total of 55 cases, and having a 2.3 frequency per 
case. This is another factor with a heavy influence on change. Codes of this variable 
emerged when reading about things like an external vehicle forcing changes within the 
organization.  In fact, the only reason for organizational change that was ever brought 
up in the DOD was the environment (and ultimately, this uni-dimensional explanation 
for change is why the original reason for change variable was dropped). This force was 
either in form of geo-political, economical pressures or in form of unconventional, 
country-less yet worldwide enemy with his unconventional attacks and tactics. 
The environment was usually mentioned in two forms: either as unconventional 
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enemy using unconventional tactics or geo-political changes: 
- non-state enemy forces operating around the globe in clandestine networks; 
new kinds of enemies—nonconventional forces, networked cells, gorilla bands—
operating in new ways both compel nonconventional responses and provide new models 
for organizing from which we can learn (c.40); 
-mistaken perception of the government regarding the country’s safety (c.103); 
- reduction in personnel anticipates support from external fixed and rotary (c.43) 
and similar issues. 
In spite of its passive behavior in the last three decades, the military seems to be 
back to making attempts to manipulating the external environment. Environment has 
always been an excellent motivator for the Americans, starting from the first pilgrims. 
They took action in their hands, because they did not like what was going on around 
them. Since they did not have enough power to shape what was happening in Europe, 
they literally replaced the environment - with the American one, and tailored it to their 
wants from the very beginning. The trait of defining environment seems to be passed to 
each American generation and thrives on this continent. Such a trait, I bet, can be also 
found in every person coming to this country. Hence, a nation of risk-takers and 
standard- setters developed. The DOD, like other typical American organizations has 
been always striving to be the best in the world, in every meaning of the word. After the 
unconventional and surprising attack of September 11, DOD examines the threat and 
tries to turn around the external factors back to the US advantage. A few examples 
reflect benefiting from many external sources:  
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-technology (c.14) / enemy as a force/motivator that requires technological, 
intellectual, and cultural adaptations (c.13) / collaborative technology for distributing 
information (c.40) / technology allows smaller forces achieve greater effects (c. 98); 
-outsiders’ knowledge – “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need 
not fear the result of a hundred battles. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know 
yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy 
and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” (c. 74); 
-enemy’s weaknesses - OODA Loop: observe, orient, decide, act by COL John 
Boyd. To combat enemy’s OODA we change speed and direction faster: short-circuit 
enemy’s thinking process which will produce opportunity for the enemy to react 
inappropriately, (c.10); 
- Global War on Terrorism created the environment for transformation (c.43); 
-changes with exogenous impetus appear to be accepted with relative ease by the 
acquisition organization: such “changes are generally adopted and acted upon with little 
significant resistance (c. 32); 
- the best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the 
organization relates (c.103). 
Thus, the DOD, reflecting typical American rearing, tends to recognize the role 
of the environment in driving change efforts and likewise attempts to make good use of 
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the environment to suit their purposes. 
Doctrine – coded in a total of 43 cases, with an average frequency per case of  
2.3. This variable seems to have a moderate influence on change processes. The 
narratives that related to doctrine described the influence of set procedures, regulations, 
laws, and orders. DOD personnel are usually strictly obligated to follow them.  
From a purely theoretical perspective, the obligation to follow doctrine has 
always been questionable, as it tends to restrain innovative solutions and strategic 
thinking. In the DOD transformation case it is of a particular concern since the doctrine 
itself does “lose” control of occurring processes, is very inconsistent and does not keep 
up with what has been going on. Without specific governing guidance, providing a 
means of unity of command or effort we cannot expect to be successful; working within 
a “coalition of the willing” framework will not suffice. This variable is like most of the 
others: a barrier, an enhancer and an excuse as well. Some of the regulations prevent a 
soldier and a leader from being effective, (particularly due to authority and chain of 
command regulations). Leaders have more room for being cooperative and can either 
allow or block effective work of a soldier when it comes to joint work. However 
“without specific governing guidance we cannot expect to be successful, working 
within a “coalition of willing” framework will not suffice” (c.47). While unity of effort 
can overcome many regulatory gaps, the ability of funding a mission and requirement of 
obtaining approval for major decisions can effectively block any process.  
Doctrinal barrier is also an obstacle because it is being constantly changed; 
giving the leaders no chance to implement and follow it, but constantly reading the 
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updates and changing what was already changed (just 3 days before, c.31). Even though 
it’s being changed so many times joint doctrine is (still) in a catch-up mode with 
modern war fighting tactics: “today the US doctrine cannot keep pace with the new 
technologies, info, systems and the people fighting the war” (c.43). 
Authority/control and command – coded  in 41 of 76 cases, and appearing on 
average 2.6 times per case. This variable has a moderate influence on change. 
Discussions of the assigned or assumed authority to carry out the task / mission; to 
make decisions and, or implement them were examples of when I used the authority 
code. Authority also reflected authority over subordinates and established or new way 
of commanding them and controlling their actions. 
DOD experiences issues with authority, responsibility, freedom of deciding and 
command and control in a large number of cases. Wayne Taylor names unity of 
command as the #1 issue: “only one responsible commander” should be the rule (c.42); 
writing that: “the violation of this principle creates confusion, undermines authority, 
threatens stability, breeds irresponsibility and, if long-lasting, wreaks havoc.” He also 
wrote, “Bifurcation of authority is a recipe for disaster.” (c.43). The legislative part of 
defining authority / command and control issues seems to cause many problems while 
carrying out the process of change and delivering expected goals. 
Money/resources – coded  with 38 cases, an average of  2.2 times per case. This 
variable has a weak influence on change process. Common mentions of budget, funds 
assigned to carry out missions; resources in form of number of people available; 
technologies, tools obtainable in exchange for money were a basis for using this code. 
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There were other passages that included money or resources, but the coding was 
different. For example, the people as a factor was counted when the action, behavior of 
people was influencing the change; people as resource was counted when there was 
shortage of staff / forced change to cut staff due to budget constraints.  
The importance of money in change processes is ever present and usually 
negative factor in all public companies. DOD has a given budget, and over most recent 
decades, it was severely cut due to perceived lack of threat. “Suffering from years of 
insufficient funding, the facilities, ranges, housing, and quality of life programs that 
form the core of the Army’s hometowns were in poor condition. Funding dipped to its 
lowest; accounts were often funded at 50 percent or less” (c.103). “Funding and 
programs were having a direct impact on increased retention of field grade officers and 
senior noncommissioned officers. It also indicated that readiness was suffering” (c. 
103). Following the underfunding, additional problems developed as these comments 
suggest: “Parochialism turns negative when competing for limited budget, the gain of 
one service is at the expense of another” (c.110); “Money allocation does not mirror 
strategic priorities” (c.69);“Problems of control of resources & their application” 
(c.100).  
However even here a few solutions have been identified and applied:  
-“shift from a program-focused approach to an integrated cross-program 
process-focused approach that will align resources to more efficiently achieve the Coast 
Guard’s strategic goals. (c. 97); 
- reuse what they have, before buying or building new. (c.95); 
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-particularly important was efficiency through standardization of support and 
services as well as reinvestment of the savings (c.103); 
-recurring savings from the reduced excess (c.62); 
-clear statements about the place the National Guard will play in the defense of 
the nation and other defense programs would help clarify budgeting (c.57). 
It is undeniable that military deals actively with occurring problems related to 
money and resources. However, the low percentage of cases where this variable was 
coded suggests that the authors see that as a daily operating condition and not a special 
circumstance related to change efforts.   
Learning – appearing in 37 cases, with an average frequency of 1.9 codes per 
case. This variable had a weak influence on all cases, but a moderate influence on the 
process of change within the cases where it was described. The learn factor reflects the 
education, awareness and training issues influencing transition. 
Learning was often described as an awareness of the need for or the availability 
of training and education in support of the new processes and work duties that would 
occur after the change efforts. It surfaced as the commonly used supplemental factor in 
DOD change (out of those cases that had extra enhancers, learning was the most 
common). People, leaders in 45% of the cases turned to it for help. One could examine 
the reasons why in the other 55% cases’ learning was not utilized, wondering why were 
they so sure of what they were doing? Learning factor was named as a challenge in 
some the cases, yet true to its nature, it usually served the transition process. Here are 
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some case conclusions about learning: 
-significant challenges in separating relevant info from the background clutter 
and fusing data from multiple sources to deduce a coherent picture (c.44); 
- understanding future threats is a constant challenge in the change process 
(c.44); 
-how to design a training that is realistic enough (c.86); 
 -key enterprise change variable – people and  knowledge (c. 28);  
- turn attention to the different methods to assessing the most relevant effects 
across the dimensions (c. 76); 
-relevant case studies and the literature provided the missing link between the 
corporate world and the institutional Army (c. 10); 
-education, training- have a clear understanding and appreciation of the scope 
and function of participating institutions, including their capabilities, limitations, 
methods, viewpoint, and culture. (c.53); 
-increase capabilities of partners—international and domestic (c.60); 
-joint training (c.43). 
Politics – appearing as a variable in a total of 28 cases, averaging 2.1 codes per 
case. Politics is a variable with a weak influence on change processes. Even though 
politics have been already stated as a part of environment, this new factor of politics 
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reflects more of “inside” political pressures on DOD. Many of the politicians are 
directly involved in shaping what is going on within DOD, such as the president - the 
commander in chief, secretary of state, secretary of defense, defense committees etc. 
These people frequently influenced the course of proceedings in the DOD. 
Politics was really an inside factor in DOD change efforts. Many politicians 
work very closely with the military officers and serve as a link between DOD and 
Congress. Only about one-fourth of the cases named politics as a barrier, suggesting a 
good relationship and cooperation. Military officers seem to and play very active role in 
political networks, communicating, explaining, and pressuring in order to align political 
decisions with DOD goals. A few examples of political barriers and enhancers are 
below: 
-a very real danger is asking any system to do too many things resulting in a 
system that does nothing especially well… (c.41, 45); 
-subject to Presidential preference and administration turnover, (c.20); 
-pressures, games, networks, cliques, have to keep community, politicians & 
union happy (c.7); 
- Committees are dedicated to the military; military expertise is seldom 
challenged; authorizing participants work in closed groups that share the same interests 
of a safe country (c.183);  
-military jargon - complicated and tedious – is being used by the military 
officers to their advantage while dealing with politicians (c183); 
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-retain a resilient network of alliances and partnerships (c. 60); 
-charged with responsibility oversight officers, who have had no say about what 
is being done because of politicians (c. 40); 
-Congress does not appear to have any type of expedited veto authority 
(constitutionality aside) that could prevent a proposed reorganization from going into 
effect (c.70); 
- pay full respect to the authority of political context (c.61). 
Time – coded in only 11 cases, at an average of 1.5 codes per case. As these 
numbers suggest, time has light influence on change processes. Descriptions suggesting 
a time shortage and time management problems were brought up in a few cases as a 
factor important in change process. 
In the cases, there were mentions of a lack of time, constraints on time, and time 
management issues. The time factor emerged mainly as a barrier to change, rarely 
helping to make change efforts successful. Considering it was seldom brought up as a 
factor, one can assume that DOD personnel deals very efficiently with time constraints.  
Below are a few examples of how “time” variable appeared: 
-because of the schedule constrains there was no time to glean over the most 
useful information (c. 46);  
-change is taking longer than anticipated (c.58); 
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-lack of time (c.30); 
--unfortunately, after twenty years joint doctrine is not completely ingrained into 
our culture (c.31); 
-“I knew that the things I most wanted to do in four years would have to be done 
in the first six months of my tenure. My advice is, if you don’t do it in the first six 
months, then you can forget it” (c.106); 
-ensure sufficient time for planning (c. 30). 
Technology /Innovation understood as change – evident in only 10 cases, this 
variable also has a light influence on change. In the cases coded with this variable, it 
sometimes cases showed that innovation, technology was interpreted as an 
organizational change. That led to honest wondering why the new system is not 
producing the desired outcome. That factor was either identified by the staff and 
corrected or identified only by the case author and described as an example of how 
people try to carry out change. 
Innovation understood as organizational change happened to happen in the 
military. On one hand it is no wonder, since DOD benefits heavily from acquiring the 
best technology available; however it brought some people to think it was the 
organizational change that was needed. Some examples: 
-belief a quick organization change and a few technical solutions are going to 
resolve the Interagency Information-Sharing (IIS) conundrum. (c.95); 
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--do not confuse change with improvements or investment – it is human 
endeavor (c.13); 
- Knowledge Management is more about people and corporate/organizational 
culture than it is about technology. Those that have been led down the path of a quick 
technological solution have most often and regrettably failed (trying to implement it 
solely as a technical solution (a box with a few wires) and not getting people involved 
early on) (c.95). 
Partial transformation – originally coded in a total of seven cases, later it was 
considered to be an (incomplete) outcome measure. It has a very light but very powerful 
and significant influence on change in the cases in which it did appear. It is a sign of 
how DOD is implementing the overall transformation – by changing only some units, 
while others continue to work the usual way. That explained why transition is not 
synchronized, proceeds at different pace and gives in to a commander style, 
effectiveness, personality. It significantly postpones and hampers the overall DOD 
effectiveness. Surprisingly, this factor was mentioned very seldom. Maybe that is 
because the authors were focusing on the details of change implementation applied to a 
unit / a company / a brigade, seldom referring to the overall DOD transformation 
proceedings. 
Another problem that occurred in only a small number of cases is that only some 
units get transformed, while others must wait their turn. Some units transform in 
revolutionary way (c. 87), some in incremental – there has been never a final decision 
made about it, it was up to a commanding general, i.e. while most or all of the active 
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Army’s combat brigades will  be transformed to the UA structure, the rest of the Army 
will still be organized along traditional lines….(c.46). Amazingly, a factor that would 
seem very important on its face validity was distinguished only in seven out of 76 cases. 
Safety – was a focus in a total of two cases, suggesting very light, but worth 
noting, influence. The safety of DOD personnel and/or the civilian people sometimes 
emerged as a factor that ultimately shaped the proceedings of change. Safety appeared 
only as an obstruction to the change processes, and even here, half of the time it was 
safety of the data, not the personnel as one would expect for organizations with a war  
fighting mission.  
-safety restrictions are problematic due to cost and complexity, safety, 
confidentiality and confidence level of data (c.8); 
-lack of attention to issues of security (c.40). 
It was a bit surprising to see military not bringing up the safety issue, but 
perhaps this can be explained with the understanding that whenever the military is 
attempting to achieve its mission, the safety of the personnel will always be at risk and 
not something that the organization can try to change.   
Computers and software architecture – also mentioned in only two cases. 
This variable included descriptions of how technology can shape the way 
communication and performance is carried out. In one case, it was brought up as a 
significant factor in change proceedings. Computers - software architecture did not 
appear as a common factor, but was named and, looking at the examples below, was 
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important to explicitly consider. 
- Software architecture to be aligned with organizational structure and 
communicational patterns-which may evolve; to serve as a bridge between the goal, the 
system and its implantation (c.8); 
-flexible enough software to be able to handle future change (c.8); 
- taking advantage of the strengths of the workers and each software application: 
assign them where best suited. (c.10). 
Stakeholder – this variable was important in only two cases, but was 
specifically named as such by the authors. Suggested some stakeholders of Department 
of Defense and brought up as a factor in the description of change. This factor appeared 
solely as a barrier, mentioned as below: 
-stakeholder artificially chosen; leader, people excluded as such (c.24);  
-compelling need for change was not fully embraced or accepted by all partners 
and stakeholders (c.35). 
Change being constantly changed – was a factor in only one case, but upon 
discovering it I wondered why it did not have more mentions across the cases since it 
seemed to be very powerful variable in my view. One can assume that a constant 
change of regulations applies and affects nearly every leader carrying out change. I 
imagine many cases focused on describing the actual process of undertaken change 
without reflecting the irritating companionship of constant updates shoved up on them. 
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It also may be a result of the different perspectives of organizational change that case 
authors were concentrating on. 
Bottom line, the relative strength of the variables was measured by their 
occurrence. Due to this fact, the following factors: time (11 cases), technology 
understood as change (10 cases), partial transformation (7 cases), safety (2 cases), 
computer systems (2 cases), stakeholder (2 cases) and change being constantly changed 
(1 case) were dropped out of further analysis. However, they cannot be completely 
discarded, since if they do occur in a particular setting, it is for a reason and their 
influence in such situation is very significant.  
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Chapter Six: Data Analysis and Research Findings 
In Chapter Five, we described the variables that were coded and presented 
information about the frequency and magnitude of the variables within the data set. One 
conclusion that we reached was that the factors that had the most relevance in the DOD 
cases were two of the originally identified variables (Leader and People)  and four were 
newly identified variables (Doctrine, Work Organization, Change Process, and Joint 
Effort). The less commonly coded variables were culture, structure, communication, 
environment, authority/control and command, money/resources, planning, politics and 
learning.  
There emerged a third group of factors that had very low frequency in coding:  
time management, safety, stakeholders, and software. Even though they may have been 
important in a specific case, they were not recurring and thus are dropped from further 
analysis due to the very low occurrence.  
As suggested in the previous chapter, deeper analysis of the cases in which the 
partial transformation and technology/innovation understood as change variable 
indicated that the authors were really describing a current outcome of the DOD 
transformation. So, for the remainder of the analysis, they are incorporated into the 
outcome measure of change dependent variable and will be looked at in this way. 
Searching for the specific reasons for change, I found that within the cases it 
was always mentioned as taking the form of an external force such as geopolitical 
changes and the emergence of an unconventional enemy. In re-examining the cases to 
determine what narratives were providing insight into the impetus for change, I realized 
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that there were narratives in the cases that did describe WHY they were changing. 
Instead of coding them as a reason, I had instead coded them as being an environmental 
factor.  
Determining this to be the case in many instances of the environment variable 
coding I have eliminated this factor, reason for change, from further analysis and report 
the instances that tell why using the environment codes reflects more accurately the 
perspectives of the case authors. Using this coding and analysis protocol, the frequency 
of the environment code is an appearance in a total of 55 cases, with an average of 2.3 
codes per case. This factor, then, can be assumed to be the primary, and nearly 
universal, reason for change in DOD. 
Starting with these findings about the variables that emerged as being important 
and continuing on to deeper analysis, this chapter introduces two important new 
variables that emerged in the case review as intervening between the independent and 
dependent variables. I reviewed the different forms of analysis undertaken to uncover 
the bivariate and multivariate relationships within the set of variables.  
 Analysis of Bivariate and Multivariate Relationships 
After all the cases were coded on the deductive and inductively identified 
variables, the next step in the analysis was to look more closely at the relationships 
between the variables. To accomplish this there were three different types of analysis 
performed. 
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Type A Analysis: In this analysis, I re-analyzed each of the coded items to 
determine if they represented barriers or obstacles to the change efforts or if they tended 
to be an enhanced of the change efforts. Conclusions from content analysis were 
gathered and summarized as either a barrier or an enhancer and are presented in the 
form of percentages. The purpose of the Type A Analysis was to provide an answer for 
the overarching question of the study: what are the barriers and enhancers in DOD 
change? As well as: what are relationships between the factors that influence change 
efforts in the DOD?  
Type B Analysis: during the content analysis a pattern emerged: it appeared that 
there was nearly always a turning point during the transition processes in the DOD 
organization’s change efforts. To confirm the prevalence of this underlying pattern, I 
conducted an iterative analysis that I have labeled the Type B Analysis. Since this 
turning point was not described in the literature that guided my inquiry, the Type B 
analysis serves as an additional means for answering Research Question #3. 
Type C Analysis: in the final round of analysis, conclusions from the qualitative 
examination of the deductive and inductive variables were grouped in a variety of ways 
and used for quantitative analysis in order to distinguish/estimate possible relationship 
between variables, patterns based on their presence in the cases. This analysis resulted 
in a logic model to describe the causal relationships between the most important 
variables drawn from the cases and thus is intended to be an additional means to answer 
Research Question #4. 
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In each of the three types of analysis, causal relationships between variables 
were never assumed unless they were transparent in a majority of the cases studied. The 
overarching question guiding this research was whether there are factors affecting 
organizational change in DOD that are not already identified in the extant literature and 
what was the role of the leader throughout the process. In each type of analysis, A, B, 
and C, I performed special sub analysis to isolate the leader variable and to provide 
information that would assist me in answering Research Question #2. In much of the 
change literature, the identified method of managing change tends to point more to the 
correct identification of a single factor rather than to any interactive relationship 
between variables. The ultimate purpose of the Type B analysis (comparison of factors’ 
occurrence) was to attempt to detect/observe inter-relationships between the 
independent variables as they act on the dependent variable. 
Type A Analysis – Identification of Barriers and Enhancers 
The primary focus of the Type A Analysis was to identify what barriers and 
what enhancers were described in the 76 cases included in this study. To answer this 
question, a detailed content analysis of every case was first performed. Any factor that 
was pointed out or surfaced as influencing change proceedings was categorized as a 
either a barrier or enhancer and then coded with a second code to reflect its source. The 
analytical protocol is demonstrated by this example:  
Case 7 was from the very beginning full of statements like “…agency fallen into 
chaos” (p.35), “chaos created by Barry’s administration” (p.57), and “surrounding 
chaos” (p.59). The use of the word chaos seems to be describing that the state of an 
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organization was clearly an existing barrier to virtually everything, and especially to the 
change efforts. Thus, the barrier code was assigned to each passage. Then, the source of 
the barrier was also coded. When the author refers to Barry’s administration, he is 
referring to the previous leader, so the leader code was assigned to this passage as well 
and recorded on the code sheet in the barrier column. Likewise, the author refers in the 
first passage to the agency, so that passage received the codes for barrier and work 
organization. 
The role of the new leader (Ramsey) in the change efforts, and particularly in 
dealing with the chaos left behind by the previous leader, (Barry), was clearly an 
important element in overcoming the barrier to change and moving the process forward. 
Drawing from the same case, we see a description of an idea the new leader came up 
with:  
“He intentionally took advantage of the surrounding chaos in the political 
community and created a little chaos within the police department. He wanted an 
operational setting that would give him an advantage as a stranger in the land he created 
as opposed to the land he inherited. Now everyone had to figure out where they 
belonged and the new rules of operations.” (p.59) … I had to take the opportunity to 
change things around…I had to strike really quickly. The window of opportunity was 
there and I took advantage of the chaos. Chaos is not always a bad thing” (p.59), 
“Ramsey encouraged … to visit chaos long enough to break up an unhealthy stability 
and to create the new shared operational reality.” (p.60) … changes helped to block 
forces against Ramsey’s effort of defining a new reality,  Again, he saw the window of 
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opportunity created by the chaos to create something new” (p.64).   
Clearly, the new leader needed to be coded as an important variable in this 
passage, so it was coded as leader. Also, his idea of taking advantage of chaos to create 
more chaos to break unhealthy stability and create a new operational reality, suggesting 
the chosen way of changing the situation, so two more codes were noted in this passage: 
process to reflect the importance of the process of change and enhancer reflecting the 
positive source of overcoming the barrier to change efforts, the new leader and the steps 
he took to change the situation. 
Table 3 reflects all the factors used for the data analysis and reports their 
occurrence in form of a barrier and an enhancer. Each side of the table (barriers and 
enhancers) is rank ordered to report the variables with the most frequency.  
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Table 3: Incidence of Barrier (B) and Enhancer (E) Codes in the Cases 
Barrier in 
# of cases Variable Name Variable Name 
Enhancer in  
# of cases 
56 Leadership Change Process 59 
55 People People 55 
50 Work organization Leadership 53 
48 Change Process Joint work/unity 45 
45 Doctrine Communication 42 
44 Environment Structure 34 
42 Culture Environment 34 
41 Structure Learning 34 
33 Joint work/unity Work organization 32 
32 Communication Doctrine 32 
30 Authority / Command & Control Authority / Command & Control 29 
28 Money/Resources Culture 28 
25 Planning Money/Resources 28 
20 Politics Planning 17 
11 Learning Politics 14 
9 Time Time 4 
9 Tech./Innovation. mistaken for change Tech./Innovation. mistaken for change 2 
5 Partial transformation Computers/software 2 
2 Safety Partial transformation 1 
2 Stakeholders Change being changed 1 
1 Change being changed Reasons for change 0 
1 Computers/software Outcome measure 0 
0 Reasons for change Safety 0 
0 Outcome measure Stakeholders 0 
 
After assigning a code to the case content that represented a barrier or an 
enhancer, the next step was to determine the most common patterns that occurred and to 
document which factors occurred in how many cases. Provided in Table 4 is a little part 
of the BARRIERS’s summary table reflecting the cases it appeared as a code in. Thus, a 
leader factor appeared as a barrier twice in case # 24. The letters right next to “24” are 
“Tol” and “CC”. They reflect yet another group of factors that were emerging as 
important leader as a barrier due to type of leadership (TOL) and the other – ineffective 
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leader as a barrier due to not adequate control/command (CC) s/he had. Those 
additional factors were also counted and included in the Type A analysis. The same 
form of analysis was completed for the ENHANCERS; an excerpt of the results is 
provided in Table 5. 
Table 4: Excerpt of Cases with Barriers & the Secondary Variable Coding 
Stakeholder Leader Communication Structure Work organiz. Culture People 
24 24 tol 24 24 24 cc 24 cc 24 
35 24 cc 29 7 24 tol 24 tol 24 
 
29 cc, tol 8 8 7 111 111 
 
7 tol 8 8 8 8 111 
 
8 tol 12 8 8 13 111 
 
8 tol 40 12 un, jt 10 14 111 
 
10 30 12 10 20 7 
 
12 47 14 12 20 8 
 
13 tol 47 jt 30 12 40 tol, a 8 
 
14 tol 53 30 12 30 12 
 
14 tol 53 un 47 jt,a 12 2t 47 jt,a 12 
 
20 95 57 env 14 53-jt 14 
 
30 a 95 jt 57 14 53 jt 14 
 
47 95 57 20 JT 57 env 20 
 
47 cc,a 37 70 a 20 JT 95 2 
tol: type of leadership   un: unity of effort 
cc: command and control  jt: joint effort 
a: authority    env: environment 
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Table 5: Excerpt of Cases with Enhancers & the Secondary Variable Coding 
 
People Environment Politics Money/resources 
24 29 12 53 a 
24 12 jt 13 57 pl 
111 12 20jt 57 pl 
111 13 103 95 
111 20jt 103 95 pl 
111 20jt 100 103 
8 20jt 31 103 
10 20jt 102 62 
12 20jt 61 37 
13 20jt 110 106 
jt: joint effort   pl: planning     a: authority 
  
After the re-analysis of the cases was done to identify the primary, secondary 
and in some cases, tertiary relationships that existed between evidence of barriers or 
enhancers and the other variables, the next step in the Type A Analysis was to draw 
conclusions about the most important interrelationships between variables and how they 
could lead to a barrier or enhancer for the organizations’ change efforts. Table 6 reflects 
the barrier and enhancer in order from the most to the least common: 
 
 
 
98 
Table 6: Major Factors Representing Change Barriers or Enhancers 
% of 76 
cases 
BARRIERS ENHANCERS % of 76 
cases 
73% Leadership Change Process 78% 
72% People People 72% 
66% Work organization Leadership 70% 
63% Change Process Joint work/unity 59% 
58% Environment Communication 55% 
55% Culture Structure 45% 
54% Structure Environment 45% 
43% Joint work/unity Learning 45% 
42% Communication Doctrine 42% 
39% Authority / command, control Work organization 42% 
38% Doctrine Authority / command, control 38% 
37% Money/Resources Culture 37% 
33% Planning Money/ Resources 37% 
26% Politics Planning 22% 
14% Learning Politics 18% 
 
What is surprising from these results in the table is that the most common 
barriers of change are nearly the same as the most common enhancers. Leadership is 
ranked as the number one barrier, occurring in 73% of the cases studied. When 
considering the most important variables that can enhance the change process, 
Leadership is listed again in 70% of the cases and is the third most important variable in 
the enhancers list. The variable for People is the second most important barrier as well 
as the second most important enhancer. The last most common variable that is 
duplicated in the table is Change Process, coded as an important barrier in 63% of 
cases, and appearing in 78% of cases analyzed as an enhancer.  
When this pattern emerged, I performed additional in-depth analysis in order to 
find out more about the barriers and enhancers. Below are examples drawn from the 
cases illustrating how the same factors had both a negative and positive influence on the 
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organization’s change efforts. These randomly chosen examples illustrate how a 
variable was both a barrier and an enhancer and that once a problem was identified 
during the change effort, the solution imposes itself. For example, in case 24, I found 
that the barrier was a lack of guidance from the leader. Then, in the case narrative, I 
later found documentation that the leader was engaged and provided guidance, which 
therefore resolved the problem.  
Table 7: The leadership variable as barrier and enhancer 
Case # Barrier Enhancer 
24 People frustrated w/ lack of guidance Leadership support 
14 
Poor leaders cause domino effect of deteriorating 
the org & processes; toxic leader = toxic 
organization 
Get rid of toxic leaders; develop & maintain 
quality leaders; repair basic foundation of 
leadership 
30 
Ineffectiveness due to lack of controlling  and 
authority Seamless C&C for the leaders 
57 
Ignorance of the unique challenges that RC leaders 
face is still pervasive with AC leaders and vice-
versa. This gap reduces the speed of integration 
and effectiveness of inter-component 
An exchange program between RC officers and 
AC officers will help bridge this gap of 
understanding unique capabilities &challenges. 
The exchanges will have second and third order 
effects as participants   return to their component 
and share their experiences 
 
As one can see from Table 7, leadership surfaces as an extremely influential 
variable in the transformation process from barrier to enhancer. The case analysis 
reveals that it is also a very controversial variable as well. In many of the cases, I 
discovered a recurring theme: How does one tell the leader, they are the problem here? 
In the DOD it was mainly the top management and/ or politicians (yet, another type of 
leader) that had the ability to make this observation and, also, the tools to turn this 
factor around. This transition from barrier to enhancer was often accomplished by 
granting more flexibility, giving more authority, modifying the law, changing structures 
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or even getting rid of the toxic leader. In cases where the leader was a barrier, the 
organizational structure was often an aid as well. In the military, it is traditional to 
frequently rotate leaders to a new duty post within the organization chart. When this 
happened, the new leader who joined the organization identified the mistakes of the old 
leader and corrected them. 
 Sometimes leaders proved to be so open minded that they recognized their own 
errors and rehabilitated themselves. Many times, guidance from the subordinates was 
honestly and openly asked for by the leader. When this happened, the transition of the 
leader variable from barrier to enhancer was obvious. The point of the change process 
was to identify where the problem was, from there the leader could proceed to correct it. 
As predicted in the organizational change literature, another important human 
systems factor – people – and in particular, the subordinates of the leader, surfaced as 
both a barrier and an enhancer in a majority of the cases analyzed. Following are a few 
examples: 
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Table 8: The people variable as barrier and enhancer 
 
As one can see from the case comments presented in Table 8, people in the 
military often cause the same problems during the change process as those in civilian 
world. Common examples of barriers are resistance, unwillingness to give up on their 
individual advantages for the sake of the new organizational goal, not fully embracing 
new structures, teams, etc. Case 106 for example reflects “some people thought change 
was being shoved down their throats and resisted appropriately”(p.27); or not 
understanding and therefore resisting  as in this quote: “ The new uniform was a stupid, 
minutia thing. With the big-time stuff such as cutting people and planes going on, to 
fool around with the uniform sort of trivializes his time” (p.31); and resisting out of 
fear: “What happened was, we went from 203 wings (people) to something less that 90 
on active service.”  
People usually resist change for a variety of reasons: they are afraid of its 
consequences; they do not understand the need for it, they are forced to abandon work 
case 
# 
BARRIER ENHANCER 
100 Institutional loyalty to the parent organization 
conflicts with loyalty developed to the JIACG 
through close coordination with other members. 
create unified interagency staffs at each of the regional 
commands to augment or replace the present military-
centric Combatant Commands 
106 Any time you attempt to re-organize, the affected 
area immediately develops antibodies 
Have the people respond to change as a friend, not the 
enemy 
15 subordination of individual interest to general interest is the largest obstacle to overcome 
develop an atmosphere focused on collaboration and 
unified purpose 
99 one of the critical challenges of executing IW is lack 
of assessment / warrior’s ability to assess 
effectiveness is limited 
situation was improved w/aggressive education  / were 
cross-trained 
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organization that they have gotten used to. The astonishing fact, when considering the 
people variable as both a barrier and an enhancer of change efforts, is that quite often 
the shortcomings of established routines are seen as natural occurrence everyone deals 
with. It usually takes a powerful, and sometimes an external, force (i.e. a new leader, 
environmental/political/economical changes) to pressure acknowledgment of the barrier 
and to foster an appropriate response to existing arrangements. 
Another very important factor in DOD was determined to be the work 
organization. Like leader and people, coding of this variable suggested that it also 
played a dual role as a barrier and an enhancer, as suggested in the next table: 
Table 9: The work organization variable as barrier and enhancer 
case 
# 
BARRIER ENHANCER 
100 
Under-Secretary level and the meetings occur in 
Washington, with representatives who are often 
unfamiliar with facts on the ground. 
Understandably, the Washington perspective often 
varies widely from that espoused by officers in the 
field 
Integrating different perspectives at a lower level, with 
the regional Under-Secretary able to give a 
consolidated response plan to the Secretary. 
56 
competing National Guard missions (federal and 
state) / Guard structure must be changed from a 
"Strength/Legacy Based" structure to a 
"Capabilities Based" / mission imbalances have 
brought the Guard close to the breaking point 
Guard structure must be changed from a 
"Strength/Legacy Based" structure to a "Capabilities 
Based" one / - capitalize on complimentary aspects of 
the state and federal missions, harmonizing the 
National Guard’s capabilities with its broad 
responsibilities 
28 
lack of integrated, cross enterprise knowledge 
needed to support & make rapid, accurate decisions 
Stove-piped data must be horizontally integrated & 
shared. / 6-sigma/cont. improvement process, org 
analysis 
46 
The tragedy of the commons.
50 
Complex systems 
contain many subsystems that may have goals that 
conflict with each other by design or management. 
(Garrett Hardin.) 
understand where the system is currently, what needs to 
be changed or improved and finally what the desired 
end-state of the system should be 
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Everyday people may complain of faulty work organization (i.e. subsystems 
ending up having contradicting goals – c. 46), but it is definitely up to the leader, 
whether formally designated or informally recognized, to recognize the problem and do 
something about it – preferably choose the best solution. The obstacle of inefficient 
work organization usually will not correct itself. Based on the leader’s choice the 
problem either snowballs into a crisis or brings tremendous benefits when successfully 
addressed. The point here is to recognize the obstacle and appropriately respond to it.  
The change process of transforming the organization proves to be another 
powerful factor that can be either a barrier or enhancer. In the next table, I provide an 
example of how this variable emerged in relation to the barrier and enhancer variables 
to illustrate: 
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Table 10: The change process variable as a barrier and an enhancer   
Case 
# BARRIER ENHANCER 
100 
Both strategic and operational direction was confused. 
Coordination problems were often met by simply 
expanding the number of officers working on the 
problem, rather than attempting to create a managed 
solution 
Align interagency operating areas, and utilize 
existing interagency planning documents across 
the interagency process. 
58 
When and how the functional and multi-functional units 
will finally align was still undetermined / the most 
difficult part of the transformational process was 
achieving a balanced approach. Chapter II in the 2001 
QDR best explains this approach by stating, “A balance 
must be struck between the need to meet current threats 
while transforming the force over time.” 
The result of this planning effort  led to the 
development of four  strategic objectives-  
Given the guidance, the services could better 
focus their transformational efforts to meet the 
strategic objectives 
28 
the processes to CH & the implementation of the 
processing centers are not synchronized /  software 
developing funding instability forcing schedule 
slippages /  CH programs suffer from instability, delays, 
quantity adjustments, CH in schedule, implementing 
new CH programs w/out evaluating them 
begin with fully developed and evaluated 
change program 
46 
While most or all of the active Army’s combat brigades 
will be transformed to the UA structure by 2007, the rest 
of the Army will still be organized along traditional 
lines! / The problem is not change itself, for change is 
ubiquitous.
10 
The problem lies in managing change and 
shaping it to meet the desired ends, decreasing the 
unknown by analyzing effects of proposed changes and 
their possible unintended consequences. 
design to work in conjunction with other 
transformation efforts/ understand where the 
system is currently, what needs to be changed 
or improved and finally what the desired end-
state of the system should be 
7 Chaos 
Taking advantage of existing chaos and creating 
even more of it in order to change the systems, 
break down cliques, impose desired changes, 
shape new social reality using; using turning 
events for change advantage 
 
It was mentioned previously that once an obstacle is identified, the solution is 
self-imposing. For example, when a problem is in-between branches deeply rooted 
rivalry solution, there is often an attempt to eliminate cultural differences suggesting 
integration. The trick is to find an effective way to (in this case) promptly eliminate the 
rivalry. In spite of the presence of a self-imposing solution, the process of changing the 
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barrier may be not as obvious. The turning point in the case of the change process 
variable is a choice of the best possible solution, and it is naturally subsequent to 
distinguishing an obstacle phase. 
Based on the high level of overlap documented for the leadership, people, work 
organization, and change process, it seems reasonable to conclude that the barriers in 
the process of change CAN become or actually ARE the enhancers of change. In fact, 
this conclusion has some justification in the literature. Identical assumptions can be 
formed based on the models and research of Kotter (1995), whose barriers are the same 
as enhancers of the change process. The authors of case 28 draw a similar conclusion “It 
is interesting to note that while meeting transforming needs, the solutions for those 
needs, more often than not, are significant attributes of the highly successful, flexible 
and adaptive organizations” (p.6). 
In order to verify the conclusion that barriers can often become enhancers in the 
change efforts, I added an additional step to the Type A Analysis. This was 
accomplished by returning back to the 76 cases and documenting for each the bivariate 
combinations of barriers or enhancers and the 24 study variables. The result from this 
analysis was a new table showing the barriers and enhancers in a slightly different 
format. Table 11 provides a portion of that analysis. 
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Table 11: Barriers and Enhancers for each Study Case 
 
Key: blue font variables are reflected on Barriers and Enhancers lists,                            
black font variables are those that are not reflected on Barriers and Enhancers list 
Env: environment                   org: work organization  str: structure  
Polt: politics                           pr: change process  ldr: leader  
Ppl: people                             comm: communication  sft: safety  
Lrn: learning                          cult: culture  comp: computers, software 
Doct: doctrine                        $: money, resources     
In Table 11, one can easily see that barriers and enhancers often have the same 
bivariate relationship with the independent variables in the vast majority of the cases.  
For example in case 7, there were seven variables that occurred simultaneously with 
barriers (environment, work organization, structure, politics, change process, leader, 
and people). For this same case, there were three variables that occurred simultaneously 
with evidence of a change effort enhancer: change process, communication and leader. 
case 
# 
Barriers Enhancers 
7 env, org, str, polt, pr, ldr, ppl pr, ldr, comm. 
8 org, str, ldr, pr, sft, ppl, lrn, comm, cult, comp, doct pr, lrn, str, comm, ldr, ppl, comp 
20 polt, org, env, cult, ppl, ldr ldr, ppl, env, org, lrn, str, doct, polt 
70 doct, str, polt doct, pr, comm, env, str 
68 cult, ppl, org, $ cult, ppl, org, $ 
82 env, pr, org, ldr, ppl, cult, str, doct ldr, pr, env, ppl, $,  lrn, comm. 
87 str, org, pr, $, ppl, cult, doct, env str, lrn, ppl, cult, doct, ldr, comm, org, pr, tm, $ 
61 ppl, cult, pr, env, org, ldr, doct pr, ppl, cult, ldr, polt 
15 str, doct, ldr, comm, ppl, env doct, ppl, $, str, comm, ldr, cult 
94 lrn, $, ldr, env, doct env, doct, pr, ldr, lrn, ppl 
90 Str, org, polt, $, ldr, doct, comm. Str, comm., org, polt, $, doct 
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As is highlighted in the row for case 7, two variables have simultaneous relationships as 
both barriers and enhancers: change process and leader. The above table served as a 
base for a number of numerical comparisons, which are described in the Type C 
Analysis.  
Going back to analyzing the most common factors identified in the study, one 
can notice that barriers to organizational change are largely pre-existing, which  means 
they do not occur during the change, and are not new issues. They were in the 
organization previously and worked well in the “old” environment (except for people 
and their resistance toward change). Since the organization’s operating environment has 
often changed in many aspects (geo-political, financing, technological etc), the previous 
structures, procedures and cultures all of the sudden have lost their effectiveness. What 
is revealed by this analysis of barriers and enhancers is that once the barriers are 
identified and adjustments are made based on the new situation, the barrier is not only 
eliminated, it actually undergoes a transformation process and becomes a change 
enhancer. 
This conclusion should not be surprising since there is a great deal of anecdotal 
evidence of this same transformation in everyday stories about the military and how it 
has changed over time. For example, work organization evolved during the times when 
an enemy was known, identified and in much weaker financial position. The technology 
was heavily biased in favor of the American Armed Forces providing a unique war 
fighting advantage. Seldom was there a need for constant joint mission with other 
military branches, let alone other governmental organizations. The same factors shaped 
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the way of leading, where commanders had the procedures to follow. People also were 
comfortable with known system, environment, and predictability. However once an 
unidentified enemy (“country-less” group of terrorists present in many geographical 
areas) struck using non-military forms of aggression (such as small cell terrorist 
operations), the world was turned upside down. 
The work organization that had been quite successful since the early days of the 
American military experience was no longer responsive in many ways to current 
situation, i.e., one can go fight the war, but what do you do where there is no battle 
place? Throughout these changes in the operating environment, the work structure and 
related standard operating procedures have lost their significance. The new war fighting 
missions required tight cooperation with other branches and outside organizations, but it 
turned out that the leaders cannot come to terms about mutual work and left the people 
working in rapidly set-up multi-systems, responsible to more than one person while 
they were trying to put something together. In such an environment, the war is being 
carried out, and the DOD must undertake change efforts to transform the military.  
Thus, a big challenge is to identify the barriers and find a good solution for 
them. Once it is done, the barrier not only disappears, but also very often accelerates the 
change process and the further organizational functioning. As Entin and Serfaty (1999) 
describe, high-performing organizations demonstrate improved coordination when they 
recognize high degrees of incongruence. And, this is why one should start from 
identifying the problems in the system. That would give enough pointers of what needs 
to be done to change the system and recognizing enhancers of the process. 
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Analyses in this perspective were performed on all 76 cases in order to 
understand why and how the same factor could be a barrier and an enhancer in the same 
situation. The conclusion emerging here suggests that not only identifying the problem 
helps, but also addressing the barrier using many of the variables analyzed in this study 
and responding to the change effort-specific barriers in the best possible way. Thus, the 
new, extended theory would be as follows: the barriers in the process of change CAN 
become or actually ARE the enhancers of change, once identified and properly 
addressed. 
Exploring Leadership  
Since one of the research questions addresses leadership, and it frequently 
occurs in the DOD, I took a closer look at what was behind the leader factor in the 
DOD. The leadership variable emerged in a few ways, summarized below. 
The leader variable occurred in 73% of the 76 cases as a barrier and in 78% of 
the cases as an enhancer. Closer examination of the cases allowed for differentiation of 
different interactive relationships between the leader and another variable. For example 
a leader could have been a barrier due to his leading style, or maybe he had poor 
planning skills, or he was blocking the change progress because there was no unity of 
effort between his unit and another military unit. A summary of the number of times 
that the leader variable was interacting with other independent variables in presented in 
Table 12.  
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Table 12: Interaction between leader and other variables 
LEADER AS A FACTOR Barrier Enhancer 
Type of leading 27 times in 17 cases 25 times in 19 cases 
Authority / Command & Control 20 times in 15 cases 22 times in 19 cases 
Joint effort / unity 20 times in 14 cases 22 times in 18 cases 
Planning 15 times in 10 cases 6 times in 6 cases 
 
As we can see from Table 12, there were fifteen cases where the leader 
experienced a lack of authority or proper command and control and this made the leader 
ineffective, thus leader was coded as a barrier. On the other hand, the type of leader 
contributed to the change process as an enhancer in 19 cases. Lack of joint effort and 
unity between the cooperating leaders emerged as a barrier in 14 cases. In 18 cases, 
leaders were able to overcome their differences, come to terms and push the transition 
forward. Leader’s planning skills surfaced as a barrier in 10 cases and as an enhancer to 
the change in 6 instances. The authority, joint effort and planning are pretty self-
evident, however the type of leading coding is a bit more complex, thus it is examined 
closer next.  
In 16 cases the type of leading style served as an enhancer to the change process, 
the leader was characterized as being a transformational leader. For the cases where the 
leader was a barrier ineffective (13 times, as a barrier) and autocratic style (7 times, 
both as a barrier and enhancer). Other mentioned styles were task (4 times) and people 
(2 times) oriented. Transformational style was set from the beginning in 7 cases and 
turned into such (in process of correcting leading style) in 9 cases. Ineffective leading 
was referred to in cases as emerging due to lack of education, experience, 
organizational skills, being indecisive etc. Ineffective leadership was transformed into 
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other leading styles 9 times, and remained not-altered in 4 cases. When transformed, 
ineffective leading was usually changed into transformational style (7 times), or 
autocratic (2 times). Consequently, transformational leading comes into view as the 
most common one, followed by ineffective (usually replaced with other style) and 
autocratic style.  
In the next step I examined the leadership style in the “full” (where the majority 
barriers were transformed into enhancers) and “mismatched” (where barriers did not 
match the enhancers; see Table 12) cases.  There were 21 full and 7 mismatched cases 
pointing out the leader’s style as a factor in change process. The analysis resulted in 
discovering that none of the mismatched cases where there were more barriers than 
enhancers had transformational leaders. For the seven mismatched cases, there were 
five ineffective and two autocratic leaders. Moreover, in these seven mismatched cases 
there was only one case with a change of leader; the new leader who was autocratic 
replaced an ineffective leader. In the other six instances, the ineffective leader remained 
as such throughout the organizational change proceedings. 
Twenty one full cases (where barriers were the same as enhancers) reflected 11 
transitions of leading styles. All of these cases showed that every ineffective, poor 
leader was replaced with a different one. Not a single ineffective leader was let to 
remain as such. Out of the 11 changes of leading style, nine ineffective leaders were 
replaced with transformational ones, one leader was replaced with someone who was 
task and people oriented, and one replacement for ineffective was with an autocratic 
leader. There were also 10 cases where leading style remained the same throughout the 
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transition; these were seven transformational leaders, two autocratic leaders and one 
people oriented leader.  
Table 13 summarizes the leading styles across all 21 cases that were well 
matched between barriers and enhances. From this table, we can conclude that 16 
transformational leaders, three autocratic, one people oriented, and one people and task 
oriented leader were present. Based on this evidence, it seems that the most effective 
leadership style for a DOD change process would be the transformational leader. This is 
quite similar to what is suggested by the leadership literature in chapter two. It is not 
that surprising since these cases were mostly drawn from the 2000-2005 time period, so 
we might conclude that military leaders are aware of and tend to adopt the best practices 
reported in extant leadership literatures.  
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Table 13: Leadership Style Analysis 
Case 
Case category: 
mismatched or 
full 
Leadership style Change of style? 
106 Full Autocratic - 
105 Full Autocratic - 
82 Full Transformational - 
31 Full Transformational - 
8 Full People oriented - 
13 Full Transformational - 
14 Full Poor                   transformational Yes 
40 Full Ineffective         transformational Yes 
53 Full Ineffective          transformational Yes 
103 Full Ineffective          transformational Yes 
37 Full Autocratic          transformational Yes 
57 Full Ineffective          transformational Yes 
87 Full Transformational - 
61 Full Poor                   people and task oriented Yes 
15 Full Ineffective          transformational Yes 
94 Full Transformational - 
35 Full Ineffective         autocratic Yes 
64 Full Transformational Yes 
52 Full Transformational - 
69 Full Ineffective        transformational Yes 
97 Full Ineffective        transformational Yes 
24 Mismatched Autocratic - 
29 Mismatched Ineffective - 
7 Mismatched Ineffective        autocratic Yes 
62 Mismatched Ineffective - 
85 Mismatched Autocratic - 
78 Mismatched Ineffective - 
45 Mismatched Ineffective - 
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Type B Analysis – The transition between barriers and enhancers 
The next analytical strategy, labeled Type B Analysis involved a re-examination 
of the cases in the study to find out more about the turning point of change processes in 
DOD. The rationale behind this analysis was to explore the transformation of barriers 
into enhancers that the Type A Analysis uncovered. In the previous section, I described 
how I examined the evidence, wherein many of the factors transformed from a barrier 
into an enhancer of the organization’s change efforts. In the Type B Analysis, I 
developed a protocol for auditing the turning point for the overall transitional outcome. 
Success in this endeavor would help me to answer Research Question #4 and would 
shed light on any methods the DOD organization staff uses to manage the occurring 
problems to their advantage. 
Once again, in the Type B Analysis, a case-by-case review was conducted to 
carefully analyze the situation, barriers, and enhancers present. The difference between 
the Type A and the Type B Analysis was that this time I was primarily looking for the 
turning point that set the transformation of a variable from a barrier to an enhancer on 
the right (or wrong) track. When I found this turning point, I carefully documented the 
method used to implement change, searching for the way the organization used the 
barriers so that they became the very enhancers making the change efforts more likely 
to succeed, even though in most cases no evidence of success or failure was offered. 
One of the first sources of evidence that led me to the conclusion about a turning 
point was the realization that the barriers were nearly always described in the cases 
before there was any mention of the enhancers. Closer examination confirmed this 
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observation and provided a logical explanation: the cases were uniformly written to 
describe the sequence of events in chronological order. So, as the organization moved 
through the change efforts, the employees would first experience the barriers and, 
likewise, the author would describe these in the first few pages of the case. Then, there 
was description of the identification of a factor as a barrier along with some type of 
transformative activity that addressed the barrier and offered a new solution which was 
successful to the point that the barrier was turned into an enhancer. 
In line with this observation, the chronological presentation of each case and my 
coding scheme allows for the confirmation of the time ordering; for example, if the 
barrier was successfully converted, then my coding of the factor as an enhancer would 
only occur in the later pages of the case study.  There were also cases where the barrier 
was not explicitly identified, or the transformative activity did not occur and the change 
process was significantly slowed or even halted. In these cases, the factor continued to 
be coded as a barrier throughout the remaining pages of the cases and did not appear 
later as an enhancer. 
In this analysis, it became apparent that this turning point in the change process 
where a barrier was identified as having such a strong effect on the change process that 
it must be addressed before any successful change could be made. The identification 
occurred in different ways. In case 8 we see that there was a barrier in not having 
performance indicators. So the change process could not proceed until the determined 
indicators that would signal to them when a misalignment was occurring. Table 14 
shows other examples or abbreviated versions of the process of identifying barriers and 
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transforming them into enhancers. The key words that led me to identify the barriers - 
(identification-fix) - enhancer method are put in bold font. Also, you will note that the 
flow of evidence starts in the early pages of the document and after the barrier is 
identified, something is done and the change process moves forward along with the 
page numbers. 
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Table 14: Turning Point Analysis 
case Citation, example 
8 
“first to establish that there is a source of risk in the mis-alignment between organization structure and processes 
and the architectural decisions that have been made. Secondly, the purpose was to identify and verify low-cost indicators 
that can be used to identify the occurrences of this misalignment” p.15 
 
“…intended to identify early indicators for misalignment…” p.18 
 
“..we are identifying early indicators. Through both types of examples, we are preparing a catalog of 
misalignments…” p.21 
13 
“…individual Services identify the need for technological and organizational transformations. Leaders across 
the Department of Defense need to personally address the vital components necessary to implement change within 
challenging military environments…” p.13 
 
“…leadership, communication, and cultural change are critical components that senior leaders must address in 
order to effectively direct change “ (abstract) 
16 
“…identify causes, risk factors, and appropriate interventions” p.9 
 
“…identify deficiencies, and apply corrective actions…” p.18 
 
“…to identify potential threats and solve problems…” p.25 
21 
“…identify measures of effectiveness applicable to the restoration of public order in Iraq….” p.6 
 
“…Attackers in Iraq gain access because residents or police fear identifying or reporting patterns of 
disorder…” p.13 
 
“In summary, to control …………. must identify those activities that disrupt the movement of 
daily…activities…” p. 48 
30 
“…shrink the management and focus on the task. General Zinni recognized that the commander needs only a 
few staff sections in order to command and control…” p.14 
 
“…The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) also recognized that the structure below the combatant command 
should be reevaluated. They recommended reviewing the structure and balance of service headquarters.47…” p.16 
106       “…any time you attempt to reorganize, the affected area immediately develops antibodies…” p.25 Challenge: have the people respond to change as a friend, not enemy… 
31 
“…Today’s Joint Staff recognizes the warfighting importance of quickly moving 
successful new technologies and warfighting concepts from experimentation into formal joint doctrine publications that can be 
adopted across the military. As a result the Joint Staff and JFCOM are streamlining the joint doctrine development process to 
reduce publication cycle time from 46 months to 21 months or less.17…” p.6 
28 
“…The clear focus was identifying near term, necessary actions to move the enterprise level, business 
transformational process forward as viewed from senior management and leadership level. The “near term” frame work 
was viewed as actions that could be realistically initiated within the next two years…” p.3 
20 
“…identifying the lack of an overarching strategic framework to guide U.S. national security policymaking and 
resource allocation…” p.3 
 
“…the current national security, interagency apparatus was unable to identify,…” p.8 
14 
              “One has only to visit Iraq briefly to recognize the complicated operations that require joint interoperability skills by 
junior officers in charge of small unit missions. These are skills that they must currently learn “on the job” rather than through 
the schoolhouse leader development process.” p. 7 
10 
“..The process of identifying a specific problem set and using a known and proven set of solutions is a logical and 
a straightforward leap,…” p.27 
 
            “The challenge and key to efficient and effective problem solving, is to correctly identify the problem, through proper 
analysis, critical thinking and reasoning in order to look for other ways to solve similar problems and not to rely on only one 
application to solve all needs.”  p.40 
“…suggested the process of identifying a problem within the Institutional Army and finding the solutions to that 
problem” p.42 
 
         “to identify and eliminate non value-adding activities and streamline other activities” p. 44 
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In case 10, you can see an example of how the barrier of non value-added 
activities was inhibiting the change process and this was turned around when they could 
shed these activities, making the unit more successful. Even though the solution was 
logical, as the author notes only by identifying this specific problem set (on page 40) 
and then custom tailoring solutions based on this identification of the barriers (on page 
42) could there be a straightforward leap in efficiency and they could streamline other 
activities (on page 44). Similar to this example, in Table 15, I display the language of 
the case that suggested that the turning point was directed at only particular factors, first 
appearing as a barrier, then after identification and crafting of a solution set being 
turned into an enhancer: 
Table 15: Turning point examples 
Case Factor as a barrier Factor as an enhancer 
15 subordination of individual interest to general interest is 
the largest obstacle to overcome 
develop an atmosphere focused on collaboration 
and unified purpose 
99 
one of the critical challenges of executing IW is lack of 
assessment / warrior’s ability to assess effectiveness is 
limited 
situation was improved w/aggressive education  / 
were cross-trained 
14 Poor leaders cause domino effect of deteriorating the 
org & processes; toxic leader = toxic organization 
Get rid of toxic leaders; develop & maintain 
quality leaders; repair basic foundation of 
leadership 
28 lack of integrated, cross enterprise knowledge needed 
to support & make rapid, accurate decisions 
Stove-piped data must be horizontally integrated 
& shared. / 6-sigma/cont. improvement process, 
org analysis 
 
Analyzing every case and putting the two sets of examples together, led me to 
conclude that there is a transformative method that was situational that many of the 
military leaders use when charged with transforming their units: they attempt to identify 
the problems, then fix them and then have the benefit of now properly working factor 
helping in changing other issues. This conclusion is in line with the important role of 
leadership we saw above when combined with the need for a specific set of solutions 
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for the identified barrier. In this regard, it supports the literature from chapter two about 
contingency theory and the value of situational leadership. 
During the Type B Analysis, it became more visibly apparent to me that the 
outcome measure of change efforts was commonly missing from the cases. So, I tried to 
be keenly aware of any suggested outcomes and, where they did exist, to make sure that 
they were properly coded. Despite this recursive analytical technique, I was not able to 
significantly increase the number of cases where the outcome measure of change efforts 
was identified. 
Considering why this was the case, I conclude that you have to take into 
consideration that usually no overall outcome could have been described. The reason 
for this conclusion is that the transformation process is still ongoing within the DOD, 
and the cases described are a part of it. From an organizational change perspective, 
many of the change efforts are targeted to deep cultural change (Schein, 1992) and so, 
at the time the case write-up was completed, it would have been far too early for the 
desired outcomes to be documented or even measurable. The DOD transition has been 
going on for years, in much lesser format before 2001, and full and more aggressively 
after September 11, 2001. The change has been taking a long time and may be a never-
ending process. Thus, the authors of the cases had less opportunity of describing the 
transition from the beginning to start, and much more time to describe ongoing 
transformational efforts in units/brigades.  
Such comments still reflect a lot of the overall current change in DOD. Many of 
the concluding comments in the cases in this research suggested that the transition, 
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while not complete, was going much better. In a few cases, the opposite was indicated, 
change efforts were not going well, but they were continuing and no final conclusions 
about the expected success or failure of the change efforts were offered by the author.  
However, some of the described transitions have been completed and serve as 
evidence from which one can draw preliminary conclusions about the transition process 
and how it is critical to the overall success or failure of the change efforts that are 
undertaken. They also contain a few examples of how I found the clues about the 
turning point of the process. 
There are two cases (106, 105) where the outcome of the branch transition was 
visible: the Secretary of State and General identified overall structure of the Air Force 
as too big and in need of consolidation and increase of efficiency. The changes were 
sweeping - from the reorganization of educational and training system through 
decreasing and consolidating units, firing many people, to implementing cradle-to-grave 
system for weapons and machinery. Even though the implementation itself was done in 
very autocratic way leaving highly dissatisfied people, the overall new structure is more 
efficient and as such is an important piece in transforming the overall DOD.  
Another case (c.37) shows a lack of success – the decision-making system in 
Pentagon has become obsolete, way too complex and anything but rational. However, 
due to lack of willingness to admit it, and lack of power for single commander to 
change the entire system it remains the same and there is a huge hold back on progress 
of DOD transformation. 
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Case 31 describes the irony of doctrine trying to catch up with the ongoing 
changes; where the regulations ended up being changed every three days (c.  ). The 
unfortunate process has been going on for twenty years, however, lately the lawmakers 
slowed down and try to give more flexible regulations that would work for a longer 
time instead of micromanaging every step of the way. The success has been achieved, 
although it is only partially achieved since there is less reliance on more detailed 
doctrine and more flexibility for responding to regulations from the changes. 
An important finding emerged from the Type B Analysis. In every case, there 
was a direct relationship between the variables that represented critical barriers and the 
transformation of these variables into enhancers. If this did not occur, then the change 
effort was halted until some other turning point event occurred. In all the cases, no other 
method than this turning point process of identifying and addressing obstacles was 
observed. 
When considering this finding, it is important to note that there are variations in 
how the turning point was represented and reported. Sometimes the obstacles were 
identified only by the author of the case, not the actual personnel being described in the 
document. In other cases, the problems were recognized by people in the organization 
but were either not addressed, or not properly addressed. Occasionally the obstacles 
were completely misdiagnosed or simply “mismatched” where some barriers were 
evident, but the response featured different variables in an attempted solution. In cases 
where this mismatch occurred, the turning point did not occur until a transformation of 
one or more of the variables occurred.  
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The documentation of a turning point in the case where a barrier is transformed 
into an enhancer is an important finding contributed by this research. None of the cases 
analyzed had any suggestion that there was a need for barriers to be transformed, nor 
did any name the process of recognizing and turning around the barriers as a technique 
necessary to continued implementation of the change efforts. It is safe to state that DOD 
does not have an officially established/tried method of transformation. None of the 
cases described a leader or any other person giving instructions to organizational 
members to distinguish the obstacles and twist them into supporting factors. My 
conclusions suggesting a “turning point” or “transforming barriers into enhancers” 
approach to changing organization seems to have been done intuitively within the case 
rather than by deliberate action. It was only through the structure of the Type B 
Analysis that I was able to generalize from the empirical observations and offer the 
inductive conclusions that can enhance theory development and be tested in future 
research. 
Type C Analysis - Quantitative Analysis to Confirm the Findings 
Table 11, presented earlier to illustrate the interactive relationship between 
variables that were barriers and became enhancers, is replicated here and an additional 
column is presented to portray the results of further quantitative analysis. In Table 16 I 
have added a new column on the right to denote full, half and half (h-h), and 
mismatched (m-m) representing the relationship between the number of barriers and the 
number of enhancers.  
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 Table 16: Type C Analysis of Barriers and Enhancers 
 
Key: blue font variables are reflected on Barriers and Enhancers lists,                            
black font variables are those that are not reflected on Barriers and Enhancers list 
Env: environment                   org: work organization  str: structure  
Polt: politics                           pr: change process  ldr: leader  
Ppl: people                             comm: communication  sft: safety  
Lrn: learning                          cult: culture  comp: computers, software 
Doct: doctrine                        $: money, resources   
m-m: mismatched cases h-h: half and half cases full: full cases 
 
 
The discovery of the turning point where barriers were transformed into 
enhancers sparked many more numerical comparisons and forms the basis for the Type 
C Analysis. In this stage of the research, the numerical comparisons were performed in 
order to confirm the possible relations and patterns that emerged inductively from case- 
by-case comparisons. In reading the results of the Type C Analysis, it is essential to 
keep in mind, that this meta-analysis is a secondary analysis of case studies, employing 
case 
# 
Barriers Enhancers 
 
7 env, org, str, polt, pr, ldr, org pr, ldr, comm. m-m 
8 org, str, ldr, pr, sft, ppl, lrn, comm, cult, 
comp,doct pr, lrn, str, comm, ldr, ppl, comp h-h 
20 polt, org, env, cult, ppl, ldr ldr, ppl, env, org, lrn, str, doct, polt Full 
70 doct, str, polt doct, pr, comm, env, str Full 
68 cult, ppl, org, $ cult, ppl, org, $ Full 
82 env, pr, org, ldr, ppl, cult, str, doct ldr, pr, env, ppl, $,  lrn, comm. h-h 
87 str, org, pr, $, ppl, cult, doct, env str, lrn, ppl, cult, doct, ldr, comm, org, pr, tm, $ Full 
61 ppl, cult, pr, env, org, ldr, doct pr, ppl, cult, ldr, polt h-h 
15 str, doct, ldr, comm, ppl, env doct, ppl, $, str, comm, ldr, cult Full 
94 lrn, $, ldr, env, doct env, doct, pr, ldr, lrn, ppl Full 
90 Str, org, polt, $, ldr, doct, comm Str, comm., org, polt, $, doct Full 
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primarily qualitative coding and analytical techniques; hence the results presented here 
do not allow one to state whether or not a finding is statistically significant. Instead, this 
form of meta-analysis allows only suggestive conclusions, often serving as a base for 
future detailed investigation.  
To conduct the quantitative analyses in the Type C analysis, I started by 
systematically comparing the variables that were listed as barriers with those listed as 
enhancers seeking to determine the level of duplication (see Table 6) within a case and 
then comparing this result across all cases. Where there was little duplication of 
variables, I purposefully revisited the case to assure that the coding was accurate. Then, 
I considered the unique facts surrounding the case and the change efforts to see if an 
explanation for the absence of the overlap could be determined. Or, if there were no 
unique circumstances, then I wanted to determine if there was any conclusion that the 
change efforts were not successful or that they had been stalled at the time the case 
report was written. 
Case #7 is an example of a case with little duplication between the barriers and 
the enhancers. In case #7 only the change process and leader variables are transformed 
into enhancers. The problems coming from the environment, structure, work 
organization and people are not taken care of and addressed only by using 
communication as a help but not leading to a turning point towards success. Possible 
explanations for this may be due to inaccurate identification of the obstacles or 
incorrectly chosen enhancers that were unrelated to the problem remedy. We may 
illustrate it as: 
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Different kinds of obstacles that could be represented as A, B, C, D, E, F, or G 
are treated with different strategies that can be represented as E –related strategy, F-
related strategy, and a Z-related strategy. The E and F strategies are matched to the 
problems of E and F (they are now enhancers), but the Z-related strategy does not 
effectively address the remaining obstacles of A, B, C, D and G. 
Cases that exhibited a similar pattern were categorized by the researcher as 
“mismatched,” signaling that a majority of the barriers are not reflected on the 
enhancers list. Overall, in the 76 cases examined, the mismatched (“m-m” code in the 
Table 16) cases made up 10.5% of all cases. 
In several of the cases, (14.5%) approximately one-half of the barriers were also 
reflected on the enhancers list. These cases were categorized as “half & half” (“h-h” 
code) cases and the results may have been due to the organization not recognizing all 
the obstacles, or having an inability to change some of the obstacles into enhancers, or 
addressing only some of the problems. I found this to be the conclusion in cases 8, 82 
and 61. 
The remaining 75% of the cases were categorized as “fully reflecting” (labeled 
full) since a majority of the barriers are the same as enhancers suggesting the correct 
recognition of the obstacles to the change efforts and a turning point where the barriers 
were transformed into enhancers that addressed a vast majority of the obstacles to the 
change efforts. These cases may have had one or two extra barriers that were not 
resolved (as in cases #15 and 90), but they were clearly a vast minority with most of the 
fully reflecting cases achieving nearly perfect duplication of variables.  
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To summarize, 75% of the cases were fully reflecting, where a majority of the 
barriers were transformed into enhancers after some turning point was reached in the 
case. Nearly 15% of the cases were categorized as half-and-half cases since some, but 
not all of the barriers were transformed into enhancers. The remaining 10.5% of cases 
exhibited a mismatch between barriers and enhancers. These numbers support the 
conclusions reported from the Type A and Type B Analyses, suggesting that a practice 
of identifying barriers and finding a way to transform them into enhancers may be an 
important turning point in change efforts and a valuable method for approaching 
organizational change in the DOD organizations. 
Another form of investigation completed during the Type B Analysis was 
deliberate re-coding and testing to detect possible relationships between some of the 
most important independent variables (as measured by the frequency and magnitude of 
the variable during the coding as well as the presence of the variable as a major factor in 
the barrier/enhancer analysis reported above. 
The first bivariate relationship upon which I conducted Type C Analysis was 
between the LEADER and PEOPLE variables. Both of these variables were frequently 
coded in the case studies (as reported in Chapter Five), each variable surfaced as a main 
factor in the relationship between barriers and enhancers, very often seen together in the 
cases. In addition, this was an important relationship to study to answer research 
question #2 since it would isolate the leader’s action and the impact on the change 
efforts that were being undertaken. I started this analysis with the intention of answering 
this question: “Can one assume that once a leader becomes a problem/enhancer people 
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will “automatically” become a barrier/enhancer?” To conduct this analysis, the same 
“main-table format” was used to count how many cases had the variables leader and 
people together as a barrier or as an enhancer. Then I would determine how many cases 
had only one of them listed as a barrier or enhancer and finally would consider when the 
variable was absent.  
Table 17: The Leader and People Variables 
Variables: 
LEADER                                  
% OF CASES 
PEOPLE                                          
% OF CASES 
                        BOTH FACTORS  as a BARRIER 57%  
                      BOTH FACTORS  as a ENHANCER 61%  
                               BOTH FACTORS  absent 7%  
            Variable as a BARRIER 70% 72% 
           Variable as an ENHANCER 73% 72% 
         Variable as BOTH BARRIER and ENHANCER 59% 65% 
          Variable absent 13% 16% 
              Variable as a BARRIER only 15% 9% 
             Variable as an ENHANCER only 15% 11% 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from Table 17? First, 73% of the cases had the 
leader as an enhancer and 72% of the cases had the people variable as an enhancer to 
the change efforts, which makes them both as the most important positively influencing 
change factor. Second, in 70% and 72% of the cases, respectively, the leader and people 
variables were barriers to the change efforts and the transformation was unlikely to 
occur. Both of these factors are highly important barriers in the change efforts (right 
after the change process as reported in Table 6). A third conclusion we can draw from 
the table is that in 59% and 65% of the cases, the leader and the people variable turned 
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from being a barrier to being an enhancement. These results suggest that both of the 
variables have a high potential of being transformed from a barrier into an enhancer 
although it may be slightly easier to transform the people variable than it would be to 
transform the leader variable.  
There were other surprising findings in this table, in particular those findings 
where there was no mention of or differences between the two variables. It is important 
to note that 13% of the cases did not mention leader (16% of the cases did not mention 
people) as either a barrier or an enhancer. In 14% of the cases the leader variable (and in 
12% of the cases people) was an enhancement to the change efforts, even though it was 
not identified as a barrier to the process. Finally, in 14% of the cases leader (in 9% of 
the cases people) remained being a barrier to the process. Which means the leader is a 
bit more likely to become an obstacle than people, and then more difficult to convert to 
an enhancer. 
There were some cases where the evidence suggests that a turning point was not 
reached, despite high levels of concurrence with either the enhancer or the barrier 
variables. In 61% of the cases, people and leader together were an enhancement to the 
process and in 57% of the cases the people and leader variables together were a barrier 
to the change. These data may suggest a possible one-way (either positive or negative) 
relationship between the two factors that would limit the likelihood of a turning point 
and transformation process, although the relationships were not as strong as previously 
assumed. For example, if a leader is pro-change, then the people he leads will more than 
likely be pro-change as well (the leader will expect them to be pro-change, motivate 
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them and check on their pro-change performance), if a leader is anti-change, the 
followers will more than likely exhibit similar anti-change attitudes and behaviors. 
The data in Table 17 allow concluding that the variables for Leader and People 
are both very important factors in the change process, each having equal potential to 
becoming either a barrier or an enhancer to the transition process. Therefore, it is very 
important to lay down an appropriate foundation for the leader and people to cooperate 
during change efforts so they do reach the turning point and become an enhancer early 
in the change efforts. Since in the majority of cases both the leader and the people 
variables turned from being a barrier into being an enhancer to the change process, thus 
hopeful conclusion can be offered. It seems reasonable to suggest that usually leader 
and people are “turn - able” factors, with a lot of potential for transformation from a 
barrier to the enhancer. Finally, in a small percentage of cases people and leader 
remained being a barrier to the process; which is a very good news suggesting that most 
of the time this barrier is overcome with a transformative solution.  
The one overall conclusion that I would offer from this Type C Analysis is that 
when a leader is a barrier/enhancer, the people are likely to follow as a barrier/enhancer 
as well. With 57% as a barrier and 61% as an enhancer respectively, I feel confident 
saying that a majority of the cases support this statement. However, I do acknowledge 
that this “majority” is close to “half” of the cases. Keeping in mind that meta-analysis 
does not allow me to name any relation as significant and does not give an option of 
specifying significance bracket; it is still safe to suggest that future research that was 
strictly to deductively test this association would be worth the effort. 
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Since there were several cases that did not reflect the significance of the leader 
or the people variables, my analysis turned to an exploration of what variables would be 
significant in understanding the relationship of barrier and enhancers. I conducted a 
targeted analysis of three combinations of independent variables: the leader and the 
change process, structure and communication, and culture and communication. The role 
of leader and people has been widely described in the academic literature, and it seems 
to be very similar in the DOD. However, considering that leadership is #1 barrier and # 
3 enhancer and that change process is the #1 enhancer and # 4 barrier, I next attempted 
to see if numerical analysis would deliver additional explanation about tentative 
findings. 
Similarly, an attempt was made to analyze factors that are usually very difficult 
to change: culture and structure as well as their impact on communication, which 
traditionally is shaped by these factors. 
The results from each of these additional analyses are presented next. 
1. LEADER and CHANGE PROCESS Comparison: 
Considering that a leader is the main barrier and process of change is the main 
enhancer, can we identify which factor is more important? An examination identical to 
that described for the leader and people variables was carried out and is reported in 
Table 18. 
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Table 18: The Leader and Change Process Variables 
 
Variables 
CHANGE PROCESS    
% OF CASES 
LEADER                        
% OF CASES 
                   BOTH FACTORS as a Barrier generally 46%  
                 BOTH FACTORS as an Enhancer generally 62%  
Absent 13% 13% 
Variable as a Barrier 63% 73% 
Variable as an Enhancement 78% 70% 
Variable as a Barrier + Enhancement 56% 59% 
Variable as a Barrier only 7 % 14 % 
      Variable as an Enhancement only 24% 14% 
 
In this analysis, I was trying to extract the possible connections between the two 
factors, but it does not reveal too much at this point. Some tentative conclusions that 
provide a basis for future research are as follows: 
• Interestingly, the variables for leader and change process were absent in 
exactly the same number of cases (13%), but these cases are not mutually exclusive, 
they are overlapping.  
• The leader variable is a bit more likely to become a barrier to the 
transition (73%) than the change process variable (63%); however, both have a very 
high potential of becoming one. On the other hand, change process variable is more 
often coded as an enhancer (78%) than is the leader variable (70%). Nevertheless, both 
of them are very important enhancers in the vast majority of cases. 
• The change process was identified as a barrier and converted into an 
enhancer in 57% cases, similar to results for the leader variable (59%). However, the 
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change process remained strictly as a barrier in 7% of the cases, while leader was a 
barrier in twice as many cases (14%). Still both variables had few occurrences, making 
an interesting revelation, implying that both forces have a high potential for being 
converted into an enhancer.  
To summarize the results from this analysis, there is good news. The variables 
for change process and leader together are more likely to be an enhancer to the 
transition (62%), than a barrier (46%); and they do show high potential of teaming up 
together in one direction (in 62% both factors had a positive relationship and in 46% 
both had a negative relationship). Also appealing is the conclusion that the change 
process is more often an enhancer (78%) than a leader is (70%). Even though the 
difference is small, it may suggest that occasionally someone else than the leader 
(people, doctrine or politician) may influence the way transformation is being 
implemented. Overall, the differences and similarities are too small to be able to 
determine which factor is the main force of the transition processes in DOD. 
2. STRUCTURE and COMMUNICATION Comparison: 
Traditionally organizational structure does influence communication channels 
and habits. To confirm the relationship in these cases, I asked the question: were these 
variables surfacing together in the DOD change efforts? 
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Table 19: The Structure and Communication Variables 
Variables     STRUCTURE       
%  OF THE CASES 
COMMUNICATION    
% OF THE CASES 
                 BOTH FACTORS as a Barrier generally 29%  
                BOTH FACTORS as a Enhancer generally 29%  
Variable absent 30% 31% 
Variable as a Barrier generally 54% 42 % 
Variable as an Enhancement generally 45 % 55% 
Variable as a Barrier+ Enhancement 38% 33% 
Variable as a Barrier only 22% 8% 
Variable as an Enhancement only 10% 22% 
 
Looking at this bivariate relationship, we can draw the following tentative 
conclusions:  
• Structure and Communication were not identified as a factor in 30% of 
the cases, which is a big percentage, especially for a public sector, where structure is 
traditionally considered a problem to any progress and the least flexible factor. 
Therefore one can consider it an unexpected and “positive” percentage. Due to its 
nature, structure still did occur as a barrier in 54% of the cases. However, it remained as 
an obstacle in only 22% of cases, which is another surprising number; and was 
converted to an enhancer in 38% cases. Those numbers indicate that structure, at least in 
DOD is more flexible, and more shapeable than commonly thought. 
• Communication on the other hand was an enhancement in 55% of the 
cases, and a barrier in 42%. It is a big consideration. It was turned around into 
enhancement in only 33% of the cases, which is surprising, considering that 
communication should be much more flexible than structure (note: structure was 
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converted into enhancer in more cases 38 %). On the other hand, communication 
remained as a barrier in only 8% of the cases, whereas structure in over 22%. Overall, 
the numbers would suggest that communication has a huge potential of being an 
enhancer (55%), but once it poses problems, it may be a bit difficult to change it over to 
being an advantage (only 33%). 
• The two factors together as a barrier or an enhancer are found in 29% of 
cases, which suggest the relationship between them is weak. This is also astonishing, 
since structure often influences communication channels. 
Communication seems to be free from the influence of structure, at least during 
the change process, and as such, was widely used as an enhancer (55% cases). It is a 
very positive and surprising fact, that a regulated and complex public organization can 
easily adjust communication to its needs. 
3. CULTURE and COMMUNICATION Comparison: 
Organizational cultural traditionally shapes communication patterns and 
channels as well. Were these two factors tied together in the DOD change? 
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Table 20: The Culture and Communication Variables 
Variables 
CULTURE                     
%  OF THE CASES 
COMMUNICATION    
% OF THE CASES 
               BOTH FACTORS as a Barrier generally 24%  
            BOTH FACTORS as a Enhancer generally 21%  
Variable absent 31% 31% 
Variable as a Barrier generally 55% 42% 
Variable as an Enhancement generally 37% 55% 
Variable as a Barrier+ Enhancement 26% 33% 
Variable as a Barrier only 27% 8% 
Variable as an Enhancement only 10% 22% 
 
Looking at this bivariate relationship we can draw the following tentative 
conclusions: 
• Here, we have even more surprising numbers. In over 30% of the cases 
neither variable was identified as factors in the transition. That is unexpected knowing 
that these factors are influential. On the other hand, it could be seen as a very good sign, 
since in over 30% of the cases these important variables did not create a variable to 
change. Another surprise finding was that these factors occurred together as a barrier or 
together as an enhancement in only 20% of the cases; one could expect stronger 
relationship between them since they tend to be closely related, usually communication 
changes due to culture changes and vice versa. 
• Culture was recognized as an enhancement in almost 37% cases, which 
is not too bad considering it is a public sector organization; while communication is an 
enhancement in 55%. One can turn these numbers around and we find culture as a 
barrier in 55% of the cases and communication in 42%. Out of these cases, culture 
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remained as a barrier in over 27%, while communication only in 8%, which suggests its 
good “turn-around” rate. 
• This analysis brings identical conclusion as the previous one: 
communication seems to be free from the influence of culture at least during the change 
process in DOD. In spite of traditionally following the regulations of how to 
communicate, the DOD officers were able to use to their advantage.  
• Flexibility of communication factor in as heavily regulated institution as 
DOD, allows to assume that it should be even easier to shape factor in civilian 
organizations. 
Exploring Barriers that were not turned into Enhancers 
From the results provided above, the phenomenon of barriers that were not 
transformed into enhancers came more sharply into focus. I decided to explore this 
more in-depth by determining the number of barriers that were not transformed for each 
of the cases. From Table 21, you can see that nearly a quarter of the cases had one 
barrier that was not eventually transformed into an enhancer. In fact, more than one-half 
of all the 62 cases with “leftover” or unresolved barriers had only one or two variables 
coded as representing a barrier to the change efforts that did not pass through a turning 
point. However, there were a few cases with many barriers leftover, suggesting that the 
turning point and transformation process would be difficult to achieve. Although it is 
important to note that each of the barriers has the potential to be transformed, so 
perhaps the organization has more options it terms of what action might represent a 
turning point as their change efforts continue.  
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Table 21: Barriers present across the cases analyzed 
CASES WITH  Percentage of all 76 cases 
w/ 1 Barrier Leftover 16 21% 
w/ 2 Barriers Leftover 20 26% 
w/ 3 Barriers Leftover 14 18% 
w / 4 Barriers Leftover 9 12% 
w/ 5 Barriers Leftover 1 1% 
w/ 6 Barriers Leftover 1 1% 
w/7 Barriers Leftover 1 1% 
 
To further explore the results suggested by the analysis reported in Table 21, I 
next inspected the variables that tended to remain as barriers to see what patterns could 
be discerned. Sixty-two cases had at least one barrier not transformed into an enhancer. 
This is probably due to being the most difficult to change or not considered a barrier. 
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Table 22: Extra Barriers by Variable Name 
Variable number of cases the variable was  an 
extra barrier 
ENVIRONMENT 22 
WORK ORGANIZATION 21 
CULTURE 21 
STRUCTURE 16 
DOCTRINE 14 
POLITICS 13 
LEADER 10 
PROCESS OF CHANGE 7 
COMMUNICATION 5 
MONEY / RESOURCES 5 
PEOPLE 3 
PLANNING 1 
LEARNING 1 
AUTHORITY / COMMAND, CONTROL 1 
 
Out of those variables that had an extra barrier/s not turned around into 
enhancer, the environment was the most common one, followed by work organization 
and culture.  The extra barriers remained as such either because they may have been not 
recognized as a barrier, or proved to be too difficult to change.  
Exploring the Extra Enhancers 
There were also 64 cases that had additional enhancers that were never a barrier 
in their situation. These additional enhancers were counted in order to look at their 
interrelationships. Similarly, all the extra enhancers were looked at (64 cases had extra 
enhancers): 
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Table 23: Extra enhancers evident across the cases analyzed 
Enhancer SUM 
LRNLEARNING 23 
PROCESS OF CHANGE 18 
COMMUNICATION 18 
DOCTRINE 15 
ENVIRONMENT 12 
JOINT WORK/UNITY OF EFFORT 12 
LEADER 11 
MONEY / RESOURCES 10 
CULTURE 9 
POLITICS 9 
PEOPLE 8 
STRUCTURE 8 
ORGANIZATION 7 
 
From the above one can see that learning factor was used most commonly as an 
additional enhancer to the change process. The factors that were seldom serving as 
supplemental enhancers are better time management, better work organization, 
structure, and people. I also looked at the cases trying to see how many cases had more 
than one supplemental enhancer: 
Table 24: Extra Enhancers by Variable Name 
Cases with  Percentage of all 76 cases 
1 extra enhancer 20 26% 
 2 extra enhancers 16 21% 
 3 extra enhancers 17 22% 
 4 extra enhancers 7 9% 
 5 extra enhancers 4 5% 
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If the DOD personnel managed to come up with extra enhancers to the process, 
usually only one supportive factor was used to overcome any barriers. The 
interpretation of enhancers is a bit different from that of the barriers: there is nothing 
wrong with having extra enhancers to the transition process, as long as all (or at least 
the vast majority of) the barriers are taken care of. The same thought from the other 
perspective: there is no point of using all kinds of supplemental supportive factors, 
when the obstacles hindering transformation are being ignored. That may suggest that 
leaders/staff trying to apply “out of the box” / innovative methods to their situations. 
Overall one initial conclusion to draw from this data is that it seems to point out 
to the fact that ONCE the barriers endured during change processes in DOD  were 
identified, there were attempts to eliminate them, which very often made them 
enhancers to the transition. However, case authors seldom referred to the overall change 
outcome, because the process has been ongoing and very seldom was it officially 
considered to be completed. The authors concentrated more on the description and 
details of change efforts in DOD, than on the overall outcome.  
While supplemental enhancers suggest the staff/leaders efforts to apply 
innovative methods to help with the process, some of the extra barriers suggest possible 
change outcome for DOD. The most important one seems to be partial transformation: 
only some units are transformed as seen in cases 46, 58, 83, 97 and 102. Whether it is a 
success or failure of change is difficult to estimate now. On one hand, the DOD is 
cautious and does not want to put the entire DOD organization through change, when it 
is not certain how to achieve this change (in case of failure only some units fail). But, 
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on the other hand, when doing it this way the transformation may be exceedingly 
prolonged. In the meantime, this approach may cause some friction if transformed units 
are incompatible with those not yet transformed.   
To summarize the results from the different forms of analysis: 
Type A Analysis – content analysis allowed me pinpoint the factors (barriers 
and enhancers) that play a role in DOD change, initiating a finding of the relationship 
between the barriers and enhancers, 
Type B  Analysis – content analysis led to identifying a turning point of the 
change processes/method of turning the barriers into enhancers and therefore 
conforming relationship between the barriers and enhancers, and  
Type C Analysis – quantitative; was attempted to detect relationships between 
some factors and patterns (extra barriers and enhancers).  
Upon completion of these three types of analysis, it is possible to offer 
preliminary findings related to the research questions. Considering all the factors that 
turned out to play a role in the DOD change processes, one can initially answer research 
question #1 stating that the key factors identified by the literature are very similar to 
those found in my analysis of change efforts in DOD organizations. 
Research question #2 sought to confirm the special role of the organization 
leader in the change efforts. From this analysis, the leader factor turned out to be the 
number one barrier and number three enhancer to change, suggesting that the leader is 
indeed a very influential factor in the DOD transformation. Leaders do play a very 
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similar role in the DOD, just as the leaders play in the civilian world. That initial 
conclusion provides a positive preliminary answer to research question #2. 
Turning to research question #3, even though there were 24 new variables 
identified in the case coding and analysis, such as environment,  joint effort and politics, 
they seem to represent variables already known to scholars and present in theories as 
influencing change processes in the civilian world. With this conclusion, we may also 
initially answer research question #3, stating that there are no variables not previously 
identified in the literature that play a role in DOD change processes. These findings and 
what they mean in terms of the scholarly literature are discussed more in-depth in 
Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this research was to examine change efforts in DOD 
organizations to determine if extant literature had sufficient explanatory power for this 
set of cases reviewed as part of the meta-analysis. Given the unique mission of the 
organization and the episodic stressors it faces when called upon to protect the nation, it 
seems reasonable to increase our understanding of how these organization’s change 
efforts as similar to, as well as different from, other organizations across all sectors. To 
accomplish this purpose, the research was guided by four questions: 
Research Question #1: Are the factors commonly identified in the organization 
change and leadership literature as important in influencing organization change efforts 
equally relevant to DOD organizations?  
Research Question #2: What is the position of the leader factor in DOD change? 
Research Question #3: Are there factors specific to DOD organizations that 
influence organization change efforts that are not identified in studies of “regular” 
public/private companies? 
Research Question #4: What are the causal relationships between factors that 
influence DOD organization change efforts?  
In the final chapter, evidence from the analysis is drawn to answer the research 
questions and to offer conclusions about change efforts in the DOD organizations. It is 
also considered how well these efforts align with extant literature. Then, a preliminary 
causal model is presented to illustrate relationships between the variables that were 
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analyzed and the outcomes of the change efforts. 
The primary contribution of this model is the discussion of the barriers and 
enhancers that interact with the independent variables to transform the change process. 
Where the barriers are successfully transformed, the change efforts gain momentum and 
continue on a trajectory suggesting that success will be achieved. There is also strong 
evidence from this analysis; however, that few outcome measures of success or failure 
are documented. As a result, any conclusions from this analysis must be considered 
tentative until more rigorous deductive testing can occur. 
The chapter closes with a return to the theoretical literature to elaborate the 
contribution of this research. The causal model uncovers new variables that seem to 
play a critical role in the success or failure of an organization’s change efforts. Where 
there is evidence of a lack of alignment with the literature we consider why this may be 
so and make recommendations for how to further develop our knowledge. 
Answers for each Research Question 
Research Question #1: Are the factors commonly identified in the organization 
change and leadership literature as important in influencing organization change efforts 
equally relevant to DOD organizations?  
Extant literature yielded eight variables to originally guide this meta-analysis of 
76 published cases document change efforts in DOD organizations. Of these variables, 
seven were considered to have a causal relationship with the dependent variable (an 
outcome measure of the change effort). Of the original seven independent variables, the 
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reason for the change efforts was not sufficiently documented in the cases studied and 
so it was dropped from further analysis. If I were to speculate on this omission in the 
cases, I would remind the reader that the authors were, to a large extent, high level 
leaders in the DOD organizations. So, a very simple explanation is that they may have 
understood the audience for their work to be other DOD-involved persons and that 
explaining the change efforts would provide redundant information to other 
organizational insiders. 
An alternate explanation for this oversight may that that their unique high-level 
organizational position suggests that they think they are the ones responsible for the 
change efforts and, since it was their idea, there would be no other reasons for change to 
document. 
A third explanation may lie in the very dynamic operations environment the 
military has experienced since the time of the cases (early 2000s) where the operations 
tempo has been high and the organization is evolving to feature more collaborative 
efforts to stretch strained resources. In addition, this is a period of evolution for the 
DOD as a whole with changes in the heuristic of how the military accomplishes their 
mission due to small scale, isolated, military engagements with “non-traditional 
combatants that rely more on technology and light weaponry and highly mobile 
responsiveness than the traditional on the ground geographic space control model of the 
“world war” scale military. While we are unable to draw any conclusions about the 
veracity of these alternative explanations, the fact remains that the reason for change 
was not sufficiently documented and coded in these cases to make the variable 
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sufficient for analysis. 
Turning to the remaining six independent variables, the variables for leader and 
people were the most prominent of those deductively tested and were also the most 
frequent when considering the entire set of independent variables (n=24) including 
those that were inductively identified. The leader and people variables had nearly an 
even number of mentions as barriers and as enhancers to organization change efforts. 
Communication, structure and culture were variables that had a moderate number of 
mentions in the 76 cases studied. Communication tended to be more of an enhancer 
than it was a barrier; while structure and culture were more frequently coded as barriers. 
The last variable, planning, had few mentions across the cases, but the majority of these 
were as enhancers to the change process.  
The outcome measure of the change efforts can be perceived as only 
representing a partial transformation. Only five cases (46, 58, 83, 97, 102) mention the 
change outcome from the perspective of entire DOD sector. These cases point to it as a 
barrier to the ongoing sub-changes, since some units operate in the old-system and some 
in the new one, becoming incompatible. One may speculate that the DOD probably did 
not want to change all the branches and their units at the same time, due to fear of 
failure, and proceeded with only some of them being changed. The decision of which 
brigade/unit would be changed was seldom explained by the case authors. From this, it 
seems that ultimately DOD is still in the process of changing and considering the past 
progress of transition, it will be there for quite many years. From this point of view, it is 
difficult to assess the overall change outcome.  
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So, to answer Research Question #1, of the seven independent variables most 
often cited in the literature as being important to organizational change efforts, the 
deductive testing shows that leader and people as certainly important in military settings 
and their presence can detract from or contribute to change efforts with nearly equal 
frequency. Attending to the communications inside the military organization is 
important as well and it can often contribute to change effort success. The culture and 
structure of the organization seem to be important areas to pay particular attention in 
military as well as other organizations. The only area where there seems to be a 
difference between our current understanding of change efforts inside organizations is 
in the reason for why the change occurs; however, since this was not documented, there 
is no reason to conclude that the deductively tested variables are not equally applicable 
to military settings. Future research may confirm this conclusion. 
Research Question #2: What is the position of the leader factor in DOD change? 
The military is an organization that has historically placed strong emphasis on 
the selection and training of its members to make them strong leaders within and 
outside of the organization. This is suggested by mottos used in military recruitment 
materials such as join the Army to “Be all that you can be” and in the Marines slogan 
“Leader, Champion, Marine.” Certainly existing literature exalts the importance of the 
leader in change efforts, but it often suggests that transformative leaders in 
organizations with more organic processes and flattened structures can be keystone 
factors. The military has a history of preference for mechanistic processes and 
command and control hierarchical structures. Would this mean their role in change 
148 
efforts was different from other organizations? That is the puzzle that prompted 
Research Question #2. 
To answer this question, the dual occurrence of the leader with the other 
independent variables was studied. This analysis concluded that the leader is the biggest 
barrier (73%) in DOD change processes and the third enhancer (70%) to it. That 
suggests that this variable has enormous influence on DOD processes. In spite of many 
operations and processes being heavily regulated, DOD leaders still have to and often 
do exercise their power over the units’ performance. The same proves to be the case 
during transformation efforts. In particular, the relationship between the leader and the 
people in the organization was critical: both factors together present in over 93% of the 
cases, more or less consciously teaming up very often in the same direction: either 
positive or negative in regards to change. And, as was determined in Chapter Six, the 
leader and people combination was both a barrier and an enhancer in 59 of 76 cases and 
was absent from only seven cases overall (less than 10%). 
Micro level analysis of the leader and change process also underscored how the 
leader could be the lynchpin in change efforts with 56 of 76 cases showing a cross-
occurrence of these two variables and no mentions in only 12 of 76 cases. Further, 
where the cross-occurrences appear, it is more likely that they will be the turning point 
in the change efforts transforming barriers into enhancers that improve the likelihood of 
success. 
Is this evidence enough to conclude that leaders in DOD organizations play a 
key role in change efforts? Surely, one may agree that there must be an affirmative 
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response to this question. The more important question, “is the leaders’ role in change 
efforts that are different in DOD organizations, cannot be answered from this research 
since the counterfactual is not equivalently documented in other scholarly works. This 
represents an area for future exploration. 
Research Question #3: Are there factors specific to DOD organizations that 
influence organization change efforts not identified in studies of public organizations 
and private sector companies?  
The availability of a large repository of scholarly and professional studies 
provided a unique opportunity to perform a meta-analysis on these works to assess the 
degree to which change efforts in the military are similar to or different from those 
more commonly written about in the private and public sectors. Not only could we 
compare by sector, but there was also the opportunity to examine an organization that 
has operated in a very tumultuous environment where the historical mission of the 
organization was being questioned or challenged as the nature of domestic and 
international security efforts changed. 
To answer this research question, the analysis was started by deductively coding 
eight variables and inductively identifying and coding an additional 16 variables. At the 
conclusion of the first round of coding, there was insufficient magnitude of influence 
for eight variables and they were dropped from further analysis. Then, a pool of nine 
variables inductively derived remained and could potentially be unique to the DOD 
change efforts. Of these, three had a relatively high frequency within the dataset 
[change process, work organization, and doctrine]; two had a moderate frequency 
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[environments and joint work/unity of effort]; the remaining four appeared in low 
frequency [authority/command and control, money/resources, learning and politics]. 
The surprising finding that emerged from this list of variables that change process, 
doctrine, joint work and learning were important enhancers with the first three 
appearing among the most frequently as enhancer of all 16 variables analyzed within 
the entire dataset. The inductively derived variables of environment and politics were 
often barriers, but they were not among the top four of all 16 studied and had relatively 
low frequencies within the data. 
So, clearly a majority of these variables was important, but were they unique to 
the DOD setting? Few would argue that the environment, politics and money/resources 
are of more concern to the military than to other public organizations and many scholars 
have characterized these concerns as issues that make public organizations different 
from private organizations. In a similar vein, one would be hard pressed to argue that 
work organization, change process and learning are sector unique given the great 
amount of attention they receive in the vast bodies of literature on organizational 
change, organizational development and leadership. Certainly military doctrine has few 
equivalent applications across the sectors. However, within the cases there was a 
prevailing sense that leaders and people have often struggled due to the regulations, and 
it took much longer for them to obtain an authorization, find a way around the policies, 
or even change the law to carry out what needed to be done. Keeping in mind the 
military “order-done, no matter how odd” mentality hardly ever was reflected in the 
transformation process. The “do” part – “transform” was ordered, but there were no 
specific orders for how to carry the order out. That left the leaders with quite a lot of 
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freedom and their own initiative. Under the pressure of carry out the orders and not too 
many known transition methods aligned with regulations, majority of the officers turned 
to correcting what was the problem. So, they did carry the order out, but along the way 
they managed to put enough pressure to change a lot of policies in order to be able to 
transform. The military doctrine usually is top-down, but this time it changed a lot due 
to the pressure from the lower echelons, which is quite unique for the military. Not 
many organizations, especially in private sector experience such an influence and 
struggle with doctrine. We have to keep in mind however, that national  defense is 
much better off being regulated and controlled than left to the free will, perception and 
spontaneity of the leaders. 
Another variable that you would expect to be military specific, or unique within 
this meta-analysis was the joint-work/ unity of effort variable given the strong emphasis 
is has received in terms of forcing cooperative activities between the military branches. 
The variable for joint-work/unity of effort represents a new operational philosophy for 
the branches of the military, so it was an important factor that few other organizations 
would have experienced in the same perspective as was traditional in the silos of the 
military branches did. It was a challenge considering the traditional rivalry between the 
branches, which now had to come together and on top of learning to cooperate with 
each other. Many private organizations also struggle with the lack of unity of effort, but 
in different perspective (mergers and hostile takeovers). Finally, few would challenge 
the nearly universal expectation of adherence to the authority/command and control 
structure of DOD organizations, making a conclusion that this is a unique variable, 
although still one that was well managed and overcome by the DOD staff. 
152 
Reviewing the inductively identified variables, the frequency for which they 
appear in the cases and the role they play as barriers or enhancers in the transformation 
process, we have to draw a negative conclusion on Research Question #3. Certainly, the 
variables of doctrine, joint work and authority/command and control structures (or their 
private/public sector equivalents) have been discussed among organizational change 
and leadership scholars. Although not one unusual/new factor was identified in DOD 
change efforts, the importance of these factors as enhancers that can increase the 
likelihood of change success appears to have been understated. 
Therefore, “constraints may be tougher” (in public sector organizations and in 
the DOD specifically) “but they are not that tough” (Golembiewski, 1985 as cited in 
Rainey, 2009, p.404). The point is what seems to be at the very core of the DOD, such 
as the perception that members must blindly follow orders and strictly obey regulations, 
were brought up as issues and changed according to the need. Such is a huge success of 
military officers, laying a much better foundation for easier transformation in the years 
to come. 
Research Question #4: What are the causal relationships between factors that 
influence DOD organization change efforts? 
The research results provide the most definitive answer to this research question. 
This is gratifying since they also offer the highest probability of furthering our 
theoretical understandings of causal relationships in change efforts, irrespective of the 
sector of the organization. From the research, we can conclude that the most important 
variables influencing organizational change in the DOD are: 
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1. Leadership / people / work organization / process of carrying out change 
- as barriers. 
2. Process of carrying out change / people / leadership / doctrine - as 
enhancers. 
Further, the identification of a simultaneous effect of the appearance of barriers 
and/or enhancers with other independent variables is not documented in the literature. 
This is an important gap since when an organization encounters a barrier the change 
efforts will be stalled, unless the organization reaches a turning point where the barrier 
is transformed into an enhancer. The cases suggest that there is a method of managing 
organizational change in the DOD that we are not aware of based on published 
scholarly works. Of course, it is possible that the DOD method of turning change 
barriers into change enhancers may be described as a method that many use, but when 
doing so they are not aware of nor document their logical proceeding. Or, perhaps, this 
turning point is otherwise categorized as a technique to handle transition. 
Assuming that this turning point in the DOD change efforts is, in reality, a key 
transformative element influencing its progress toward change success, we find that the 
turning point is often achieved through the correct diagnosis and treatment of identified 
problems. If the organization does not recognize a barrier to the change efforts that has 
arisen and then purposefully craft a strategy that leverages an existing enhancer then the 
change efforts are stalled in most of the cases studied. 
From this research, I have identified important interactive relationships that exist 
between several deductively and inductively identified factors. The cross-occurrence of 
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these variables seems to influence the DOD transformational processes in a majority of 
the cases studied. The most common cross-occurrence is between leader and people, 
where I find that the variables for leader and people seem to follow each other in either 
a positive (enhancer) or a negative (barrier) direction. That is to say that both of the 
factors have equal potential to becoming either a barrier or an enhancer to the transition 
process; therefore it is very important to lay down an appropriate foundation for leader 
and people so they are enhancers to the transformation from the very beginning.  
On the other hand, considering the weak link between communication (an extra 
enhancer) and the structure/culture factors (most often in the form of leftover barriers) 
in the DOD turning-point transformation process, one can argue that communication is 
the most flexible factors of all three and apparently can be easily adjusted on as needed 
basis. When an organization is forming, the structure and culture as set by the original 
leaders and gradually evolve as members enter and leave the organization based on the 
strength of the acculturation and cultural norming process. If they are sufficiently 
strong, one can expect these two factors to heavily influence communication patterns. 
However, during a change process the influence of these two factors may diminish to 
the point that they can be overcome when communication enhances the need for and 
anticipated benefits of change efforts. 
In addition, other variables that were strong barriers such as the environment 
and politics affected the organizations in this study can cause a great deal of discord and 
disharmony between organization and its environment and other stakeholders. 
Identifying the elements of dissonance (which may be factors of organizational change), 
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one can reshape them, so they help align the organization with the new situational 
imperatives. 
One recommendation that arises from this conclusion is that it is important for 
organizations to identify barriers then develop strategies to transform the organization’s 
change efforts and increase the likelihood of measurable success. Taking into 
consideration the inductive path in this research, we can replicate it as follows: 
Figure 2: Understanding the transformation process 
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The transformational process can be represented as shown in Figure 3: 
Figure 3: The Turning Point in Transformation 
BARRIERS ARE ENHANCERS  
                USE BARRIERS AS ENHANCERS 
                                
THE BARRIERS IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE ARE THE ENHANCERS OF 
CHANGE, ONCE IDENTIFIED AND PROPERLY ADDRESSED. 
 
USE X- RELATED STRATEGY FOR X-GOAL,                                              
INSTEAD OF P, R-RELATED TACTICS 
 
               TREAT X, Y WITH X, Y REMEDIES, Z MAY NOT HELP 
 
Subsequently, the above illustration can be condensed into a (positive version of 
a vicious) cycle: “A condition in which a disorder or disease gives rise to another that 
subsequently affects the first” (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English 
Language, 2009). 
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Thus, there may be some changes in the environment which do become a 
problem for an organization and force a change upon it from outside the organization. 
Recognizing that there needs to be something done about it, a company decides to 
initiate efforts to transform itself to be better aligned with the environment and not lose 
its functionality.  
Some ideas of transformation will ignore the problems (i.e., complex structure, 
inefficient work organization), which may be unintentional. Many others will try 
innovative methods that promise great results, but these great results can probably be 
achieved only when a company is rather problems free. Many will try to follow some 
methods with strictly pointed out factors to use, that may not be useful in a particular 
situation (renovating culture and communication channels without changing structure 
and work organization). Following these the problems will became barriers blocking 
whatever change efforts were undertaken, further pushing the company into even wider 
misalignment with the environment, as the time passes. This will become a vicious 
negative  cycle. Other organizations for various reasons will turn to more basic 
thinking, the bare minimum of “let us see what is not working here and try to correct 
it”. Was that thought of as the main way of transferring organization? It was probably 
considered more as preparing a good start for the transformation. Either way, the 
problems causing the disconnection with the environment get to be identified (the 
vertical structure of the organization costs way too much money, effort and delay in 
operating, resulting in losing to the faster, more flexible competitors; work organization 
is not efficient) and a suitable solution is applied (flattening the structure; which will 
free a lot of money and allow for flexibility and short idea-end product cycle). 
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Following, the organization is gaining its place in the environment back and sort of “all 
of the sudden” the very issues that were the barriers are now the enhancers to the 
transformation (flattening the structure will make reforming work organization much, 
much easier) and effective performance. 
Figure 4: Picture of the Vicious Cycle 
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Literature related to the conclusions of this study 
The overall conclusion of this research is: 
“Barriers can be successfully used as enhancers in the process of change” 
and is being assumed as a method of managing transformation processes. 
There are published studies/articles that seem to confirm the results of this study, 
especially as they relate to the importance of the original eight variables on 
organizational change efforts. In addition, the importance of the leader in change efforts 
can be generalized with greater confidence.  On one hand the inductive variables 
suggest that the original research assumptions of the presence of factors unique to DOD 
organizations is accurate, but there are also sufficient reasons to invalidate speculation 
that DOD has some undisclosed factors / techniques that we could identify and learn 
from (which was the underlying goal of this project). 
Very similar patterns of change were found in Greiner’s 1967 study of 18 
organizational change attempts (as cited in Rainey, 2009, p.407). Greiner describes 
“diagnosis and recognition” as a part of transformational process. Interesting thing 
however, is that in his study it was always “a new person (that enters as a change 
agent)”; “the newcomer uses his or her objective, external perspective to encourage 
examination of old views and rationalizations and attention to “real” problems”. Then 
the “top management becomes heavily involved…,” suggesting that the (external) 
consultants were open enough to see the real problems and the top management alone 
had been going in some other direction. 
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Either way this similar finding was described in late 1960s. Rainey (2009, 
p.407) states that “about thirty years later Kotter (1995)…” cited Greiner’s article while 
working on his own research regarding transformation. Kotter’s (1996) findings may be 
considered parallel with this study’s conclusion about barriers and enhancers.  
Kotter identified eight most common errors in the change processes, and they 
are: Some of the most common errors when transforming an organization are: (1) 
Allowing too much complacency, (2) Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding 
coalition, (3) Underestimating the power of vision, (4) Under communicating the vision 
by a factor of 10x-100x, (5) Permitting obstacles to block the new vision, (6) Failing to 
create short-term wins, (7) Declaring victory too soon, (8) Neglecting to anchor changes 
firmly in the corporate culture . 
In 1996, Kotter introduced his “Eight step guide to successful change”: (1) 
Establishing a sense of Urgency, (2) Creating a guiding coalition, (3) Developing a 
vision and strategy, (4) Communicating the changed vision, (5) Empowering broad-base 
action, (6) Generating short-term wins, (7) Consolidating gains and producing more 
change, (8) Anchoring new approaches in culture. It is interesting to note how the errors 
and successful steps closely mirror each other. 
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Table 25: Kotter’s Common Errors and Steps to Successful Change 
Eight most common errors Eight step guide to successful  change 
under communicating establishing sense of urgency 
Failing to create a sufficiently 
powerful guiding coalition forming a powerful guiding coalition 
Underestimating the power of vision creating a vision 
Under communicating the vision by a 
factor of 10x-100x communicating the vision 
Permitting obstacles to block the new 
vision empowering others to act on the vision 
Failing to create short-term wins planning for & creating short term wins 
Declaring victory too soon / too much 
complacency 
consolidating improvements & creating more 
change 
Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in 
the corporate culture institutionalizing change approaches 
 
However, while he suggested that they were flip sides of the same coin, this 
research suggests that they have an interactive effect that influences change efforts 
when a turning point is reached, but stalls change efforts when no transformation 
occurs. 
Similar comparisons can be made between the results of this study and 
conclusions drawn by Entin and Serfaty comments (1999) about adaptive team 
coordination when they conclude that high-performing organizations demonstrate 
improved coordination when they recognize high degrees of incongruence. It is a task to 
identify the barriers and find a good solution for them. However once this is done, the 
barrier is not only neutralized, but very often accelerates the change process towards 
improved functioning. And this is why one should start from identifying the problems in 
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the system. That would give enough pointers about what diminishes efficiency and 
subsequently needs to be reorganized. 
Authors of one the examined cases also came to similar conclusion (Ladd et al, 
2006): “It is interesting to note that while meeting transforming needs, the solutions for 
those needs, more often than not, are significant attributes of the highly successful, 
flexible and adaptive organizations” (c.28, p.6). A panel of Army officers undertook the 
issue of acquiring, educating and developing military personnel. Responsibility for this 
multi-phase and prolonged process was highly fragmented. Overall, the staff that was 
already acquired and trained still lacked the “integrated, cross enterprise knowledge 
needed to support operations and make rapid, accurate decisions” (c. 28). 
There were plans to change the organizational structure, but they did not 
consider possible transformational realignments, consolidations. With stove-piped data 
and unsynchronized makeover of processing centers the overall, transition was getting 
nowhere. The course of change was accompanied with developing of new software 
which further caused instability forcing schedule slippages, delays, adjustments, change 
of change implementation and obvious lack of evaluation. 
While developing antidotes for identified problems, they came to a conclusion 
that the solutions (horizontal integration of data, reviewing and adjusting education, 
consolidating contracts for new software, 6-sigma improvement process etc) not only 
would eliminate the barriers, but would result in forming a “successful, flexible and 
adaptive” system, thus bringing much more than just removing the problems. 
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Beer, Einstat & Spector (1990) seem to make a similar statement when they 
explain that the focus of change depends on what needs to be changed. The authors 
concluded that in order to implement change, one needs to know what to change. Thus, 
the perception of what needs to be changed is crucial for transitional success. The 
inaccuracy of the subject of change more often than not is a major obstacle to the whole 
process of transition. For example, if a company needs to reorganize its work processes, 
but instead thinks that changing cost structure will help, then the existing problem will 
not get solved. 
Similarly Kerr’s (1975) article can be applied here. The essay mainly addresses 
rewarding systems, and ironical misalignment between organizational goals and offered 
incentives. The finding of “rewarding A while hoping for B” can be surprisingly widely 
applied, from reorganizing the incentive system to realigning work arrangements and 
organizational structure with the company’s goals (p. 7). The subject matter is to use X-
related strategies for X goals, instead of wasting the effort on M, N, O and P – related 
approaches.  That translates easily into “treat X, Y with X, Y remedies, Z may not be 
useful here”. 
Since many times throughout this research I found medical terminology to be 
helpful in understanding the “use barriers as enhancers” oddity, I could not resist 
exploring a bit more the analogical link between DOD and medical ways of work. 
Hence, “barriers are the same as enhancers” discovery led to “use barriers as enhancers” 
presumption later extended to “the barriers in the process of change CAN become or 
actually ARE the enhancers of change, once identified and properly addressed”. This 
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statement then was translated into “use X- related strategy for X-goal, instead of M, N, 
O, P tactics” or, as a matter of preference “ treat X, Y with X, Y remedies, Z may not 
help”. 
Henceforward, a troubled patient (ineffective organization) comes to a doctor 
(management) not being able to function well. Neither she, nor the doctor, are sure of 
what the reason for the illness is. The doctor proceeds to analyze the symptoms and 
identify their causes (organizational obstacles). Once this is complete, we have a 
diagnosis and the treatment (change strategy) follows. Soon enough, the illness gives in 
to the treatment and/or medication and the patient regains the strength and ability to 
function again. 
There a few versions of the situation: 
A – an illness may not produce symptoms until developed into advanced, 
sometimes too late to reverse stages; 
B – a patient comes with a problem X (hearing loss), but is unaware of  having 
problem Y (cancer)  
C – an unconscious patient being brought to a hospital does not describe the 
symptoms. The doctors have to guesstimate. 
The situations A and C have a high potential for misdiagnosis with disastrous 
consequences. The doctors’ ability to trace the symptom back to its cause, the 
knowledge and effective use of available tools (tests, x-rays, EKG’s etc) is naturally 
directly linked to the patients’ wellbeing. Either the illness is correctly diagnosed, 
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treated, and the patient goes home being able to fulfill her roles (parent, worker, friend, 
volunteer etc) or is misdiagnosed and given a painkiller for the lung problems (Z-
strategy for Y barrier), the patient progressively gets worse (unaccomplished objectives, 
mission), loses the ability to take care of herself, and ultimately dies (overall failure, 
bankruptcy, termination). If the misdiagnosed sickness is not as serious, the patient may 
eventually fight it off on her own or spend the rest of his life dealing with the more or 
less irritating problem. 
Situation B (unawareness of the problem) may be disastrous as well. Due to lack 
of symptoms the illness develops to a point when it requires either a major treatment or 
causes death. Again, depending on the nature of undetected issue, the results may vary. 
If the patient goes home with ear tubes but undiagnosed cancer, her well-being is 
seriously endangered. If she goes home having treated cancer, but does not pick up 
quick enough that she’s losing hearing, she may end up taking second mortgage to 
finance advanced hearing apparatus or rely on reading and writing to communicate. 
Neither situation is good, although the second patient can still perform her functions to 
some extent. Naturally, if the unnoticed illness is more like flu, the organism will most 
likely fight it off on its own. 
Bottom line, the traditional and logical medical ways to keep us alive 
(prevention, periodic evaluations, correct diagnosis and treatment) do not seem so 
natural in managing business entities. Competition in the twenty-first century forced us 
to search for pro-active and innovative methods to keep our organizations ahead of the 
game. Those methods may certainly work magic but I assume only for generally healthy 
166 
companies. Organizational change turns out to belong to a different category. It has 
many characteristics of treatment, simple “if it’s broken – fix it” approach, but 
surprisingly it has may result not only in bringing the organization back to health, but 
puts it on track of becoming a “successful, flexible and adaptive” company. 
Based on results of this meta-analysis study and other researchers’ observations 
the  “using barriers as enhancers” or “diagnostic” approach to handling organizational 
change seems to be viable in real life and may prove to be worthy of being labeled as 
one of the “methods / techniques” in academic literature. 
Did this research serve its purpose? 
This study attempted to find factors that play a role in managing transition 
processes in the DOD organizations. Considering difficult by nature defense work 
settings, it was assumed that the staff has worked out their own methods to effect 
change. Identifying them was supposed to benefit the rest of us in the civilian world 
offering yet another way to handle organizational transformation, especially if it already 
works for DOD organizations. The study was supposed to benefit DOD personnel as 
well, and add to the limited strategies custom-tailored for them. 
Considering the above, I think it is fair to state the study served its purpose. One 
could argue that it did reveal unique items to DOD organizations, even if it did not 
reveal completely unknown variables, or a secret procedure. The research also 
uncovered an unofficial, intuitive approach many of DOD personnel used in order to 
ensure successful reform. This is seen in the barrier and enhancer turning 
point/transformation cycle. The concept may not be new, but it certainly appears to 
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have been long forgotten in civilian world. Strangely enough it was emerging as 
something very odd.  Bringing the name to it, discovering its trickery paid off in 
understanding its logic and high potential to produce better than expected results. The 
best feature of this method is that no matter what aspects of change emerge in your 
situation, this technique can be always applied and should work. Knowing about such 
“factor-transformation” methods proves to be very valuable when applying factors 
dictated by other routines does not bring expected outcomes.  A more specific, true 
experiment or observation study should reveal if the finding of this study is useful, as 
assumed when managing organizational change. 
Future research 
Future research could certainly explore the findings from this study, in order to 
examine their consistency and efficacy in practice. Most importantly, we need to 
determine if there are ever any measurable outcomes from change efforts and why they 
do not get reported on a more regular basis. Is it just the time frame for publishing the 
results is too short to measure change, or do we really have nothing to report! Then, we 
need to expand our knowledge of the “barriers as enhancers” transformation method as 
an effective technique for managing change processes whether in civilian or military 
settings. More specific, deductive research could considerably strengthen (or disprove) 
this theory. Next, we need to systematically examine the factors that tend to remain as 
barriers in order to find a method of at least neutralizing their negative influence. 
Expanding our understanding of this can help organizations to deliberately 
develop strategies to avoid the occurrence of barriers that stall change efforts. Another 
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stream in future research should examine situations where the process of change, leader, 
people and doctrine, as the most common factor present in these cases, are absent. Was 
the process of change handled differently? Were the results different? If so, then how 
was it handled and how does this modify the logical model proposed on the basis of 
these research results? How come the leader appeared so neutral to the process? And 
finally, we need a closer examination of relationships between the variables in 
transformation processes (one way relation between leader and people; relative 
independence of communication from other factors, etc). This could bring valuable 
insight to this so ubiquitous process. 
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